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Human memory is a system that is inherently fallible and prone to distortion, and our 
memory for future actions is no exception. Prospective memory is defined either as 
remembering to carry out a task at a particular moment in the future or as the timely 
execution of a previously formed intention. For a variety of reasons, one may miss this 
prearranged moment and thus fail to fulfill an intention. This thesis focuses on the 
factors that may affect the fulfilment of a delayed intention and contribute to 
prospective memory failures.  
As the rather scant literature on the effect of stress on prospective memory functioning 
has produced contradictory findings, Part One of this Thesis investigates the role of 
stress in prospective memory failures in a strict sense, namely forgetting to carry out 
intended actions at the appointed time and place. One study involving healthy 
participants examines the disruptive effect of daily stress on prospective memory 
functioning and explores the moderating role of individual factors in modulating the 
harmful consequences associated with stress in everyday life. Another study carried 
out with healthcare workers investigates how work stress and burnout may contribute 
to forgetting clinical tasks, which may result in potential adverse events jeopardizing 
patient safety.  
Besides stress, misremembering future intentions may also arise from the lingering 
effect of misinformation on our memory, attitudes, and behaviors. Part Two of this 
Thesis, encompassing 6 experiments on healthy participants, shows how inaccurate 
and invalid information survive despite sophisticated correction attempts, influencing 
memory and reported future intentions.  
Overall, the results of the studies presented in this Thesis prove the fallibility of our 
memory for future actions. Various techniques to reduce the risks associated with 








La memoria umana è un sistema intrinsecamente imperfetto ed incline ad errori, e la 
memoria per le azioni da svolgere nel futuro non fa eccezione. La memoria prospettica 
è definita come il ricordare di portare a termine un compito in un particolare momento 
nel futuro o l’esecuzione puntuale di un’intenzione formulata precedentemente. Per 
diversi motivi, una persona può dimenticare questo momento prestabilito e quindi non 
ricordarsi di portare a termine un’intenzione. Questa Tesi si concentra sui fattori che 
possono influenzare l’esecuzione di un’intenzione futura e contribuire ad errori di 
memoria prospettica. 
Poiché i pochi lavori esistenti in letteratura riguardo l’effetto dello stress sulla memoria 
prospettica hanno riportato risultati contradditori, la Prima Parte di questa Tesi indaga 
il ruolo dello stress negli errori di memoria prospettica intesi in senso stretto, ovvero 
come il dimenticarsi di eseguire azioni prestabilite al tempo e nel luogo opportuni. Uno 
studio che coinvolge partecipanti sani esamina l’effetto negativo dello stress 
quotidiano sul funzionamento della memoria prospettica ed esplora il ruolo di 
moderazione di alcuni fattori individuali nel modulare le conseguenze negative 
associate allo stress nella vita quotidiana. Un altro studio condotto sugli operatori 
sanitari indaga come lo stress lavorativo e il burnout possono contribuire a dimenticare 
compiti lavorativi, cosa che può produrre possibili eventi avversi che mettono in 
pericolo la salute del paziente.  
Oltre allo stress, ricordare in maniera non corretta intenzioni future può derivare 
dall’effetto persistente della disinformazione sulla nostra memoria, sui nostri 
atteggiamenti e comportamenti. La Seconda Parte di questa Tesi, che contiene 6 
esperimenti condotti su partecipanti sani, mostra come la credenza in informazioni 
errate ed invalidate possa persistere nonostante tentativi sofisticati di correzione di 
queste informazioni, influenzando la nostra memoria e le future intenzioni.  
Complessivamente, i risultati degli studi presentati in questa Tesi dimostrano la 
fallacia della nostra memoria per le azioni da svolgere nel futuro. Vengono discusse 






Consider when you forgot to do something you clearly “told yourself” you needed to 
remember at a particular time, such as going to a doctor’s appointment, or on a 
particular occasion, such as congratulating a friend soon after his PhD viva. Or when 
you thought you would recall the details of a situation, an event or a conversation 
perfectly well, and then found out you remembered them differently from the way they 
really were. In these cases, your brain was tricking you. Decades of work in 
psychology have shown that our memory regularly fails us; we have to expect our 
memory to be extremely prone to errors and be aware that our faulty memory system 
may even lead to potentially disastrous consequences.  
This Thesis looks at the ways in which delayed intentions, that is memories for actions 
that have to be performed in the future, can be forgotten and misremembered. In 
particular, its focus is on two main factors affecting the fulfilment of a delayed 
intention, namely stress and misinformation. Part One of this Thesis, entitled Stress 
and Prospective Memory, focuses on unsuccessful operations of “proper” prospective 
memory tasks, namely failing to remember to do things in the future like taking a 
medication or resuming an interrupted work task. The role of stress is examined in two 
studies and it appears to be crucial in affecting the fulfilment of this type of future 
intentions both in our daily life and in the work context. Part Two of the Thesis, entitled 
Misinformation and Prospective Memory, rather than just considering failures to 
accomplish tasks in the future, broadens the discussion to examine those circumstances 
when we fail to stick with our future intentions and plans because we inadvertently 
continue to rely on inaccurate information. One example of our continued reliance on 
misinformation is when we hear that vaccines cause autism, then learn that is not true, 
and nevertheless decide not to immunize our children in the future. Specifically, four 
studies exemplify the problems associated with encountering misinformation as well 
as possibilities for remediating the continued influence of misinformation in our 
memory, reasoning and decision-making. The Thesis ends with some 
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Introduction and Outline of the Thesis 
 
 
A hallmark of human behaviour is the capacity to settle in advance the actions to be 
carried out in the future and to act accordingly once the time of action comes or when 
the circumstances permit it (McDaniel, Howard, & Butler, 2008; Ferrero, 2017). For 
instance, a pianist may form the intention of playing Clair de Lune, one of Claude 
Debussy’s best-known composition, at a recital next year; he may keep this intention 
in mind for as long as necessary and, because of it, he may begin to play the piece once 
the time of the recital comes.  
 However, we are all familiar with scenarios where, despite our best intentions, 
we forgot to buy something, call someone, take a medication, or send a letter. These 
and countless other cases exemplify the distance between intending and doing. As 
Gollwitzer (1999) humorously noted, this vast distance is perfectly reflected in the 
common New Year’s ritual of forming heroic resolutions (e.g., quitting smoking, 
avoiding unhealthy foods) that soon resolves into the realization that implementing 
those intentions is much more difficult compared to forming them. The question 
naturally arising is why it is so difficult to act upon one’s intentions, even when one 
may be highly motivated to so (Cohen & Hicks, 2017). 
 The concept of intention is considered to be central in human goal striving and 
attainment (e.g., Bandura, 1991; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; Wicklund & 
Gollwitzer, 1982). However, the correlations between intentions and behaviour appear 
to be modest; as Gollwitzer and Sheeran (2006) concluded in their meta-analytic 
review, the strength of intentions accounts for only 20% to 35% of the variance in 
future behaviour. Intriguingly, the weak association between intentions and behaviour 
seems to be largely due to people having good intentions but failing to act on them 
(Gollwitzer, 1999; Orbell & Sheeran, 1998). 
 Researchers acknowledge the great variety of challenges that individuals face 
when attempting to pursue a goal; for instance, one may be absorbed by other 
competing goals, wrapped up in one’s own thoughts, or simply unmotivated (Cohen 
& Hicks, 2017; Kliegel, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2008). But often we fail to carry out 
intended actions because we simply forget. Human memory is in fact essentially prone 
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to various kinds of distortions and illusions (Mazzoni & Memon, 2003; Mazzoni & 
Scoboria, 2007; Scoboria, Boucher, & Mazzoni, 2015). The extant empirical literature 
has acknowledged that our memory is inherently fallible – an acceptance that was 
influenced considerably by the research of Elizabeth Loftus on the accuracies of 
eyewitness testimony (e.g., Loftus, 1993, 2003, 2005, 2008; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). 
Our memory does not provide a veridical representation of events as experienced 
(Bartlett, 1932; Cubelli & Della Sala, 2009; Schacter, 1996). It simply does not work 
as a camera or a VCR and implies more subtle processes than record, rewind, and 
playback (De Vito & Della Sala, 2011). Human memory is, in fact, entirely 
reconstructive, meaning that what gets encoded into memory is shaped by what people 
have already stored in memory, their own expectations, needs, beliefs and emotional 
state (Schacter, Norman, & Kouts, 1998; Tulving, 1983). Moreover, what gets 
reconstructed later on is determined by that same multitude of factors that contributed 
to its encoding. Thus, a memory trace is always in an unstable state as it gets rewritten 
and remodeled every time it is retrieved (Howe & Knott, 2015; Schacter & Addis, 
2007; Tulving, 2002).  
 Whilst the idea that our memory is far from being perfect might sound like a 
truism, it is nevertheless important to accept that memory errors are a necessary part 
of daily living. In his classic book on human error, Reason (1990, p. 17) claimed that 
“the more predictable varieties of human fallibility are rooted in the essential and 
adaptive properties of human cognition”. In a similar vein, Schacter (1999, p. 183) 
argued that “memory’s sins should not be viewed as flaws in system design or 
unfortunate errors made by Mother Nature during the course of evolution”. In his view, 
memory foibles are the result of an adapted system that retains the kind of information 
that is most likely to be needed in the environment in which the system operates. More 
recently, Gigerenzer (2008, 2015) adapted Herbert Simon’s (1955, 1956) notion of 
“bounded rationality” to stress the cognitive limitations of human mind and highlight 
the large repertoire of “fast-and-frugal” heuristics that people use to make decisions, 
often based on very little information and in little time. At any given moment in time, 
there is indeed a huge amount of information in one’s immediate surroundings that 
one might attend to. Therefore, to function properly, one needs to create incomplete 
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records of the events and to forget information that is no longer current, such as old 
phone numbers or where we parked the car yesterday (Laney, 2013).  
Yet, as described earlier, this may also backfire resulting in testable patterns of 
errors. Some of these errors can be merely annoying and correctable, like when one 
forgets to attach a file after having written an email message or to buy bread when 
passing the grocery store, while others can have huge impacts on people’s lives, such 
as when a surgeon forgets an instrument inside a patient’s body before closing an 
incision or a pilot forgets to roll down the wheels before landing a jet. What is common 
in all these examples is that one’s intentions are temporarily put on hold – stored in 
memory – to be reactivated or retrieved at an appropriate point in the future; they are 
fundamentally failures of our memory for future actions or prospective memory errors 
(Brandimonte, 2006). Besides, as Reason (1990, p. 107) stated, “failures of prospective 
memory…are among the most common forms of human fallibility”. 
The present Thesis focuses on the factors that may affect the fulfilment of a 
delayed intention and thus contribute to prospective memory failures. In particular, it 
aims at investigating the role of stress on prospective memory errors in a strict sense, 
namely forgetting to carry out intended actions at the appointed time and place, and 
failures in performing future intentions in a broader sense, that is misremembering 
future intentions because of the lingering effect of misinformation on our memory, 
attitudes, and behaviors. 
The Thesis is divided into two parts. To set the stage, Part One starts with a 
thumbnail sketch of what is generally intended by prospective memory, the main 
characteristics and phases of a prospective memory task, the methodologies for 
investigating prospective memory, and the relevance of prospective memory in real-
world settings. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 examine the role of stress on unsuccessful 
prospective remembering, here described stricto sensu as forgetting to carry out 
intended actions at the appointed time and place. Part Two of this Thesis aims to 
develop the analysis of prospective memory failures into a broader conceptual 
framework. It has been stated that “the theoretical development of this area 
[prospective memory] will depend on the integration of theories of memory with 
theories of action” (Baddeley & Wilkins, 1984). Hence, to progress in our 
understanding of this topic we need to examine questions and theories that extend 
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beyond those normally considered by prospective memory researchers. For this 
reason, here I considered under the umbrella of prospective memory not only 
remembering to accomplish some task in the future, but also remembering to stick with 
one’s future intentions and plans. To illustrate, prospective memory failures may 
include intending to prepare dinner in a few minutes time but then, when the doorbell 
suddenly rings and a neighbour starts discussing the latest gossip, forgetting all about 
dinner. However, prospective memory glitches may also refer to intending to dine at 
the “China Garden” restaurant but then deciding to go elsewhere because we heard a 
news report about a family who died after eating at that restaurant. And we intend to 
dine elsewhere despite we also heard about the medical examiner who reported that 
food poisoning was ruled out as a possible cause of death for the family (Seifert, 2002). 
Part Two therefore expands upon Part One by addressing how future intentions 
transform into actions despite or by virtue of new information becoming available and 
substituting previous information and the intentions formulated on its basis. Chapter 5 
to 8 encompass a total of 6 Experiments, investigating how the lingering phenomenon 
of misinformation may continue to influence our memory, reasoning, decision making, 
beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours even after sophisticated correction attempts, 
interfering with our future intentions and plans. These experiments focused on vaccine 
misinformation and the strategies intended to correct it, a topic that concerns precisely 
those mechanisms which underlie false remembering (in this case, remembering myths 
instead of facts about vaccines), and, because of that, failures of acting on intentions 
(in this case, failures to carry out the planned activity of following medical advice and 
getting the recommended shots). In doing so, Part Two tries to connect the dots 
between intentions, its antecedents (i.e., beliefs and attitudes) and outcomes (i.e., 
behaviours), and memory. As will be further explained through the Chapters, treating 
prospective memory alongside beliefs and attitudes makes a whole literature on 
beliefs/opinions formation and change available and potentially relevant to provide 
insights into the reasons why one’s future intentions may be forgotten. A General 



































1.1 What is prospective memory? 
Since the publication of the first book entirely devoted to prospective memory 
(Brandimonte, Einstein, & McDaniel, 1996), a large and growing body of literature 
has considered prospective remembering as a distinctive aspect of memory that is 
central to developing our understanding of how intentions are translated into actions 
and under which circumstances they fail (Kliegel et al., 2008). 
 Prospective memory (PM) involves the mechanisms and characteristics of 
memory for actions that have to be performed in the future (Brandimonte, 2006). It is 
usually defined either as remembering to carry out a task at a particular moment in the 
future or as the timely execution of a previously formed intention (Brandimonte et al., 
1996). Einstein and McDaniel (1990) distinguished between two general classes of 
PM tasks. One class, termed time-based, requires the individual to perform an action 
at a specific time (e.g., attend a meeting tomorrow at 2 p.m.) or after some amount of 
time has passed (e.g., take food out of the oven in 10 minutes). Here, time serves as a 
trigger to retrieve the memory to attend the meeting or to empty the oven. The other 
class, termed event-based, requires the individual to perform an action in response to 
a specific cue in the future (e.g., remember to buy bread on the way home from work). 
Here, the trigger to retrieve a PM intention is the occurrence of a specific event in the 
environment. 
 Both time- and event-based PM have been intensively investigated in 
laboratory and naturalistic settings (Kliegel et al., 2008). In particular, a great deal of 
attention has focused on the causes of the memory trace reactivation. According to the 
preparatory attentional and memory processes (PAM) theory (Smith, 2003), 
individuals periodically recollect their plans, which can subsequently lead them to 
monitor the environment for cues that signal that the PM intention should be 
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performed. Consider the concrete example of remembering to buy bread on the way 
home from work. According to this view, we self-initiate retrieval of this plan 
throughout the day and when we are driving home from work then we will begin to 
monitor the environment for signs of the grocery store. It derives that PM retrieval 
cannot occur in the absence of monitoring and PM failures are due either to lapses in 
devoting attentional resources to monitoring or to a retrospective memory loss of the 
content of the intention (e.g. forgetting that it is bread that needs to be purchased) 
(Scullin, Mullet, Einstein, & McDaniel, 2015). Instead, the multiprocess theory 
(McDaniel and Einstein, 2000) contends that both monitoring and spontaneous 
retrieval are used in prospective remembering. According to this view, in the absence 
of monitoring, the occurrence of a target event (e.g., the grocery store) that has been 
associated with an intention can spontaneously trigger retrieval of an episodic memory 
(e.g., the intention to stop at the grocery store and buy bread) (Scullin et al., 2015). 
 Anyhow, Einstein and McDaniel’s (1990) distinction between time- and event-
based PM does not fully capture all the important dimensions along which PM tasks 
may vary. For instance, distinctions have been made between habitual and episodic 
PM tasks (Harris, 1983), simple and complex PM tasks (Einstein, Holland, McDaniel, 
& Guynn, 1992), and single- and dual-activity PM tasks (Harris, 1983), just to mention 
a few. Memory researchers agree indeed that there are many different forms of future 
intentions and that each type of intention has its own characteristics and processing 
requirements (Brandimonte, 2006). However, there are also some common features to 
all PM tasks (Brandimonte et al., 1996; Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000).  
First, prospective memory properly takes place when there is a consciously 
formed intention or plan to perform an action at some later time when circumstances 
permit it (Dismukes & Nowinski, 2007). This is a subtle but critically important aspect 
as it permits to distinguish prospective memory from other kinds of behaviors. 
Consider, for example, the case of classical conditioning: by virtue of pairings of a 
biological potent, unconditioned stimulus (e.g., food) to a neutral, conditioned 
stimulus (e.g., a bell), the organism has a readiness to act in a certain way (e.g., 
salivation) when the conditioned stimulus is encountered in the future. However, 
classical conditioning should not be studied under the umbrella of prospective memory 
research (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). 
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The second feature of PM tasks is that the execution of the intended action is 
not immediate, rather there is a retention interval between forming and executing the 
intention, typically filled with activities not directly related to that delayed intention. 
This period may last minutes, hours, or days (Brandimonte, 2006).  
A third consideration is that in a typical PM task the individual must recollect 
the intended action at the appropriate instance without an explicit prompt stimulating 
retrieval. A critical difference between prospective and retrospective memory rests 
indeed on the presence and absence of explicit prompting for remembering. For PM, 
no agent explicitly prompts the individual to remember the deferred intention when 
execution becomes appropriate; thus, one must “remember to remember” (Dismukes, 
2012). According to Ste-Marie and Jacoby (1993), PM involves indeed what is called 
spontaneous remembering, that is an automatic process that occurs when memories 
arise in consciousness involuntarily and without direct prompts to interrogate memory. 
To illustrate, when passing the grocery store, nothing alerts us to pay attention to this 
cue, and no one instructs us that this cue is relevant to a previously formed intention 
(e.g., buy bread when on the way home from work). As Graf and Uttl (2001, p. 442) 
underlined, “what is unique about PM tasks is that they require identifying or 
recognizing cues as telltale signs of previously formed plans and intentions when (the 
cues) occur as a part of ongoing thoughts, actions, or situations”.  
 Any PM task, in fact, is embedded in an ongoing activity. To illustrate, in a 
typical laboratory PM task, individuals are required to memorize a list of words – 
which represents the ongoing task – while they have to remember to press a particular 
key on the computer keyboard when a particular item appears – which represents the 
prospective, background task. As part of ongoing thoughts, actions, or situations, PM 
is not an isolable act of pure cognition; yet, it involves the cognitive processes of 
attention, planning, task management as much as it involves memory (Dismukes, 
2012). For this reason, some researchers have suggested that “the loss of the term PM 
would leave us better off, not impoverished” (Brandimonte et al., 1996, p. 144) and 
questioned that PM is a distinct form of episodic memory. However, others insist on 
the unique requirements of PM (Graf & Uttl, 2001) and on the existence of special 
storage properties associated with PM (Brandimonte et al., 1996). For example, 
Goschke and Kuhl’s (1993) findings of faster recognition latencies for PM relative to 
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retrospective memory suggests that the former may be stored in a more highly 
activated state, which is adaptive given the special cueing problem inherent in PM 
tasks. 
 
1.2 Phases of a PM task 
The realization of a delayed intention and its associated action consists of some general 
phases (Brandimonte et al., 1996), as illustrated in Figure 1.1: 
A. formation and encoding of intention and action; 
B. retention interval; 
C. performance interval; 
D. initiation and execution of intended action; 
E. evaluation of outcome. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Overview of the different phases involved in the realization of a delayed intention 
(adapted from Brandimonte et al., 1996) 
 
Phase A refers to the retention of an intention (what a person wants to do), an 
intent (that he/she has decided to do something), and a retrieval context that concerns 
the criteria for recall (when he/she should retrieve the intent and the action and initiate 
them). For instance, the different elements of an intention to buy groceries after work 
may be encoded as follows: “I will” (that-element) “buy groceries” (what-element) 
“after work” (when-element).  
 Phase B refers to the delay between encoding and the start of a potential 
performance interval, while phase C concerns the performance interval or period when 
the intention should be retrieved. For example, an intention to telephone a friend this 
evening may have been encoded 2 days ago. Therefore, it would have a retention 
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interval of approximately 2 days and a performance interval of approximately 3 hours 
(7:00 p.m. – 10:00 p.m.). 
Finally, phases D and E are concerned with the initiation and execution of the 
intended action, and evaluation of the resultant outcome, respectively. 
 According to Einstein and McDaniel (1990), each prospective memory task 
comprises two components. The first retrospective component corresponds to phase A 
and consists of the what- (action), that- (intent), and when- (retrieval context) elements 
that together form the content of a postponed intention. Instead, the second prospective 
memory component corresponds to the elements described in phases B through E and 
refers to the retrieval of the action “at the appropriate time or in response to the 
appropriate event” (p. 725). 
 
1.3 PM in real-world settings 
Our everyday life is filled and sometimes overflowing with PM demands. 
Remembering to attend meetings in our work activities, to have dinner with a friend 
to maintain our social relations, or to take medication to handle our health-related 
needs are unequivocal examples showing how good prospective memory is essential 
for normal functioning (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). As a consequence, PM failures 
can cause problems in effectiveness and efficiency or be even devastating. For 
instance, non-adherence to prescribed medication schedules due to a prospective 
memory failure can be particularly problematic for patients with asymptomatic 
conditions like hypertension (Insel & Cole, 2005), leading to serious health problems.  
 Direct and pervasive consequences of PM errors are also evident in the 
workplace, especially for people working in complex and stressful work contexts, such 
as the healthcare or aviation (Bourne & Yaroush, 2003; Grundgeiger, Sanderson, & 
Dismukes, 2014; Rothschild et al., 2005). For instance, in the intensive care unit, 
nurses must remember to deliver medications, to redress wounds, or to properly chart 
changes in vital signs and failures to perform any of these actions may result in poor 
health outcomes for the patient. Similarly, aircraft pilots must remember to perform 
several actions before take-off and landing and failures to perform any of these actions 
may result in injury or death (Scullin et al., 2015). Indeed, Dismukes (2006) revealed 
that almost one-fifth of the major airline accidents can be attributed to PM failures. 
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Similarly, analysing self-reported errors by airline pilots, Nowinski, Holbrook, and 
Dismukes (2003) observed that 74 of the 75 errors involving memory failures were 
prospective in nature. Thus, PM is not only ubiquitous in our lives, but it is also 
essential to maintaining health and safety (Dismukes, 2012). 
 
1.4 Methodologies for studying PM 
Several methods exist for studying PM, each of which has its own methodological 
strengths and weaknesses. In an important laboratory paradigm devised by Einstein 
and McDaniel (1990), participants are instructed that, while performing a primary, 
ongoing task, such as rating the pleasantness of a series of words, if a certain target 
cue appears, they should perform a separate action, such as pressing the keyboard 
space bar, which represents the PM component of the task. In this case, PM 
performance is simply measured as the percentage of trials on which the individual 
remembers to perform the separate action.  
 Whilst this represents a well-controlled experimental setting, it may not capture 
the extent to which PM demands occur in real-world contexts. For this reason, 
researchers have usually preferred incident reports, field studies, and simulations. For 
example, Nowinski and colleagues (2003) analysed airline accident reports as well as 
pilot reports of errors in order to document PM errors and to assess the conditions that 
may contribute to them. Instead, Grundgeiger and colleagues analysed videos from a 
full-scale patient simulator for factors enhancing or inhibiting anaesthesiologists’ PM 
or recordings of a light-weight eye tracking worn by nurses during their shift to observe 
various PM tasks occurring in the intensive care unit (Grundgeiger, Liu, Sanderson, 
Jenkins, & Leane, 2008; Grundgeiger, Sanderson, MacDougall, & Venkatesh, 2009).  
Other widely used methods for investigating prospective memory are questionnaires 
including specific questions tapping information about recall of future intentions (e.g., 
“How often do you forget to keep appointments?”) or naturalistic studies during which 
participants may be asked, for example, to return postcards from home, telephone the 
experimenter, or record information relevant to their PM intention in a diary. 
 As suggested by McDaniel and Einstein (2007), there should be a healthy 
interplay between the laboratory and nonlaboratory approaches, because only combing 
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different methods researchers can provide converging evidence, which can be used to 





























Study 1: On the effect of stress on prospective memory errors 
in everyday life1 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In spite of its relevance and implications for real-world functioning, thus far empirical 
literature on prospective memory has been somewhat inconsistent (Woods et al., 
2014). For instance, it seems surprising that the effectiveness of prospective memory 
functioning has only recently attracted research with respect to experiencing stress, a 
fairly pervasive condition in daily life that may affect how we perform, how we feel, 
and many of our bodily functions (Bourne & Yaroush, 2003). 
 Simply defined, stress refers to a disturbance of bodily homeostasis caused by 
a mismatch between situational demands and the individual’s perceived resources to 
cope with such demands (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Adverse effects of prolonged 
stress on physical (e.g., heart disease, cancer, stroke, etc.; Cohen, Janicki-Deverts, & 
Miller, 2007) and mental health (e.g., depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
pathologic aging, etc.; Hammen, 2005; Kendler, Karwoski, & Prescott 1999; Marin et 
al., 2011) are well-documented and a great deal of research suggests that stress can 
also tax cognitive functions, including memory (Rӧnnlund, Sundström, Sörman, & 
Nilsson, 2013; Staal, 2004). In particular, stress seems to force the individual to focus 
on the here-and-now, with consequent potential degradation of retrospective and 
prospective memory performance (Bourne & Yaroush, 2003). Indeed, stress is a strong 
modulator of memory functioning but it is also well-know that memory is not a unitary 
                                                          
1 Pluviano, S., Gamboz, N., & Brandimonte, M. A. (2016, May). On the effect of stress on cognitive 





process and, therefore, stress can exert different effects depending on the memory type 
under study (Luethi, Meier, & Sandi, 2008).  
 Across the board, previous works have found that everyday stress was the most 
perceived cause of everyday memory problems as individuals reported a greater 
number of memory failures on stressor days than on non-stressor days (Neupert, 
Almeida, Mroczek, & Spiro, 2006; Neupert, Mroczek, & Spiro, 2008; Vestergren & 
Nilsson, 2011). Specifically, Rӧnnlund et al. (2013) revealed that high-stressed 
individuals reported a higher frequency of retrospective and prospective memory 
failures. Similarly, Gupta and Pande (2015) revealed that daily stress was a significant 
predictor of mindfulness, attentional errors, prospective and retrospective memory 
errors. Instead, Luethi et al. (2008) found that exposure to stress was associated with 
a pronounced working memory deficit and this seems particularly interesting because 
of the unclear relationship between the latter and prospective memory (Nater et al., 
2006).  
 Also a substantial body of neurophysiological evidence seems to substantiate 
the detrimental effect of stress on prospective memory. Indeed, it clearly appears that 
prospective memory performance is closely related to prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
functioning (Arnsten, 2009) and that stress-induced increased sympathetic nervous-
system (SNS) activity is associated with increased catecholamine release, which, in 
turn, decreases firing of PFC neurons (Ramos & Arnsten, 2007). Thus, one would 
reasonably expect that stress has the potential to strongly affect prospective memory 
performance. However, recent studies in which stress was experimentally induced in 
laboratory settings (e.g., Schnitzspahn, Plessow, Kirschbaum, & Kliegel, 2014; 
Walser, Fischer, Goschke, Kirschbaum, & Plessow, 2013) showed that prospective 
memory performance was not impaired under stress. Nater et al. (2006) even found 
that stress might enhance time- (but not event-) based prospective memory.  
 Conceivably, the inconsistency in the available evidence is due, among other 
things, to the different classes of stressors each time at stake as well as to the diverse 
cognitive performances examined and their objective or subjective evaluation. It 
should also be noted that the threshold level at which stress begins to have an impact 
on cognitive performance is likely to vary with several individual factors that are often 
overlooked in the literature (Rӧnnlund et al., 2013).  
15 
 
 For instance, consider how the simple use of compensatory strategies to meet 
cognitive challenges under stress and support everyday habitual performance and 
competence can enhance memory performance. In addition, there are specific 
personality factors that seem to play an important role in determining resistance to 
stress. In this regard, resilience has increasingly become a focus of research in the 
behavioural and medical sciences, conceived as a universal coping ability to bounce 
back or recover from stress, to adapt to stressful circumstances, and to function in spite 
of stress or adversity by virtue of a positive engagement with the world (Caprara, 
Steca, & De Leo, 2003; Carver, 1998). Indeed, its buffering effect in relation to the 
adverse impact of stress on psychological functioning is well-established (e.g., 
Beasley, Thompson, & Davidson, 2003) but there is not substantial empirical evidence 
supporting its protective effect as referred to cognitive functioning. Additionally, there 
seem also to exist particular individual mood factors, such as depression or anxiety, 
that are associated not only with stress but also with memory performance (Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; Rönnlund et al., 2013), even though their relevance 
for prospective memory is still to establish.  
 Therefore, the general purpose of the present study was to examine the 
relationship between daily stress and prospective memory in everyday life, as well as 
to explore the potential moderating effect of individual factors (i.e., compensatory 





The sample comprised 52 (56.5%) men and 40 women (43.5%) and included 4 subjects 
(4.3%) aged under 26 years, 16 (17.4%) aged between 26 and 35 years, 36 (39.1%) 
aged between 36 and 45 years, 21 (22.8%) aged between 46 and 55 years, and 15 
(16.3%) aged over 55 years. The great majority of the participants (n = 48, 52.5%) had 







After collecting a brief demographic profile (sex, age, educational level), participants 
were administered several self-report questionnaires and an objective test of 
prospective memory. These instruments are described below (see Appendix A). 
 Psychological stress was evaluated using the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-10; 
Cohen & Williamson, 1988) (Cronbach’s α = .86; M = 19.82, SD = 7.05), which 
measures the degree to which situations in one’s life are appraised as stressful. Item 
were designed to tap how unpredictable, uncontrollable, and overloaded individuals 
find their lives. A sample item is: “In the last month, how often have you been upset 
because of something that happened unexpectedly?”. Responses were based on a five-
point Likert scale (from 0 = never to 4 = very often). PSS scores are obtained by 
reversing the scores on the four positively stated items (items 4, 5, 7, and 8) and then 
summing across all scale items. It is possible to obtain a range of scores ranging from 
0 to 40. Higher scores indicate a higher level of stress perceived by each individual. 
 Self-reported everyday cognitive failures were assessed via the Cognitive 
Failure Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982; Di 
Fabio, Giannini, & Martelli, 2004) (Cronbach’s α = .95; M = 45.63, SD = 18.07), 
which examines the level of slips of action, inattentiveness, and forgetfulness in daily 
life. The scale comprises 25 items on a five-point Likert format (from 0 = never to 4 = 
very often). A sample item is: “Do you read something and find you haven’t been 
thinking about it and must read it again?”. All questions are worded in the same 
direction. CFQ scores are obtained summing across all items and it is possible to obtain 
a range of scores ranging from 1 to 100. Higher scores indicate more self-reported 
cognitive failures. 
 Self-reported prospective and retrospective memory failures were evaluated 
using the Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ; Smith, Della 
Sala, Logie, & Maylor, 2000), which is a 16-item questionnaire assessing the 
frequency of memory failures on two main subscales: the Prospective Memory 
subscale (PRMQ ProM; sample item: “Do you fail to mention or give something to a 
visitor that you were asked to pass on?”) (Cronbach’s α = .88; M = 19.4, SD = 6.44) 
and the Retrospective Memory subscale (PRMQ RetM; sample item: “Do you forget 
something that you were told a few minutes before?”) (Cronbach’s α = .91; M = 19.59, 
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SD = 6.7). Respondents rate the frequency of their ProM and RetM failures on a five-
point Likert scale (from 1 = never to 5 = very often), resulting in minimum and 
maximum scores on either scale of 8 and 40, respectively. Higher scores indicate more 
self-reported memory failures.  
 A paper-and-pencil measure of prospective memory was obtained adapting the 
Continuous Lab Measure of Event Cued ProM (Lab EC ProM/C; Uttl & Kibreab, 
2011), which provides a more objective measure of prospective memory performance 
that is nearly reliable as standardized tests of episodic retrospective memory (Uttl, 
Hodgson, & White 2014). Participants were instructed to circle all occurrences of a 
prospective memory cue while filling the various questionnaires. The prospective 
memory cue appeared four times in an increasingly intrusive visual form and location 
(e.g., increased font size, vertical lift, and horizontal spacing). The first prospective 
memory cue circled was used as an index of prospective memory ability; participants 
who circle the 1st occurrence of the prospective memory cue receive 4 points, 3 points 
if the first circled cue is the 2nd cue, 2 points if it is the 3rd cue, 1 point if it is the 4th 
cue, and lastly 0 points if participants do not circle any cues. In the present study the 
cue word was “punto” (= point) and it appeared in the following visual form and spatial 
location: 1) in lower case, normal font, non-prominent location, embedded in the last 
question of the PSS; 2) in lower case, normal font, more prominent location, as part of 
question #3 in the MCQ; 3) in lower case, bold, more prominent location, appearing 
as part of question #11 of the Ego-Resiliency scale (this question was added for this 
purpose but was not included in the scoring of the scale); 4) in capitals, bold, more 
prominent location, appearing as part of the instruction of the GHQ-12. 
 Memory strategies were evaluated via the Memory Compensation 
Questionnaire (MCQ; Dixon & Bächman, 1992), which assesses the extent to which 
individuals compensate for memory losses and deficits. In order to reduce participants’ 
burden for the present investigation, three out of seven original scales of the MCQ 
have been selected, featuring 23 items. The External scale (Cronbach’s α = .84; M = 
2.04, SD = .78) comprises 8 items concerning the use of external memory aids (e.g., 
notes, calendars, and bookmarks) for enhancement of everyday memory performance. 
A sample item is: “Do you post notes on a board or other prominent place to help you 
remember things for the future (e.g., meetings or dates?)”. The Internal scale 
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(Cronbach’s α = .90; M = 1.91, SD = .81) includes 10 items focusing on the use of 
mnemonic strategies (e.g., imagery and rehearsal) for promoting effective memory 
performance. A sample item is: “Do you repeat telephone number to yourself in order 
to remember them well?”. Finally, the Reliance scale (Cronbach’s α = .81; M = 2.02, 
SD = .85) consists of 5 items concerning the extent to which the respondent recruits or 
uses other people as memory aids. A sample item is: “When you want to remember an 
important appointment do you ask somebody else (e.g., spouse or friend) to remind 
you?”. Responses are based on a five-point Likert scale (from 0 = never to 4 = always), 
with higher scores representing more frequent use of the indicated compensatory 
behaviour.  
 Resilience was assessed via the Ego-Resiliency scale (Block & Kremen, 1996; 
Caprara et al., 2003) (Cronbach’s α = .92; M = 4.6, SD = 1.07) whose items tap the 
ability to recover from stress and return to individual’s ego-control after the temporary 
stressing influence is no longer acutely present. A sample items is: “I get over anger 
with someone reasonably quickly”. The scale comprises 14 items on a four-point 
Likert scale (from 1 = never to 7 = always). Higher scores mean higher individual 
resilience. 
 Mental health was evaluated using the shortest version of the General Health 
Questionnaire (GHQ-12, Piccinelli, Bisoffi, Bon, Cunico, & Tansella, 1993; Goldberg 
& Williams, 1998) (Cronbach’s α = .89; M = 12.32, SD = 7.22), which is a well-known 
measure for the screening of non-psychiatric mental problems. Items tap factors such 
as somatic symptoms, anxiety, insomnia, social dysfunction, and depression. 
Participants report whether they have experienced a particular symptom of mental 
distress over the past few weeks according to a four-point Likert scale, ranging from 
0 (= better than usual) to 3 (= much less than usual) for the six positively worded items 
and from 0 (= no) to 3 (= much more than usual) for the other six negatively worded 
items. Hence, the questionnaire gives a total score ranging from 0 to 36. The higher 
the score, the more symptoms an individual is experiencing. 
 
2.3 Procedure 
First, following the procedure by Gupta and Pande (2015), independent sample t-tests 
and correlations between study variables were conducted to account for the results. 
19 
 
Then, multiple hierarchical regression was used to identify possible predictors of 
prospective memory. Next, variables were standardized and, subsequently, 
prospective memory and a single moderator at a time were entered into the second step 
of the regression equation (after control variables inserted at the first step), while the 
interaction term was added at the third step. When the interaction term was statistically 
significant, that is provided additional significant variance, Jeremy Dawson’s Excel 




Independent sample t-tests 
Table 2.1 shows the median value of perceived stress scores. The perceived stress 
scores were divided into two groups (low-perceived stress group and high-perceived 
stress group) by using median split technique. The median was found to be 20. 
 
Table 2.1. Median of perceived stress scores 
Variable Median 
Perceived Stress 20 
 
 Table 2.2 presents the independent sample t-tests between low- and high-
perceived stress groups. When the two groups were compared, several significant 
differences emerged.  
 When it comes to cognitive failures, individuals experiencing high perceived 
stress reported more cognitive errors. Indeed, there was a significant difference in the 
scores for the low- (M = 40.13, SD = 16.6) and high-perceived stress (M = 53.21, SD 
= 17.55) groups; t(90) = -3.59, p < .01. 
 Likewise, as regards self-reported prospective memory, individuals 
experiencing high perceived stress reported more prospective memory errors. In fact, 
there was a significant difference in the scores for the low- (M = 17.11, SD = 5.3) and 
high-perceived stress (M = 22.66, SD = 6.57) groups; t(90) = -4.48, p < .01. Similarly, 
high-stressed participants also reported more retrospective memory errors. Again, 
there was a significant difference in the scores for the low- (M = 17.3, SD = 5.15) and 
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high-perceived stress (M = 22.82, SD = 7.36) groups; t(90) = -3.99, p < .01. In fact, 
we further remember that, according to the scoring pattern of the Prospective and 
Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ), the lower the score, the better the 
memory for both subscales. 
 Afterward, referring to the paper and pencil prospective memory test, the 
performance of individuals experiencing low perceived stress was slightly better than 
the one of high-stressed participants. Indeed, there was a significant difference in the 
scores for the low- (M = 2.89, SD = .98) and high-perceived stress (M = 2.24, SD = 
1.17) groups; t(90) = 2.89, p < .01. 
 Subsequently, t-tests for memory compensation strategies suggested that low-
stressed individuals drew upon them more than high-stressed ones. Indeed, in relation 
to external memory strategies, there was a significant difference in the scores for the 
low- (M = 2.3, SD = .74) and high-perceived stress (M = 1.68, SD = .7) groups; t(90) 
= 3.98, p < .01. Similarly, regarding internal memory strategies, there was a significant 
difference in the scores for the low- (M = 2.22, SD = .72) and high-perceived stress 
(M = 1.74, SD = .72) groups; t(90) = 4.9, p < .001. Again, as concerns reliance memory 
strategies, there was a significant difference in the scores for the low- (M = 2.35, SD 
= .73) and high-perceived stress (M = 1.55, SD = .79) groups; t(90) = 4.98, p < .001. 
Next, in respect to resilience, low-stressed participants were slightly more resilient 
than high-stressed ones. In fact, there was a significant difference in the scores for the 
low- (M = 4.94, SD = .88) and high-perceived stress (M = 4.11, SD = 1.13) groups; 
t(90) = 3.99, p < .001. 
 Finally, low-stressed individuals’ mental health was remarkably better than 
high-stressed ones. Indeed, there was a significant difference in the scores for the low- 
(M = 10.3, SD = 6.63) and high-perceived stress (M = 15.18, SD = 7.13) groups; t(90) 








Table 2.2. Means, standard deviations and t-values for the low- and high-perceived stress 
group on study variables 
Dependent 
variables 







SD1 SD2   
Cognitive failures 40.3 53.21 16.6 17.55 -3.59** .001 
Prospective 
memory 
17.11 22.66 5.3 6.57 -4.48*** .000 
Retrospective 
memory 
17.3 22.82 5.15 7.36 -3.99*** .000 
Prospective 
memory test 
2.89 2.24 .98 1.17 2.89** .005 
External memory 
strategies 
2.3 1.68 .74 .7 3.98*** .000 
Internal memory 
strategies 
2.22 1.47 .72 .72 4.9*** .000 
Reliance memory 
strategies 
2.35 1.55 .73 .79 4.98*** .000 
Resilience 4.94 4.11 .88 1.13 3.99*** .000 
Mental health 10.3 15.18 6.63 7.13 -3.37** .001 
Note: *** p < .001, ** p < .01 
 
Correlations 
Table 2.3 depicts Pearson correlations between study variables. Age positively 
correlated with cognitive failures (r = .22, p < .05), prospective (r = .25, p < .05) and 
retrospective memory (r = .25, p < .05), and negatively with the prospective memory 
test (r = -.26, p < .05), external (r = -.25, p < .05) and internal memory strategies (r = -
.27, p < .01).  
 Perceived stress positively correlated with cognitive failures (r = .35, p < .01), 
mental health (r = .33, p < .01), prospective (r = .43, p < .01) and retrospective memory 
(r = .41, p < .01), while it negatively correlated with the prospective memory test (r = 
-.29, p < .01), resilience (r = -.39, p <.01), external (r = -.24, p < .01), internal (r = -
.34, p < .01) and reliance memory strategies (r = -.20, p < .01). 
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 Cognitive failures positively correlated with mental health (r = 58, p < .01), 
prospective (r = .78, p <.01) and retrospective memory (r = .77, p < .01), and negatively 
with the prospective memory test (r = -.39, p < .01), resilience (r = -.37, p < .01), 
external (r = -.24, p < .01), internal (r = -.34, p < .01) and reliance memory strategies 
(r = -.20, p < .01). 
 Prospective memory positively correlated with retrospective memory (r = .94, 
p < .01) and mental health (r = .54, p < .01), and negatively with the prospective 
memory test (r = -.46, p < .01), external (r = -.32, p < .01) and internal memory 
strategies (r = -.39, p < .01), and resilience (r = -.39, p < .01). 
 Retrospective memory positively correlated with mental health (r = .54, p < 
.01), and negatively with the prospective memory test (r = -.48, p < .01), external (r = 
-.32, p < .01) and internal memory strategies (r = -.40, p < .01), and resilience (r = -
.38, p < .01). 
 The scores on the prospective memory test positively correlated with resilience 
(r = .33, p < .01), external (r = .37, p < .01) and reliance memory strategies (r = .25, p 
< .05), while they negatively correlated with internal memory strategies (r = -.45, p < 
.01) and mental health (r = -.39, p < .01). 
 In respect to memory compensation strategies, external memory strategies 
positively correlated with resilience (r = .48, p < .01), internal (r = .72, p < .01) and 
external memory strategies (r = .67, p < .01). Instead, internal memory strategies 
positively correlated with reliance memory strategies (r = .58, p < .01) and resilience 
(r = .56, p < .01). Moreover, reliance memory strategies positively correlated with 
resilience (r = .60, p < .01) and negatively with mental health (r = -.26, p < .05). 
 Finally, resilience negatively correlated with mental health (r = -.45, p < .01). 
23 
 
Table 2.3 Pearson correlations between study variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Gender (1 = m, 2 = f) -             
2. Age  .03 -            
3. Education  .03 -.11 -           
4. Perceived stress  .02 .18 -.07 -          
5. Cognitive failures .11 .22* -.04 .35** (.95)         
6. Prospective memorya .16 .25* .01 .43** .78** (.88)        
7. Retrospective memorya .15 .25* .02 .41** .77** .94** (.91)       
8. Prospective memory testb -.09 -.26* .03 -.29** -.39** -.46** -.48** -      
9. External memory strategies -.1 -.25* -.04 -.39** -.24* -.32** -.32** .37** (.84)     
10. Internal memory strategies -.04 -.27** .04 -.46** -.34** -.39** -.40** -.45** .72** (.90)    
11. Reliance memory strategies -.05 -.11 .07 -.46** -.20* -.17 -.16 .25* .67** .58** (.81)   
12. Resilience -.04 -.17 -.1 -.39** -.37** -.39** -.38** .33** .48** .56** .60** (.92)  
13. Mental healthc .06 .12 .01 .33** .58** .54** .54** -.39** -.16 -.18 -.26* -.45** (.89) 
Note. Internal consistencies (Cronbach alphas) between brackets on the diagonal; a In both cases, lower scores indicate better memory; b Higher scores indicate better memory;  
c Lower scores mean better mental health, while higher scores mean worse mental health; ** p < .01, * p < .05 
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Hierarchical regression and moderation 
A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted where the criterion variable was 
prospective memory as subjectively measured via the Prospective and Retrospective 
Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ). As depicted in Table 2.4, control variables (i.e., 
gender, age, and education) were inserted at step 1, perceived stress at step 2, while 
compensatory memory strategies (i.e., internal, external, and reliance), resilience and 
mental health were inserted at step 3. 
 As regards control variables, only age showed a positive association (β = .25, 
p < .05) at step 1, but its beta coefficient lost statistical significance after the insertion 
of perceived stress (β = .54, p < .001) at step 2. At step 3, after the insertion of the 
other predictors, the beta coefficient of perceived stress decreased. A significant 
positive association emerged for both reliance memory strategies (β = .35, p < .01) and 
mental health (β = .34, p < .01) at step 3, while resilience, internal and external memory 
strategies did not show any significant association. Total R2 was equal to 49% (p < 
.01). Age explained 9% (p < .05) of prospective memory, while 15% of variance (p < 
.001) was attributable to perceived stress and, ultimately, 25% (p < .001) to both 
mental health and reliance memory strategies.  
 The decrease in age beta coefficient between step 1 and 2 could be an indicator 
of a potential moderation effect by perceived stress towards the relationship between 
age and prospective memory. Similarly, the decrease in perceived stress beta 
coefficient between steps 2 and 3 could be an indicator of a potential moderation effect 
by mental health and reliance memory strategies towards the relationship between 
perceived stress and prospective memory. In an exploratory way, other hierarchical 
regressions were conducted to check for these interactions.  
 
Table 2.4. Hierarchical regression analysis for prospective memory as criterion variable 
 Prospective memory 
 βStep 1 βStep 2 βStep 3 
Gender .15 .15 .11 
Age .25* .18 .07 
Education .03 .05 -.01 
Perceived stress  .54*** .23* 
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External memory strategies   -.18 
Internal memory strategies   -.21 
Reliance memory strategies   .37** 
Resilience   -.12 
Mental health   .43*** 
R2 .09* .24*** .49*** 
∆R2 .09* .15*** .25*** 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
Table 2.5 shows the only significant interaction detected, namely the one between 
perceived stress and reliance memory strategies on prospective memory (β = .21, p < 
.05). Perceived stress indicated a significant association (β = .42, p < .001) but reliance 
memory strategies did not (β = .03, p = .77), while the interaction term was significant 
(β = .21, p < .01). The interaction term explained an additional R2 equal to .04 (p < 
.05; overall R2 = .28). In order to analyse this relationship properly, a graphic 
representation was made (see Figure 2.1). Perusal of this interaction suggested that 
individuals using more reliance strategies reported less prospective memory errors 
only in the condition of low stress. Indeed, individuals experiencing a higher level of 
stress reported more prospective memory errors when using more reliance memory 
strategies. 
 
Table 2.5. Hierarchical regression results for the effect of perceived stress and reliance 
memory strategies on prospective memory 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 β β β 
Step 1: control variables    
Gender .15 .15 .17 
Age .25* .18 .16 
Education .03 .05 .05 
Step 2: main effects    
Perceived stress  .42*** .45*** 
Reliance memory strategies  .05 .03 
Step 3: interaction effect    
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Perceived stress x Reliance memory strategies   .21** 
R2 .09* .24*** .28** 
∆R2 .09* .15*** .04** 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
Figure 2.1. Significant interaction effect between perceived stress and reliance memory 




Although for a long time has received scarce attention by memory researchers, 
prospective memory is essential for a wide array of everyday activities and its 
breakdown may be as disruptive as the impairment in retrospective memory (Graf & 
Uttl, 2001). Drawing on a fairly inconclusive debate about its decline under stress 
conditions, the main objective of the current study was to examine the adverse effects 
of perceived stress on prospective memory errors.  
 The present results showed that high-stressed individuals reported a substantial 
higher frequency of both general cognitive failures and prospective memory errors 
compared to low-stressed ones. Therefore, the detrimental impact of stress also applies 
to proper prospective memory functioning. Confirmatory evidence of this negative 
effect was also provided by the association between perceived stress and both the 


































comprehensive assessment of prospective memory, this study evaluated both 
prospective memory as reported subjectively by the participants and objectively via a 
self-made test, observing a high concordance between the two measures.  
 Besides these cognitive performance discrepancies between high- and low-
stressed individuals, pronounced differences were also found regarding the use of 
compensatory memory strategies, as it clearly appears that they were more frequent 
among less stressed individuals, and mental health, because participants who reported 
higher level of stress also complained about greater negative symptoms. Also 
resilience negatively related to perceived stress, suggesting that higher levels of 
resilience matched with lower levels of stress.  
 By means of a hierarchical regression analysis, it was observed that, when age 
was controlled, perceived stress accounted for the 15% of variance in prospective 
memory (as subjectively evaluated). Moreover, mental health (e.g., negative 
symptoms as anxiety and depression) and reliance memory strategies, combined, 
explained the 25%. In addition, consistently with the literature suggesting that memory 
complaints are common among the elderly or increase with age (e.g., Jonker, 
Geerlings, & Schmaud, 2000; Reid & MacLullich, 2006; Vestergren & Nilsson, 2011), 
also age related to prospective memory failures, accounting for the 9% of variance. 
Instead, neither resilience, nor external memory strategies, nor internal memory 
strategies were associated with prospective memory.  
 An interaction effect between perceived stress and reliance memory strategies 
on prospective memory was also detected, indicating that, in the case of moderate 
stress, leaning on reliance memory strategies might help in reducing prospective 
memory errors. However, the same did not seem true in high-stress situations, in which 
other more useful resources might come into play. Clearly, further research on the 
buffering effects of individual factors is overdue, in particular referring to those 
situations where persistent stressors linger. 
 Some limitations of the present study should be pointed out. Firstly, the sample 
size was relatively small, even though a post-hoc power analysis (G*Power 3; Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicated a 96% chance of detecting a large effect 
size and a 65% chance of detecting a medium effect size between the two groups, the 
low- and the high-perceived stress group, as significant at the 5% level. Secondly, the 
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nature of the study was cross-sectional, meaning that no reliable conclusions can be 
drawn regarding the causal directions of the effects. Furthermore, I used self-report 
measures for all the study variables except prospective memory, which might have 
increased the risk of misinterpret relationships because of the impact of common 
method variance. However, some authors argue that common method variance tends 
to attenuate rather than to inflate interactions (Spector, 2006).  
 In conclusion, the present study provided a further look into the relationship 
between everyday stress and memory problems, shedding light on the adverse effect 
of stress on prospective memory functioning. From a practical standpoint, the results 
obtained could be useful for therapeutic interventions among individuals who report 
feeling stressed to overcome potential memory failures. Future population-based 
studies on this issue could benefit from longitudinal designs to take into account causal 
chains effects and, as the current study may be considered only a first contribution for 
a more exhaustive examination of the moderation effects of individual factors, future 
research should also address in more depth the buffering role of other variables (e.g., 
personality traits) that may weaken the disruptive effect of stress on memory. 
 The next chapter continues to discuss the relationship between stress and 
prospective memory focusing upon the human contribution to accidents in complex, 
















Study 2: On the effect of stress on prospective memory errors 
in the healthcare context 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Imagine a nurse who begins her long work shift by examining every patient’s chart. 
Some patients are scheduled for surgery, while others are about to undergo urgent 
medical examinations or are waiting for critical test results. All patients need to be 
checked at different times throughout the day, while the nurse must also perform a 
number of tasks that are not limited to direct contact with the patient, such as charting, 
documentation, care coordination, and searching for equipment or supplies. Despite 
her best efforts, the nurse may find it difficult to provide the best quality of care in 
such fast-paced environment, which is so plagued by frequent interruptions. Thus, it 
is likely that she may forget to carry out some pending tasks, which may result in 
potential adverse events.  
 This example underlines how the Florence Nightingale’s famous dictum “first, 
do no harm” (Leape, 1994) is not so simple to follow for healthcare providers. Indeed, 
the extremely demanding context in which they usually work does not accommodate 
human beings’ physical and cognitive limits, contributing to job stress and increasing 
the risk of medication errors and accidental injuries (DeLucia, Ott, & Palmieri, 2009). 
In particular, nurses’ job is inundated with prospective memory demands, which 
require to recall a previously formed intention at a specific time (time-based PM) or in 
response to a specific cue in the future (event-based PM; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). 
Unsurprisingly, a significant number of iatrogenic injuries to patients is due to nurses’ 
slips and lapses, namely PM failures to carry out intended plans of action (Dieckmann, 
Reddersen, Wehner, & Rall, 2006; Fink, Pak, Bass, Johnston, & Battisto, 2010; Leape 
et al., 1995). Indeed, medication errors due to PM failures may play a role in patients’ 
deaths (Institute of Medicine, 1999). Although PM failures may have such damaging 
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consequences, there are still few studies that have explicitly analysed nurses’ role in 
making, preventing, and detecting this type of errors.  
 Very little is also known about the association between medication errors, PM 
failures and feeling of distress (West et al., 2006). A great deal of research suggests 
that long-term stress can negatively impact memory functioning in everyday life (e.g., 
Pluviano, Gamboz, & Brandimonte, 2016; Rӧnnlund, Sundström, Sörman, & Nilsson, 
2013; Staal, 2004). As concerns the medical area, some studies revealed that work-
related stress and burnout may dramatically contribute to general cognitive failures 
and PM errors in healthcare delivery, leading to reduced quality of care and patient 
safety (Barret & Yates, 2002; Battisto et al., 2009; Eskildsen, Andersen, Pedersen, 
Vandborg, & Andersen, 2015). This can be very alarming as work stress and burnout 
are quite commonly experienced among healthcare workers. According to a survey 
investigating nurses’ opinions about their work environments, 53% of them agreed 
with the following statement: “My job is often so stressful that I felt burnt out” (Boyle 
& Miller, 2009). Along the same line, Mayo and Duncan (2004) reported that the most 
frequent causes of errors according to nurses were fatigue and exhaustion. Moreover, 
previous studies addressing the relationship between burnout and information 
processing showed that burnout is associated with difficulties in voluntary control over 
attention and impaired memory (Peterson et al., 2008; Rydmark et al., 2006; 
Sandström, Rhodin, Lundberg, Olsson, & Nyberg, 2005; Van Der Linden, Keijsers, 
Eling, & Van Schaijk, 2005). This is not surprising as individuals with burnout 
symptoms often complain about difficulties in “keeping in their mind” daily tasks 
(Maslach, Schaufeli, & Leiter, 2001), which is an essential ability for successful 
prospective remembering. 
 Furthermore, nurses often lack the correct knowledge of what constitutes a 
medication error; indeed, they often fail to recognise errors when confronted with real 
examples of medication scenarios (Mayo & Duncan, 2004). As the primary step for 
preventing medical errors is the correct recognition of these very errors, it is necessary 
to clarify what truly constitutes a medication error and what specific actions and best 
practices could prevent it from happening. 
 Based on the above arguments, the present study aims at further examining a) 
the relationship between general cognitive failures, PM errors, work-related stress, and 
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Thirty-one healthcare workers (24 females and 7 males) from the gynaecologic and 
obstetrician ward of the San Paolo Hospital in Naples volunteered in participating in 
this study. Mean sample age was 47.16 years (SD = 8.29), while job tenure was 18.13 
years (SD = 8.53). All participants had completed at least some college-level 
education, with 21 (67.7%) having earned a college degree and 10 (32.3%) an 
advanced degree. Among those workers, 19 were nurses (61.3%), 6 (19.4%) 
obstetricians, and 6 (19.4%) healthcare assistants.  
 
Measures 
Data were gathered via a battery of self-report questionnaires (see Appendix B) 
assessing work stress, burnout, everyday cognitive failures, prospective memory, and 
perception of medication errors.  
 Work stress was assessed by means of the Need for Recovery Scale (Van 
Veldhoven & Meijman, 1994), a measure derived from the Questionnaire on 
Experience and Evaluation of Work (QEEW; Van Veldhoven & Meijman, 1994). The 
11 items included in this scale investigate the severity and duration of work stress by 
assessing symptoms related to overload, lack of energy for new efforts, reduced 
performance, and social withdrawal. This scale proved to predict accidents at work 
(Swaen, van Amelsvoort, Bültmann, & Kant, 2003). Items are on a 4-point Likert 
scale, ranging from 1 (= never) to 4 (= always). Higher scores reflect a higher need for 
recovery.  
 Burnout was measured by means of the Oldenburg Burnout Inventory (OLBI; 
Demerouti, Bakker, Vardakou, & Kantas, 2001), which assesses two core dimensions 
of burnout, i.e., exhaustion and disengagement from work. It consists of two subscales 
containing 8 items each, wherein four are positively worded and four negatively 
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worded. The exhaustion subscale (items 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16) refers to general 
feelings of intensive physical, affective, and cognitive strain, therefore being a long-
term consequence of prolonged exposure to certain job demands. Instead, the 
disengagement subscale (items 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15) refers to distancing from 
one’s work and experiencing negative attitudes toward the work object, work content, 
or work in general. Each item in the OLBI is on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(= strongly agree) to 4 (= strongly disagree). Items 2, 4, 8, and 12 from the exhaustion 
subscale and items 3, 6, 9, 11 from the disengagement subscale were reversed so that 
for all of the items higher scores indicated a higher level of burnout.  
 Everyday cognitive failures were evaluated using the Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Parks, 1982; Di Fabio, 
Giannini, & Martelli, 2004). This questionnaire examines the level of slips of action, 
inattentiveness, and forgetfulness in daily life. It comprises 25 items in a 5-point Likert 
format, from 0 (= never) to 5 (= very often). Higher scores indicate more self-reported 
cognitive failures.  
 Prospective memory was evaluated using both subjective and objective 
measures. Three subjective measures were used. First, 8 items from the Prospective 
and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ ProM; Smith, Della Sala, Logie, & 
Maylor, 2000) were used to evaluate self-reported PM failures. Respondents rated the 
frequency of their PM errors on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (= never) to 5 (= very 
often). Minimum and maximum possible scores were 8 and 40, respectively. Higher 
scores indicated more prospective memory errors. Second, participants were presented 
with one item investigating participants’ perceived relevance of PM for daily practice 
on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (= not important at all) to 5 (= absolutely 
essential). Third, a self-developed scale partially based on an existing taxonomy of PM 
tasks from the aviation setting (Dismukes & Nowinski, 2007) was presented in order 
to account for the peculiarities of the healthcare context as a prospective memory-
demanding work situation. This scale encompasses five items on a five-point Likert 
scale, ranging from 1 (= never) to 5 (= very often). Respondents were asked to estimate 
how often they encountered five prototypical work situations prone to PM errors 
during the preceding month. These work situations were related to: (a) episodic tasks 
(item no. 1), which require to remember to perform at a later time a task that is not 
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habitually performed; (b) interruptions (item no. 2), by which individual’s attention is 
diverted by the intrusion of another task and then he/she must remember to resume 
where he/she left off; (c) habitual tasks (item no. 3), which involve multiple steps 
whose execution becomes largely automatic; (d) habit capture (item no. 4), by which 
habitual actions substitute atypical actions; and, lastly, (e) interleaving tasks (item no. 
5), which force the individual to juggle several task concurrently. The objective test of 
PM was administered to have a comprehensive account of participants’ prospective 
memory failures. It consisted in the Continuous Lab Measure of Event Cued ProM 
(Lab EC ProM/C; Uttl & Kibreab, 2011). Participants were instructed to circle any and 
all occurrences of a prospective memory cue while filling the questionnaire. The PM 
cue consisted of a word (“serie” = series), appearing four times in an increasingly 
intrusive visual format and location. More precisely, the cue-word appeared in the 
following visual format and spatial location: 1) in lower case, normal font, non-
prominent location, as part of question no. 9 in the Need for Recovery Scale. This 
question (i.e., “Quando torno a casa da lavoro, mi assalgono pensieri ricorrenti su una 
serie di cose che avrei potuto fare meglio a lavoro” – “When I get home from work, I 
have a series of reoccurring thoughts about what I could do better at work”) was added 
to the original scale for this purpose but it was not included in the scoring for 
calculating the level of stress; 2) in lower case, normal font, more prominent location, 
as part of the instructions in the OLBI (i.e., “Di seguito trova una serie di affermazioni 
rispetto alle quali può essere d’accordo o meno” – “Below you can find a series of 
statements which you may agree or not agree with”); 3) in lower case, bold, more 
prominent location, appearing as part of question #20 of the CFQ. This question (i.e., 
“La sua serie televisiva preferita verrà tramessa domani sera. Le capita mai di chiedere 
a qualcun altro (ad esempio il suo coniuge o un amico) di ricordarglielo?” – Your 
favourite TV series will be broadcast tomorrow night. Do you ever ask someone else 
(such as your spouse or a friend) to remind you?”) was included in the CFQ for this 
purpose but it was not included in the scoring for calculating the frequency of everyday 
cognitive failures; 4) in capitals, bold, more prominent location, as part of those items 
modelled after Dismukes & Nowinski’s (2007) taxonomy of PM tasks in the aviation 
setting (i.e., “C’è una SERIE di crescenti cambiamenti nelle sue mansioni lavorative” 
– “A SERIES of changes is occurring in your work”). This item was not included in 
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the following analyses. The scoring procedure of the objective test of prospective 
memory was as follows: 4 points were given when the first circled cue-word was the 
first cue-word presented; 3 points were given when the first circled cue-word was the 
second cue-word presented; 2 points were given when the first circled cue-world was 
the third cue-word presented; 1 point was given when the first circled cue-world was 
the last cue-word presented; 0 points were given when participants did not circle any 
cue-word. 
 Perception of medication errors was evaluated by means of a modified version 
of the Gladstone Questionnaire (Gladstone, 1995), encompassing diverse subscales. 
The first 10 items require to rank possible causes of medication errors on a five-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (= never) to 5 (= very often). The following 5 items are 
formulated as scenarios where respondents have to indicate, with a “yes/no” response, 
whether the described fictitious event represents a medication error and whether it 
should be reported to the physician. The last 5 items, requiring a “yes/no” response, 
elicit participants’ perspective about dealing with medication errors and reporting 
them to superiors or other members of the medical staff.  
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the measures and of the relevant variables included 
in the following analyses.  
 
Table 3.1. Summary of the measures and of the relevant variables included in the analyses 
Issue Measure Variable Scale 
Work stress Need for Recovery Scale Need for Recovery 
4-point Likert scale (1 = 





4-point Likert scale (1 = 
strongly agree; 4 = strongly 
disagree) 
Disengagement 
4-point Likert scale (1 = 









5-point Likert scale (1 = 








5-point Likert scale (1 = 
never; 5 = very often) 
Single item on perceived 




5-point Likert scale (1 = not 
important at all; 5 = 
absolutely essential) 
Self-developed scale 
assessing frequency of 
encountering five 
prototypical work 




situations prone to 
PM errors at work 
5 points Likert scale (1 = 
never; 5 = very often) 
Continuous Lab Measure 
of Event Cued ProM 
Objective PM errors 
0 (when participants did not 
circle any cue-word) to 4 
points (when participants’ 
first circled cue-word was 





Modified version of the 
Gladstone Questionnaire 
Causes of medication 
errors 
5 points Likert scale 
(1=never; 5 = very often) 
Recognition and 
reporting of fictitious 
medication errors  
“yes/no” response 
Dealing with 
medication errors at 
work and propensity 





After providing some demographic details (i.e., sex, age, educational level, and 
tenure), participants were administered the various self-reported questionnaires. As 
they worked through the questionnaires, they were instructed to circle any and all 
occurrences of a prospective memory cue word (“serie” = series). Questionnaires, 
accompanied by a cover letter outlying the aims of the study, were distributed in 
sealable envelops to further guarantee privacy and were collected immediately after 




Relationship between PM errors and work-related stress, burnout, and general 
cognitive failures 
Correlational analyses were used to assess the relationship between PM failures, 
general cognitive failures, work-related stress, and burnout. In particular, the variables 
of interests were Gender, Age, Education, Tenure, Need for Recovery, Exhaustion, 
Disengagement, Cognitive failures, Self-reported PM failures, and Objective PM 
errors. Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, Cronbach’s α) and correlations 
among these variables are presented in Table 3.2. Results showed that age positively 
correlated with tenure (r = .69, p < .01). Then, need for recovery positively correlated 
with exhaustion (r = .6, p < .01), disengagement (r = .4, p < .05), cognitive failures (r 
= .87, p < .01), and self-reported PM errors (r = .66, p < .01), while it negatively 
correlated with the scores from the objective PM task (r = -.5, p < .001). Exhaustion 
was positively associated with disengagement (r = .45, p < .05) and cognitive failures 
(r = .58, p < .01), while disengagement was positively associated with self-reported 
PM errors (r = .52, p < .01). Then, cognitive failures positively correlated with self-
reported PM errors (r = .71, p < .01) and the objective PM task (r = -.53, p < .01). 
Finally, self-reported PM errors negatively correlated with the scores from the 
objective PM task (r = -.41, p < .05).
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Table 3.2. Means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s α (on the diagonal), and zero-order correlations for the research variables 
 M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Gender a - -          
2. Age  47.16 (8.29) .03 -         
3. Education b - .04 -.3 -        
4. Tenure 18.13 (8.53) .04 .69** -.03 -       
5. Need for recovery 25.48 (8.35) -.18 .2 -.18 .05 .94      
6. Exhaustion 20 (3.53) .07 .03 -.04 .05 .6** .70     
7. Disengagement 20.32 (3.5) -.19 -.15 .16 -.11 .4* .45* .62    
8. Cognitive failures 45.59 (21.39) -.07 .28 -.18 .03 .87** .58** .34 .95   
9. Self-reported PM errors 18.35 (6.37) -.34 .18 .1 .19 .66** .29 .52** .71** .87  
10. Objective PM task 2.06 (1.55) -.03 -.3 .2 -.18 -.5** -.2 -.22 -.53** -.41* - 
 Note.  a 0 = male, 1 = female; b 1 = lower, 2 = higher; ** p < .01, * p < .05
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Individual perception of medications errors 
Concerning nurses’ perceptions of the relevance of PM errors for daily practice (see 
Table 3.3), results showed that 93.5 percent of respondents rated PM as “absolutely 
essential”, “very important” or “of average importance”, while 6.4 percent estimated 
PM as having “little importance” or being “not important at all”.  
 
Table 3.3. Importance attributed to PM for daily practice 
Importance attributed to PM No. (n = 31) (%) 
absolutely essential 17 54.8 
very important 8 25.8 
of average importance 4 12.9 
of little importance 1 3.2 
not important at all 1 3.2 
Note: “Importance attributed to PM for daily practice” measures responses on a five-point 
Likert scale from 1 (= not important at all) to 5 (= absolutely essential) to the question “In your 
opinion, how much is important prospective memory for patient safety?”. 
 
Descriptive statistics concerning the frequency of encountering situations prone to PM 
errors at work (see Table 3.4) showed that participants rated interleaving and 
interrupted tasks as the situation most prone to lead to PM errors. 
 
Table 3.4. Mean ratings of frequency of self-reported PM errors  
Type of task Item M (SD) 
Interleaving 
task 
You made some mistake while accomplishing simultaneous 




While accomplishing a work task, you were abruptly 
interrupted by a colleague or an event and you cannot 










While accomplishing a highly habitual task, circumstances 
required you to deviate from a well-established procedural 
sequence and you cannot remember whether you 
unintentionally reverted to the normal procedure or not. 
2.35 (1.4) 
Episodic task You had to postpone at a later time some work task that is not 
usually performed. However, you cannot remember whether 
you eventually accomplished the task or not.  
2.22 (1.1) 
Habitual task You made some mistake during the execution of a highly 
habitual task, which consists of steps performed always in the 
same sequence. 
2.16 (.97) 
Note: Participants rated the frequency of each PM error on a five-point Likert scale, ranging 
from 1 (= never) to 5 (= very often).  
 
With respect to the perceived causes of medication errors (see Table 3.5), participants 
identified fatigue and exhaustion, wrong prescriptions of the physician, and failures to 
correctly identify the patient as the most frequent causes of medication errors. 
 
Table 3.5. Mean ratings of possible causes of medication errors 
Item M (SD) 
Medication errors occur when nurses are tired and exhausted. 3.84 (.97) 
Medication errors occur when the physician prescribes the wrong dose. 3.35 (1.47) 
Medication errors occur when the nurse fails to check the patient’s name-
band with the Medication Administration Record (MAR). 
3.35 (1.4) 
Medication errors occur when nurses are distracted by other patients, co-
workers, or events on the unit. 
3.32 (1.07) 
Medication errors occur when the nurse miscalculates the dose. 3.29 (1.37) 
Medication errors occur when the nurse sets up or adjusts an infusion device 
incorrectly. 
3.13 (1.41) 
Medication errors occur when the medication label/packaging are of poor 
quality or are damaged. 
3.1 (1.51) 





Medication errors occur when the physician’s writing on the doctor’s order 
form is difficult to read or illegible. 
3.03 (1.3) 
Medication errors occur when nurses are confused by different types and 
functions of infusions devices. 
2.87 (1.52) 
Note: Participants rated the frequency of each possible cause of medication errors on a five-
point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (= never) to 5 (= very often).  
 
Concerning the recognition and reporting of medication errors on the basis of five 
different medication scenarios describing fictitious incidents (see Table 3.6), 
descriptive statistics revealed that there was a considerable disagreement between 
respondents as to whether each described incident constituted a medication error (e.g., 
48.4% yes vs. 51.6% no in the second scenario), as well as to whether each described 
incident should be reported to the physician (e.g., 54.8% “yes” vs. 45.2% “no” in the 
first scenario).  
 
Table 3.6. Perception of medication errors and their reporting to supervisors in fictitious 
scenarios 
Item Response No. (n = 31) (%) 
Scenario 1. A patient misses his midday dose of oral ampicillin because he was in x-ray for 3 hours. 
Medication error Yes 13 41.9% 
 No 18 58.1% 
Notify physician Yes 17 54.8% 
 No 14 45.2% 
Scenario 2. Four patients on a busy surgical unit receive their 6 PM dose of IV antibiotics 4 hours late. 
Medication error Yes 15 48.4% 
 No 16 51.6% 
Notify physician Yes 12 38.7% 
 No 19 61.3% 
Scenario 3. A patient receiving TPN feeding via an infusion pump is given 200 ml/hr instead of the correct 
rate of 125 ml/hr for the first 3 hours of the 24-h infusion. The pump was reset to the correct rate after the 
change of shift at 7 A when the oncoming nurse realized the pump was set at the incorrect rate. 
Medication error Yes 25 80.6% 
 No 6 19.4% 
Notify physician Yes 23 74.2% 
 No 8 25.8% 
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Scenario 4. A patient admitted with status asthmaticus on 08/13 at 2 AM is prescribed albuterol (ventolin) 
nebulizers every 4 h. The nurse omits the 6 AM dose on 08/13 as the patient is asleep. 
Medication error Yes 13 41.9% 
 No 18 58.1% 
Notify physician Yes 14 45.2% 
 No 17 54.8% 
Scenario 5. A physician orders oxycodone hydrochloride and acetaminophen (Percocet) 1-2 tabs for post-
operation pain every 4 h. At 4 pm the patient complains of pain, requests 1 pill and is medicated. At 6.30 
pm the patient requests a second pain pill. The nurse administers the pill. 
Medication error Yes 16 51.6% 
 No 15 48.4% 
Notify physician Yes 19 61.3% 
 No 12 38.7% 
 
Concerning how participants deal with medication errors at work (see Table 3.7), 
descriptive statistics showed most participants indicated that they usually know what 
constitutes a medication error (71%) and when an incident report should be completed 
(58.1%). Only half of the sample (54.8%) indicated that medication errors are reported 
regardless of the fear of possible reactions of the nurse manager or co-workers. Finally, 
most participants stated that they never failed to report a medication error because they 
thought it was not serious (58.1%) or because they were afraid of repercussions (71%). 
 
Table 3.7. Perceptions about medication errors reporting 
Item Response No. (n = 31) (%) 
I am usually sure what constitutes a medication error. Yes 22 71 
 No 9 29 
I am usually sure when a medication error should be 
reported using an incident report. 
Yes 18 58.1 
 No 13 41.9 
Some medication errors are not reported because nurses 
are afraid of the reaction they will receive from the nurse 
manager or co-workers. 
Yes 14 45.2 
 No 17 54.8 
Have you ever failed to report a medication error because 
you did not think the error was serious enough to warrant 
reporting? 
Yes 13 41.9 
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 No 18 58.1 
Have you ever failed to report a medication error because 
you were afraid that you might be subject to disciplinary 
action or even lose your job? 
Yes 9 29 
 No 22 71 
 
3.5 Discussion 
Healthcare delivery is colloquially termed a “24/7” operation as it takes place 24 hours 
a day and 7 days a week, imposing a continuing challenge to healthcare workers. 
Indeed, they are confronted with complex tasks that require sustained attention and are 
particularly vulnerable to the effects of fatigue and stress (Warltier, Howard, Rosekind, 
Katz, & Berry, 2002). In particular, nurses daily monitor the quality of care delivered 
in hospitals and, as they spend the most time with patients as compared to any 
healthcare providers, the burden of medication errors falls more heavily on them than 
on any other member of the healthcare team (Osborne, Blais, & Hayes, 1999).  
 A number of reviews (e.g., DeLucia et al., 2009) identified slips and memory 
lapses, as well as stress and fatigue, as the most frequent causes contributing to 
medication errors. Yet, there is a paucity of empirical research examining memory 
errors caused by work stress and burnout as co-factors which may lead to forget 
clinical tasks and potential adverse events. Given the centrality of this issue for 
patients’ safety, this study attempted to evaluate how stress and burnout can contribute 
to PM errors in the healthcare context, along with examining individual perception of 
medication errors.  
 Our findings highlighted the detrimental impact of work stress and burnout on 
cognitive processes, as these negative experiences appeared to positively correlate 
with both general cognitive failures and self-reported PM errors. Confirmatory 
evidence of this negative effect was also provided by the significant correlation 
between perceived stress and burnout, on the one hand, and the objective evaluation 
of prospective memory, on the other. 
 Our investigation of healthcare workers’ perception of medication errors also 
provided some useful insights. Firstly, healthcare workers claimed that PM is 
particularly relevant for their daily practice. They reported that PM errors, posing a 
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significant threat to patient safety, more frequently derive from interruptions or 
multitasking. Moreover, consistently with Mayo and Duncan (2004), our results 
provided confirmatory evidence that healthcare workers were not sure about what 
constitutes a medication error. Indeed, even though most participants declared to be 
“usually sure what constitutes an error” (71% yes, 29% no), they did not correctly 
recognise medication errors when confronted with fictitious medication scenarios. 
Then, when we asked whether existed barriers to reporting errors to other people, many 
participants revealed that fear of disciplinary actions is still widespread and errors are 
consequently often hidden. Therefore, a great deal of difficulty persists in dealing with 
human error when it occurs, and a non-blaming, non-punitive, and non-fearful learning 
culture, in which one can openly admit errors, in order to learn from them and to avoid 
them in the future, is still needed (Vrbnjak, Denieffe, O’Gorman, & Pajnkihar, 2016).  
 Some limitations of this study need to be acknowledged. First, our data came 
from the use of self-report measures, raising the issue of common method bias and the 
risk of misinterpret relationships between variables (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003). Second, this study involved a small sample of workers from a 
gynaecological unit in one hospital system, which may limit the broader 
generalizability to other wards and hospitals. Moreover, a post-hoc power analysis 
(G*Power 3; Faul et al., 2007) showed that the statistical power for this study was .40 
for detecting a moderate effect, whereas the power increased to .87 for the detection 
of a large effect. Thus, there was more than adequate power at the large effect size 
level, but less than adequate statistical power at the moderate effect size level (Button 
et al., 2013). Third, the nature of the study was correlational, meaning that no reliable 
conclusions can be drawn regarding the causal directions of the relationships between 
variables. However, I believe that the knowledge gained from this study can contribute 
to improving practitioners’ understanding of the cognitively demanding nursing work 
environment, and it may draw attention to the need for redesigning the nursing work 
system in order to minimize the reliance on memory (e.g., through the use of tools, 
such as checklists or protocols) and reduce errors caused by stress. This study can also 
inform educational programs designed to promote the recognition of medication errors 
among healthcare workers, insisting on a whole-system approach that considers errors 








































4.1 Planning out future actions about health 
Part One of this Thesis portrayed prospective memory as the cognitive function we use 
for formulating plans and promises, for retaining them, and for recollecting them 
subsequently when circumstances permit (Brandimonte, 2006; Graf, 2012). What we 
have learned from Studies 1 and 2 is that this function is essential for many everyday 
tasks, from picking up groceries after work to attending an important meeting at the 
right time and place, as well as for maintaining our efficiency at work.  
 Deficient prospective memory may also significantly impact our health. 
Medical adherence is, in fact, deeply intertwined with how people set and maintain 
future health goals and plans. As Gollwitzer and Oettingen (2007) highlighted: 
 
“a first prerequisite for medical adherence is that people walk away from a 
health care provider (or from medical instructions obtained elsewhere) with a 
strong intention (goal) to act on the advice or instruction given. Second, and 
equally important, people need to effectively translate their goals into action, 
not only after the advice has been given but also weeks and months thereafter” 
(p. 23). 
 
Poor prospective remembering has long been recognised as a substantial obstacle in 
the treatment of several conditions including HIV/AIDS, rheumatoid arthritis, and 
diabetes (Eysenck, 2009), as well as in health-promotion and disease-prevention 
enterprises requiring immediate costs and only long-term rewards, such as starting to 
exercise regularly or picking up a healthy diet (Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & 
Oettingen, 1998). Preventive health behaviours like vaccination could be added to 
these examples. Indeed, getting vaccinated involves multiple steps truly resembling a 
prospective memory act: first, the individual needs to form and encode the intention 
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of getting the vaccine at hand; then, there is a retention interval that lasts weeks or 
even months between intention formation and intention execution; finally, after this 
delay, the individual may successfully retrieve the intention from retrospective 
memory. There may be particular problems during these diverse steps because of the 
complexity of the intention, its relationship to other stored intentions, or the presence 
of other competing intentions. For example, individuals may ask themselves whether 
the intention to vaccinate is compatible with what they believe, whether it is based on 
information coming from a perceived credible source, or whether relevant others 
believe that vaccines are safe and effective, therefore endorsing this intention 
(Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012; Schwarz & Newman, 2017). 
 However, according to Gollwitzer (1993, 1996, 1999), there is a strategy that 
may help people to keep their health intentions in mind, which is referred to as 
“implementation intentions”. An implementation intention is a planning technique that 
delineates what people need to do, and when, to fulfil their intentions. It is usually 
formulated as an if-then plan that might take the form of “If I receive a notice about a 
flu-shot clinic, then I will immediately schedule an appointment” (Brewer, Chapman, 
Rothman, Leask, & Kempe, 2017). A wealth of research indicates that implementation 
intentions are effective at enhancing the likelihood of goal achievement (for a review, 
see: Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). In the context of vaccination, a randomized control 
trial that prompted people to specify a date and a time for their next influenza 
vaccination increased vaccination coverage (Milkman, Beshears, Choi, Laibson, & 
Madrian, 2011). However, implementation intentions are designed to help people to 
act rather than to change their intentions. As Sheeran, Webb and Gollwitzer (2005) 
suggested, implementation intentions could be particularly effective for individuals 
who hold favourable beliefs, attitudes, and intentions toward the target behaviour. This 
implies that vaccines-hesitant people may be less easily persuaded by this kind of 
“self-reminder”. As detailed in the following Chapters, the reasons for their resistance 
to vaccination may be related to the complex issues of misinformation and mistrust. 
 
4.2 The continued influence effect of misinformation in memory 
Our everyday lives revolve around the acquisition of information. Sadly, we are not 
always presented with accurate and valid information; we often encounter ideas and 
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concepts that are instead inaccurate and invalid; we are misinformed (Rapp & Braasch, 
2014). Misinformation by definition does not accurately reflect the true state of the 
world (Cook, Ecker, & Lewandowsky, 2015); rather, it refers to “any information that 
turns out to be incorrect, irrespective of why and how that information was acquired 
in the first place” (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2011, p. 1).  
 Much research indicates that misinformation can survive in the face of updated 
records; people can continue to rely on misinformation even if they remember and 
understand a subsequent retraction (e.g., Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988; Seifert, 2002; 
Cook & Lewandowsky, 2011). The lingering phenomenon by which misinformation 
continues to influence memory, reasoning, and decision making even after 
sophisticated correction attempts is known as “continued influence effect” (Johnson & 
Seifert, 1994). Reliance on misinformation may spread and have severe social effects 
because, if people believe in something that is factually incorrect, misinformation may 
form the basis for decisions that run counter to a society’s best interest (Lewandowsky 
et al.,2012), as in the case I chose to analyse: vaccine misinformation. Therefore, there 
is the need to learn more about how people come to hold misperceptions and to 
determine the most effective way to counter mistaken beliefs (Nyhan & Reifler, 2012).  
 This chapter analyses the intricate phenomenon of misinformation: where it 
originates and is spread, how it affects our cognition, and how to counteract its 
negative effects.  
 
4.3 Mapping the origins and sources of misinformation  
Misinformation can come in many guises. The analysis of the origin and dissemination 
of misinformation has yielded a new field known as “agnotology”, that is the study of 
ignorance and its cultural production arising from intentional attempts to spread 
confusion and deceit, usually to sell a product or win favour (Proctor, 2008).  
Some evidence indicates that corporations with vested interests have been 
involved in deliberate campaigns to disseminate misinformation. For instance, 
companies like the American Petroleum Institute or the Western Fuels Association 
have promoted doubt and ignorance about the anthropogenic influences on global 
warming (Hoggan & Littlemore, 2009). For years, big tobacco firms have conspired 
to deny, distort, and minimize the harmful effects of cigarette smoking (Glantz, 
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Barnes, Bero, Hanauer, & Slade, 1995). Similarly, the Coca-Cola Company has poured 
vast amounts of money into studies aimed at countering claims that drinking soda does 
not cause obesity (Malhotra, Noakes, & Phinney, 2015). When it comes to vaccines, a 
popular argument by vaccine deniers is that those who defend vaccine are “in the 
pocket of Big Pharma” (Kata, 2012) or other companies interested in promoting 
pharmaceutical products for devious purposes or profit, ignoring, for example, that the 
direct cost to the public health infrastructure of containing one case of measles is far 
greater than the estimated cost of uncomplicated individual illness (Dayan, Ortega-
Sánchez, LeBaron, & Quinlisk, 2005). 
Rumours and fiction can constitute further significant sources of 
misinformation. For example, Michael Crichton’s novel “State of Fear”, whose central 
thesis is that scientists are bending facts to fit their unsubstantiated global-warming 
theories, has become a bestseller and the fiction author has been invited as a climate 
“expert” to testify before a US Senate committee. Another case of particular concern 
involves the controversial documentary “Vaxxed: From Cover-Up to Catastrophe”, 
which has alleged a cover-up of a purported link between the MMR vaccine and 
autism. The movie, directed by Andrew Wakefield – the former doctor who 
perpetuated the hoax that originated the current vaccine scare – was scheduled to 
premiere at the “2016 Tribeca Film Festival” but was eventually withdrawn after 
receiving harsh criticisms from members of the scientific community worldwide. 
 The media play a large role in disseminating misinformation. Sometimes this 
deception occurs accidentally and without malice; because of the need for timely news 
coverage of unfolding events, TV news, radio reports, and the press tend to update and 
correct earlier information (e.g., announcing partial results of an opinion poll or the 
death toll after a natural disaster). Another potential source of misinformation relies 
on journalists’ tendency to present “balanced” coverage by giving equal weight to all 
sides of an issue. Even though this is not formally wrong, it could imply presenting an 
issue as being more balanced between opposing viewpoints than the evidence actually 
supports. In this way, experts could be given equal voice with non-experts and 
important information that would establish one side’s claims as baseless could be 
omitted. For instance, evidence shows that balanced presentations of the autism-
vaccine controversy can deceive the public and influence judgments of vaccines risk 
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(Dixon & Clarke, 2013). Another example is the false controversy related to global 
warming, which is remote from the actual state of science and slides into overt denial 
of scientific facts (Lewandowsky, Mann, Brown, & Friedman, 2016). For this reason, 
giving equal voice to the majority of scientists that attribute climate change to the 
effects of the greenhouse-gas emission caused by humans and to the small number of 
sceptics who still dispute this conclusion can induce laypeople to think there is a 
serious disagreement within the scientific community, when in fact there is an 
overwhelming scientific consensus favouring anthropogenic global warming 
(Verheggen et al., 2014).  
With regard to new media, digital misinformation has been labelled by the 
World Economic Forum (WEF) as one of the main threats to our society (Zollo et al., 
2015). The Internet has become a sort of “modern Pandora’s box” (Kata, 2010), where 
the amount of misinformation grows proportionally with the availability of valid 
information or even faster because of the lack of fact-checking. The nature of the new 
generation of the Internet (Web 2.0) has obliterated authority and “flattened truth” 
(Keen, 2007), allowing any and all opinions to spread widely and in record time (Kata, 
2010, 2012; Wineburg, 2016). To the extent that it is not uncommon for the naïve user 
to fall into the trap of “echo-chambers”, where the same misleading content appear on 
many linked websites and blogs of similar persuasion, giving the false impression of 
corroborative evidence from multiple independent sources (Del Vicario et al., 2016). 
An added complexity related to digital misinformation is that users tend to select and 
share content related to a specific narrative that reinforces their own opinions and 
beliefs, a phenomenon known as “selective exposure” (Prior, 2002). In particular, 
those considered on the fringe – members of marginalized groups – tend to aggregate 
into like-minded and isolated clusters or “cyber-ghettos” (Johnson, Bichard, & Zhang, 
2009), which foster segregation, polarization, and the spread of conspiracy theories 
(Bessi et al., 2015; Grimes, 2016). This is demonstrated by the anti-vaccination 
movement on the Internet, where self-proclaimed experts are able to spread their 
deceiving messages and weaken evidence-based opinions from qualified experts, 
taking advantage of the postmodern characteristic of relativism by which there are no 
objective facts but rather multiple meanings and way of “knowing” (Kata, 2012). This 
is particularly worrisome because recent studies demonstrated that people are 
50 
 
increasingly turning to the Internet to find health information and have a hard time 
gauging source credibility appropriately and accurately, being distrustful of official 
sources like healthcare professionals, health departments or government sources and 
reporting more confidence in alternative and unreliable sources such as anti-
vaccination organizations (Salmon, Moulton, Omer, DeHart, Stokley, & Halsey, 2005; 
Salmon et al., 2009). As discussed later in Study 5, some studies corroborate indeed 
that source trustworthiness – the perception that the source is willing to provide 
information that the source itself believes to be accurate – is crucial in affecting belief 
change and gaining behavioural compliance, regardless of the level of source expertise 
– the extent to which the source is capable of providing accurate information (Guillory 
& Geraci, 2013). Even worse, the lower one’s prior knowledge about the health topic 
at hand and involvement with it, the more influential the source credibility becomes 
(Jung, Walsh-Childers, & Kim, 2016). In the area of vaccine safety, given that 
laypeople lack relevant knowledge and trust in science and institutions, the implication 
is that inferences about the trustworthiness of the source of information, rather than 
about its real expertise, could steer one’s vaccination intention, regardless of the ability 
of the source to provide reliable information. 
 
4.4 Reasons for resistance to misinformation 
To better understand how people form and hold misperceptions even over matters 
where the evidence is so unequivocal (e.g., climate change, vaccines, and the 
birthplace of the American president Barack Obama; Lewandowsky et al., 2012), it is 
particularly useful to draw from social psychology research on motivated reasoning. 
Festinger’s pioneering theory of cognitive dissonance (1957) postulated that 
inconsistency between facts, opinions, beliefs, or attitudes in an individual’s cognitive 
system produces tension that must be reduced or eliminated. The discrepancy between 
these elements is labelled “cognitive dissonance”.  
 Festinger (1957) described four basic situations that facilitate dissonance: a) 
decision making, by which dissonance is a result of making a decision between two or 
more alternatives; b) forced compliance, by which dissonance occurs when individuals 
comply to public pressure without a concomitant change in their private opinion; c) 
social support, by which dissonance is caused by the disagreement with other persons; 
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and, finally, d) voluntary or involuntary exposure to dissonant information, by which 
dissonance arises from information that is inconsistent with the cognitions already held 
(Martin & Briggs, 1986). 
 This last situation may be particularly tricky when trying to correct 
misinformation. The main problem is that people are not blank slates, rather they 
already have beliefs and a set of facts lodged in their mind, which usually have an 
uneasy relationship with external facts. Nevertheless, these pre-existing beliefs dictate 
how people gather information and what they choose to accept, to the extent that, under 
certain circumstances, people may display a “confirmation bias”. This means that they 
uncritically choose to believe only what they want to believe, usually what fits their 
pre-existing beliefs and deeply held views, trying to avoid opposite claims and 
uncongenial information that challenge these beliefs (Klayman, 1995; Nickerson, 
1998). Inconsistent cognitions may indeed produce cognitive dissonance, namely that 
feeling of discomfort described earlier that is threatening for one’s self and usually 
activates a natural self-defence mechanism. Moreover, when something is inconsistent 
with prior beliefs and knowledge, people have trouble processing it (Winkielman, 
Huber, Kavanagh, & Schwarz, 2012). Instead, when the new information matches 
existing beliefs, processing is easier and people tend to nod along (Schwarz, Newman, 
& Leach, 2016). Confirmation bias is particularly strong among politically 
sophisticated individuals and among those with stronger underlying beliefs or attitudes 
on the issue in question (Nyhan & Reifler, 2012). Nevertheless, it can be spontaneously 
activated in the minds of most individuals, to the extent that “we may not even notice 
information that challenges our existing beliefs – at best we can be easily persuaded to 
ignore or misinterpret the information” (Whitworth, 2011, p. 203).  
 There are several ways to reduce cognitive dissonance fuelled by information 
challenging beliefs that people hold strongly, including counter-arguing the message 
(attempting to directly rebut the claim in question), bolstering one’s original attitude 
(bringing to mind reasons why the initial belief was correct), derogating the source of 
the message (dismissing the validity of the source of the claim), social validation of 
one’s original attitude (bringing to mind others who hold the same view), and reacting 
with negative affect (becoming upset or angry). Worst of all, even in the face of clear 
contradictory scientific evidence, people may continue to hold their beliefs by 
52 
 
distrusting the efficacy of scientific methods and concluding that the topic in question 
is not amenable to scientific investigation, a particular resistance strategy called 
“scientific-impotence excuse” (Munro, 2010).  
Much experimental evidence corroborates the idea that for those who are 
strongly fixed in their views, being confronted with counterarguments can cause their 
views to be strengthened. In fact, one of the most potent backfire effects of corrective 
information strategies occurs with topics that tie in with people’s “worldviews” (Cook 
& Lewandowsky, 2011). For instance, using in-depth “challenge” interviews that 
presented participants with substantive challenges to their political opinions, Prasad et 
al. (2009) showed that Republicans who believed Saddam Hussein was linked to the 
9/11 terrorist attacks – a false belief that was the result of a campaign of false 
information and innuendo from the Bush administration – did not change their mind 
even after being presented with a direct quote from George Bush denying any 
connection between the two. These voters displayed a behaviour called “inferred 
justification”: they believed 9/11 was the main reason for the war against Iraq and 
actively resisted information suggesting otherwise, even though the correction was 
made by a source they seemingly trusted. Along the same line, Nyhan and Reifler 
(2010) conducted an experiment in which participants were given mock news articles, 
each of which contained a false claim followed by a clear and direct correction, for 
example that Bush’s tax cuts increased government revenues (revenues actually fell). 
Later corrections in the stories slightly decreased misperceptions among liberals but 
increased them dramatically among conservatives.  
Apart from deep-rooted beliefs and ideologies, the acceptance and persistence 
of misinformation are favoured by tacit norms of everyday conversational conduct. 
According to Grice’s conversational logic perspective (1989), information relayed in 
conversation comes with a “guarantee of relevance” and listeners proceed on the 
assumption that speakers try to be truthful, relevant, and clear (Lewandowsky et al., 
2012). Therefore, invalid information, as any other information, can be taken at face 
value just because people have a response bias towards uncritically accepting 
something as true, believing the speaker is acting in “good faith” (Pennycook, Cheyne, 
Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015). This could also be the reason why correction 
attempts frequently fail: if the correction is truthful, why would a well-intentioned 
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source have presented misinformation in the first place? And if the earlier information 
(representing actually misinformation) is believed to be accurate, how can its 
correction be simultaneously accepted as accurate? (Seifert, 2002). People feel 
extremely uneasy when two sources of information cue conflicting responses and 
conflict monitoring failures represent an important source of bias in reasoning and 
decision making (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2015). 
Moreover, when we initially encounter information, a mental model of the unfolding 
events as we know them is built. When new information becomes available and 
relevant, this model needs to be updated. If the required changes are small, they can 
be integrated into this model incrementally, while if they are more pervasive, a 
“global” update becomes necessary and the old mental model needs to be discarded to 
create a new one (Bailey & Zachs, 2015; Swire & Ecker, 2018). The problem here 
arises because people, feeling uncomfortable with gaps in their knowledge of an event, 
tend to prefer an incorrect but complete model over a corrected but incomplete one, 
clinging to the original misinformation and ignoring the correction. To illustrate, part 
of the reason why so many people continued to believe in the alleged link between 
vaccines and autism, despite extensive corrections, was that autism was on the rise, 
increasing in notoriety and frequency each year, and seemingly so just as the measles 
vaccine was stepped up, consolidating into the public’s mind the false causal link that 
the measles vaccine caused autism (Jacobson, Targonski, & Poland, 2007). The 
conflict created by having a readily available plausible answer to a question (“What 
causes autism? Measles vaccine!”), but at the same time knowing that it was wrong 
because of the numerous retractions, was easily resolved by sticking to the original 
misconception and ignoring the overwhelming evidence indicating the opposite 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012). 
  
4.5 Corrective efforts  
Debunking misinformation is no easy job. Corrective efforts can even trigger backfire 
effects, so that people not only fail to change their minds when confronted with facts, 
but they may come to hold their wrong beliefs more tenaciously than ever (Cook & 
Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Vaccines misinformation is no 
exception (Nyhan, Reifler, Richey, & Freed, 2014; Nyhan & Reifler, 2015); several 
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attempts have been made to counteract vaccination misconceptions and the diverse 
strategies usually employed to this end will be presented in the following chapter. 
More generally, researchers have come to understand that corrections should 
not be solely informational, rather they should replace the original misinformation with 
a better alternative, or at least, explain why the misinformation came to be (Seifert, 
2002). This is why, as explained before, people build mental models of the world and 
want them to be complete. When we retract something, this leaves a gap in people’s 
understanding. But people do not like gaps and they will go back to that 
misinformation, put it back in their model and use it in their reasoning. To avoid this, 
the best thing to do is to give people an alternative piece of information that they can 
put in their model. Two useful guides, the Debunking Handbook (Cook & 
Lewandowsky, 2011) and the Uncertainty Handbook (Corner, Lewandowsky, Phillips, 
& Roberts, 2015), provide other useful recommendations to debunk misinformation, 
including not overloading people with information, emphasizing the core facts and not 
the myths, using a graphic as a pie chart to visually enhance the message, choosing a 
messenger who is trustworthy to communicate the consensus, and finding the closest 
match between the values of the audience and those of the messenger.  
Yet, there is no single formula, recipe, or procedure that completely removes 
misinformation from memory and works in every situation. To foreshadow briefly, the 
following studies will corroborate the idea that the continued influence effect of 
misinformation is a powerful influence on later reasoning (Seifert, 2002). That is not 
to say there is no reason for optimism. While correcting misinformation is absolutely 
important and finding the best way to do so is much needed, we should worry that 
misinformation should not be acquired in the first place. In the political unrest 
following Brexit and the 2016 presidential election in the US, where the political 
landscape was rife with misinformation, it is not difficult to understand that there is no 
such thing as free-floating information; all information we encounter comes from 
somewhere and may be distorted by political motives, personal opinions or biases 
(Swire & Ecker, 2018; Wineburg, 2016). As the possibility for misinformation 
multiplies, the only candle in the dark relies upon laypeople’s baloney detection ability 











Vaccines are the safest and most effective tools for preventing infectious diseases and 
their success in achieving relevant public health outcomes, such as the reduction or 
eradication of many life-threatening conditions, is well-established. However, many 
people appear hesitant about vaccines, doubting their benefits, worrying over their 
safety or questioning the need for them. Addressing vaccine hesitancy, defined as a 
“delay in acceptance or refusal of vaccines despite availability of vaccination services” 
(WHO, 2014, p. 575), is not a simple task for the following reasons. First, vaccine 
hesitancy is rooted in a set of cognitive mechanisms that conspire to render 
misinformation particularly “sticky” and pro-vaccination beliefs counter-intuitive 
(Miton & Mercier, 2015), involving a multitude of emotional, social, cultural, and 
political factors (Larson, Jarrett, Eckersberger, Smith, & Paterson, 2014). Second, 
public information campaigns designed to dispel erroneous vaccination beliefs often 
overlook these factors and have limited or even unintended opposite effects (Nyhan & 
Reifler, 2015; Nyhan, Reifler, Richey, & Freed, 2014). Furthermore, even when 
attempts to correct invalid information do not “backfire” by entrenching the original 
misinformation (Johnson & Seifert, 1994), they can frequently fail because people 
cannot successfully update their memories and still fall back on information they know 
is not correct in order to make inferences and explain events. 
A vivid example of persistent reliance on mistaken beliefs despite extensive 
corrections involves the alleged risks of childhood vaccines, especially the purported 
link between certain vaccines and autism, fear of which escalated following the widely 
discredited Wakefield et al.’s study (Offit & Coffin, 2003). Despite an abundance of 
                                                          
2 Pluviano, S., Watt, C., & Della Sala, S. (2017). Misinformation lingers in memory: Failure of three 
pro-vaccination strategies. PLoS ONE, 12(7), e0181640. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0181640 
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scientific evidence that shows no causal effect between any vaccine and autism (Heron 
& Golding, 2004; Honda, Shimizu, & Rutter, 2005) sizable segments of the public still 
champion Wakefield’s view. To understand what causes such persistent reliance on 
patently incorrect information, it is useful to consider some relevant memory processes 
in more detail. 
Classical laboratory research on memory for inferences (Johnson & Seifert, 
1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988) demonstrates that the continued reliance on 
discredited information is very difficult to correct. Even when people clearly 
remember and understand a subsequent correction when asked about it immediately 
(suggesting that they have encoded it and can retrieve and potentially comply with it), 
they can still be influenced by the effect of the retracted misinformation. That is, 
people are susceptible to misinformation even though they had acknowledged that the 
information at hand is factually incorrect. As Rapp and Braasch stated (2014; p. 3), 
“the problem is not just that people rely on inaccurate information but that they rely 
on it when they seemingly should know better”. This seemingly irrational reliance on 
outright misinformation has been demonstrated with beliefs related to well-known 
material (e.g., biblical narratives; Erickson & Mattson, 1981; Hannon & Daneman, 
2001), blatant hoaxes (e.g., paranormal claims; Manza, Hilperts, Hindley, Marco, 
Santana, & Hawk, 2010) or personally experienced events (e.g., distorted eyewitness 
testimonies; Loftus, 2003). It also occurs despite measures intended to make the 
presentation of information clearer and despite explicit warnings about the misleading 
nature of the information at hand (Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Tang, 2010; Trembath, 
Paynter, Keen, & Ecker, 2016). Therefore, simply retracting a piece of information 
does not stop its influence because outdated pieces of information linger in memory. 
In the case of vaccines, providing evidence about the safety of immunisation may not 
be enough as people may have heard or read somewhere that, for example, vaccines 
are not necessary, that they cause autism or contain dangerous chemicals. This false 
information persists in their minds. 
An added complication is that the use of inaccurate information does not 
necessarily emerge immediately after its presentation but may occur after a delay 
between the initial presentation and later test points (Appel & Richter, 2007; Zhu et 
al., 2012). Classical laboratory research on the lasting effect of misinformation in 
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memory confirms that immediate tests following the presentation of inaccurate 
information are less likely to detect people’s susceptibility to misinformation 
compared to longer time intervals (Belli, Windschitl, McCarthy, & Winfrey, 1992; 
Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). 
Given these difficulties, there is a need to investigate debiasing practices used 
to disseminate correct information concerning vaccines, which, at the very least, 
should do no harm and ideally should help people better understand why and when 
they can trust scientific advice. 
A number of strategies have been used to communicate the scientific consensus 
about vaccination and promote correction of misinformation. Perhaps the simplest 
strategy is exposing myths while concurrently debunking them, which is based on the 
idea of reiterating myths and then discrediting them with a number of facts. However, 
repeating myths might contribute to increasing their acceptance due to their perceived 
familiarity (Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010; Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 
1977; Peter & Koch, 2016). According to content-focused models of judgement, the 
strong arguments presented by the facts should decrease the acceptance of myths 
(Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & Yoon, 2007). Moreover, some have argued that simply 
reviewing misinformation may even facilitate memory updating (Pashler, Kang, & 
Mozer, 2013). The scant available experimental evidence appears to only marginally 
support this approach. Consistent with it, in a natural classroom environment, 
Kowalski and Taylor (2009) found that “refutational lectures” (in which popular 
misconceptions about psychology where directly addressed and contrasted with 
evidence opposing them and supporting the correct information) resulted in students 
having better access at the end of the course to the correct information. In the context 
of immunisation, there has been an inconclusive debate about whether health messages 
using a fact versus myth format are effective in reinforcing accurate information and 
refuting false information. Some studies found that repeating myths led to a marked 
increase in accepting those myths as true. For example, in an unpublished study, 
participants who read a “myths vs. facts” flyer regarding the flu vaccine subsequently 
misremembered myths as facts after only 30 minutes and expressed less favourable 
attitudes toward flu vaccination and lower intentions to get vaccinated, relative to 
control participants who did not read the flyer (Schwarz et al., 2007). Similarly, in a 
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study by Skurnik et al. (2005) participants who read either true or false health-related 
statements could not distinguish fact from fiction after a 3-day delay. Even worse, the 
more they were warned that a statement was false, the more they accepted it as true. 
Despite these backfire effects, many pro-vaccination initiatives continue to confront 
erroneous beliefs with established evidence. A recent study by Cameron et al. (2013) 
employing different facts versus myths message formats justifies the use of myths to 
overcome health misinformation, as participants who were exposed to facts, myths, 
and evidence to counteract those myths gained more knowledge regarding a specific 
health topic and had a better recall accuracy than those who were merely presented 
with factual information. 
An alternative corrective technique is to represent information in visual form, 
using well-designed graphs which can attract and hold people’s attention, help the 
observer to process information more effectively, and facilitate recollection (van der 
Linden, Leiserowitz, Feinberg, & Maibach, 2014). Being easier to process than 
complex verbal description, graphical representation of data can also provide more 
clarity and less opportunity for misinterpretation than text, simplifying complex ideas 
and highlighting what is important. According to Gigerenzer (2014), a specific tool 
that could allow people with no medical or statistical competence to make competent 
decisions is a “fact box”, which consists of a table for transparent risk communication, 
summarizing the scientific evidence for a drug, treatment, or screening method in an 
easily understandable manner. Fact boxes usually show benefits and harms for people 
with and without treatment in plain frequencies, avoiding misleading statistics or 
statements of risk that may be misunderstood by laypeople. As transparent as a fact 
box, even though visually more appealing, is an “icon box”, which consists of a visual 
tool showing two groups of individuals: those who underwent a treatment and those 
who did not. Each individual is represented by an icon indicating benefits and harms. 
Although there has been relatively little research on the use of fact boxes as tools for 
informing the general public about pros and cons of a treatment, some studies show 
promising results. For instance, Schwartz et al. (2007, 2009) demonstrated how the 
use of simple fact boxes about drugs may help people to make better informed choices 
by improving their knowledge of drug benefits and side effects. 
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A third alternative to counter anti-vaccination attitudes is to harness the power 
that fear exerts on people, by highlighting grave risks from diseases (i.e., emotionally-
charged messages that show the possible serious consequences of a disease likely to 
happen in non-vaccinated individuals). According to Nyhan et al. (2014), this puts 
individuals into the “domain of losses”, making them aware of the dangers associated 
with the decision not to vaccinate their own children. An early meta-analysis by Witte 
and Allen (2000) revealed that fear appeals can actually increase the perception of the 
severity of the health threat inducing behaviour changes, at least as long as the 
individuals believe that they are able to protect themselves and avert the threat. Results 
from a comprehensive meta-analysis by Tannenbaum et al. (2015) showed that fear 
appeals are particularly effective at positively influencing attitudes, intentions, and 
behaviour under specific circumstances. Powerful persuasive messages like fear 
appeals seem also more successful when they recommend one-time behaviours (as is 
often the case for vaccination) compared with behaviours that should be repeated over 
an extended period of time (Robertson, 1978; Rothman, Martino, Bedell, Detweiler, 
& Salovey, 1999). However, the outcome of Nyhan et al.’s (2014) recent study did not 
corroborate the effectiveness of this approach. The images of sick children that they 
used to make risks more salient paradoxically increased beliefs in the false 
vaccine/autism link, a phenomenon they labelled danger-priming effect. Similarly, a 
study by Guillaumier et al. (2014) on the effectiveness of diverse anti-smoking 
messages showed that highly emotive warnings, which stressed the negative health 
effects of smoking via resonant texts and vivid pictures, did not motivate smokers to 
quit their behaviour. To achieve this aim, the use of a plain cigarette packaging proved 
to be more effective (Wakefield, Hayes, Durkin, & Borland, 2013). 
Notwithstanding the centrality of the vaccine issue, there is little systematic 
research on correcting vaccine misinformation and we found no strong evidence 
recommending any specific intervention to address vaccines hesitancy (Betsch, Böhm, 
Chapman, 2015; Jarrett, Wilson, O’Leary, Eckersberger, & Larson, 2015; Larson et 
al., 2014). Therefore, the present study aims at adding to our knowledge by directly 
contrasting the effectiveness of three promising strategies employed to reduce vaccine 
misperceptions in a controlled experimental setting. More specifically, we sought to 
test the three information strategies discussed above, namely the myth vs. fact message 
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frame, the presentation of fact/icon boxes, and the use of fear appeals. Two research 
questions were raised: 1) to what extent can these different approaches influence 
people’s vaccination beliefs and behaviour?; 2) does any of these approaches have a 
comparative advantage in terms of its ability to counter anti-vaccination attitudes, 
given the persistent effect of misinformation in influencing memory, reasoning and 
decision making, as well as the possibility of backfire effects? Finding answers to these 
questions can help to determine the best way to provide corrective information, 
undermining widespread vaccination myths, advancing our understanding of how 
people process information regarding controversial health issues, and ultimately 





Participants were students from diverse departments of the University of Edinburgh, 
the Suor Orsola Benincasa University of Naples, and the Second University of Naples, 
resulting in an initial sample of 134 individuals. Participants were recruited via adverts, 
e-mail invitations, and snowball sampling. All participants gave their written informed 
consent and participated on a voluntary basis. The first wave of the study was 
completed by 134 respondents. We then re-contacted all participants from Wave 1. A 
total of 120 participants completed the second wave of the study (drop-out rate: 10%). 
Respondents who dropped out from the study and those who completed both waves 
did not differ on any relevant aspect. Our sample for all subsequent analyses consisted 
of the 120 participants who completed both waves of the study. Among those, 47 
(39.2%) were men and 73 (60.8%) women. Mean age was 25.35 years (SD 3.52, range 
19-34). Most participants had a Bachelor’s (n. 46, 38.3%) or a Masters’ degree (n. 63, 
52.5%), while 11 respondents (9.2%) were PhD students. The study received ethical 
approval from the Psychology Research Ethics Committee of the University of 






Questionnaires. All participants in the study completed two questionnaires 
(see Appendix C). The first questionnaire was a preliminary survey aimed at assessing 
participants’ baseline beliefs and attitudes towards vaccines, which has been used in 
previous studies (Freed, Clark, Butchart, Singer, & Davis, 2010; Nyhan et al., 2014). 
It consisted of 8 items which covered common attitudes from both the pro- (e.g., 
“Getting vaccines is a good way to protect my future child(ren) from disease”) and the 
anti-vaccination side (e.g., “Some vaccines cause autism in healthy children”). 
Participants were asked to indicate their degree of agreement with each statement on 
a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (= strongly disagree) to 5 (= strongly agree). The 
second questionnaire was a post-manipulation survey that assessed whether and how 
participants’ beliefs and attitudes toward vaccines changed compared to the baseline 
measure. The three-item post-manipulation survey has also been used in previous 
studies (Nyhan et al., 2014). The first item evaluated general misperceptions about 
vaccines causing autism (“Some vaccines cause autism in healthy children”) with a 5-
point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (= strongly disagree) to 5 (= strongly agree). Item 
two investigated beliefs about vaccines side effects (“Children vaccinated against 
measles, mumps, and rubella will suffer serious side effects”) with a 6-point Likert 
scale, ranging from 1 (= very unlikely) to 6 (= very likely). The third item asked 
participants to evaluate how likely they would be to give MMR vaccine to their child 
on a 6-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (= very unlikely) to 6 (= very likely). This 
post-manipulation survey was administered twice, immediately after the correction 
interventions ('Time 1') and after a 7-day delay to evaluate the longevity and robustness 
of the observed effects ('Time 2').  
Correction interventions. Participants could be exposed to one of 4 
experimental conditions. Examples of messages for each condition are presented in 
Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. In the first condition (Myths vs. Facts Correction), 
participants received a booklet confronting 10 “myths” with a number of “facts”. Each 
page of the leaflet contrasted a popular erroneous belief about vaccination (e.g., low 
perception of vaccine efficacy, safety concerns about immune overload, fear of the 
alleged presence of toxic poisons and chemicals in vaccines, etc.) with established 
evidence intended at decreasing the acceptance of that myth. Myth/fact #10 
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specifically addressed the common misconception about the link between MMR 
vaccine and autism (Figure 5.1). The text for this intervention, which was taken nearly 
verbatim from the WHO’s (World Health Organization) website, was displayed in a 
columnar format, with the “myth” and “fact” headings on each column to avoid any 
ambiguity. The length of each myth and fact was matched to reduce the risk of 
individuals devoting more attention to one text rather than the other.  
In the second condition (Visual Correction), participants viewed a series of 
tables comparing the potential problems caused by measles, mumps, and rubella with 
the potential side effects caused by the MMR vaccine (Figure 5.2). Each table showed 
the chance of various outcomes for people who do and do not get vaccinated. In order 
to test the effectiveness of graphic material as a communication device, the MMR 
Decision Aid presented in the NCIRS’ (National Centre for Immunization Research & 
Surveillance) website was adapted for this intervention.  
In the third condition (Fear Correction) participants were presented with 
pictures of unvaccinated children with measles, mumps, and rubella, along with the 
description of the symptoms of each disease and a brief warning about the importance 
of vaccinating one’s own child (Figure 5.3). Materials for this intervention were drawn 
from the IDPH’s (Illinois Department of Public Health) website. The brief warning in 
the instructions, formulated in personalised language (i.e., “The following images 
show some of the consequences you may face choosing to not vaccinate your child”), 
emphasized the similarities between the victims of these diseases and participants’ 
actual or future children to increase perceptions of susceptibility. 
Finally, in the control condition (Control) participants read two unrelated fact 
sheets containing tips to help prevent medical errors (Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality, December 2014) and get safer healthcare (Agency for Healthcare 













Figure 5.2. Example of message for the Visual Correction 
This message compared the potential problems caused by measles with the potential problems 
caused by the MMR vaccine. Common and usually mild symptoms that can be treated at home are 
represented in green, moderate complications that need medical attention but may not include 
hospitalisation are portrayed in yellow, and serious complications that need urgent medical 




Figure 5.3. Example of message for the Fear Correction 





5.3 Procedure  
Participants were informed at the outset that the experiment consisted of two parts or 
sessions, both seeking to gather their opinions about vaccines (Figure 5.4). After 
providing some demographic details (i.e., sex, age, educational level), all participants 
completed the preliminary survey aimed at assessing their baseline beliefs and attitudes 
towards vaccines. Next, participants were randomly assigned to 1 of the 4 conditions, 
namely the Myths vs. Facts Correction, the Visual Correction, the Fear Correction, or 
the Control Condition. Participants were unaware of the other experimental conditions 
and researchers were blind to condition allocation until printed materials were 
delivered to the study participants. After the experimental intervention, all participants 
completed the post-manipulation survey (Time 1), evaluating their beliefs in the link 
between vaccines and autism, in vaccines side effects, and vaccination intention. After 
a 7-day delay, all participants were re-contacted to participate in the second wave of 
the study during which the same questions of the post-manipulation survey were asked 
again (Time 2). At the end of the second session, participants were carefully debriefed. 
The researcher made the actual purpose of the study clear, revealing the experimental 
condition to which each participant was assigned and asking whether he/she had any 
questions about the study. Lastly, participants were thanked and compensated.  
Three key outcomes were evaluated: individual beliefs in vaccines causing 
autism (Vaccines Cause Autism) and side effects (Vaccines Side Effects), and intention 
to vaccinate (Vaccine Hesitancy). As these outcomes were collected twice for all the 
participants, our study design consisted of one between-subject variable (Correction 
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Intervention) with four levels (Myths vs. Facts Correction, Visual Correction, Fear 
Correction, and Control), and three within-subject variables (Vaccines Cause Autism, 
Vaccines Side Effects, and Vaccine Hesitancy), each with two levels (Time 1 and Time 
2).  
 





Data were stored and analysed using SPSS (version 20).  
For ease of interpretation, the item evaluating one’s vaccination intent was 
reverse-coded so that higher values indicated higher vaccine hesitancy. Therefore, all 
3 key outcomes were in the same direction as higher means indicated stronger vaccine 
misconceptions.  
To determine whether correction interventions had a time-varying effect or 
resulted in null effect on vaccination attitudes, different mixed-design ANOVAs were 
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performed on the whole sample, with independent measure on correction interventions 
(treated as a between-subjects variable) and repeated dependent measures on the three 
items/outcomes of the post-manipulation survey, i.e., Vaccines Cause Autism, 
Vaccines Side Effects, and Vaccine Hesitancy (treated as within-subjects variables). 
When significant interactions between correction interventions and time were found, 
separate estimates of simple main effects were carried out. Finally, to test whether the 
difference between outcomes measurements at Time 1 and Time 2 was statistically 
significant, we created 'change scores' for each of the 3 key outcomes (Vaccines Cause 
Autism, Vaccines Side Effects, and Vaccine Hesitancy), which were computed as the 
difference between mean outcomes scores at Time 2 and Time 1.  
For multiple comparisons between groups, Tukey’s HSD correction method 
was applied. Significance was accepted at p < .05 for all statistical analyses.  
Table 5.1 indicates means and standard deviations for the outcomes at Time 1 
and Time 2 in the whole sample. Following Table 1, the three sub-sections address our 
three key outcome measures. 
 
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) for the outcomes at Time 1 
and Time 2 
 Time 1 Time 2 
M SD M SD 
Vaccines Cause Autism 1.8 .9 2.12 .93 
Vaccines Side Effects 2.1 1 2.72 1.3 
Vaccine Hesitancy 1.66 .83 2.02 .92 
 
Beliefs in vaccines/autism link 
Concerning beliefs in the vaccines/autism link, there was a statistically significant 
interaction between correction interventions and time [F(3, 116) = 23.263, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .376]. The data in the conditions by time interaction are detailed in Figure 
5.5A. Simple main effect for condition revealed that there was a statistically significant 
difference in these beliefs between interventions at Time 1 [F(3, 116) = 6.183, p = 
.001, partial η2 = .138]. Indeed, beliefs in the vaccines/autism link were significantly 
greater in the fear correction intervention compared to the myths vs. facts (M = .83, 
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SE = .22, p = .001) and visual condition (M = .8, SE = .22, p = .002). A statistically 
significant difference in these beliefs between interventions was also detected at Time 
2 [F(3, 116) = 8.194, p < .001, partial η2 = .175]. This time, beliefs in the 
vaccines/autism link were statistically significantly higher in the myths vs. facts 
condition compared to the visual (M = .97, SE = .22, p < .001) and control condition 
(M = .8, SE = .22, p = .002), and in the fear condition compared to visual condition 
(M = .67, SE = .22, p = .016). Simple main effect for time confirmed that there was a 
statistically significant effect of time on beliefs in the vaccines/autism link for the 
myths vs. facts [F(1, 29) = 31.508, p < .001, partial η2 = .521] and the visual condition 
[F(1, 29) = 4.462, p = .043, partial η2 = .133]. Pairwise comparisons indicated that 
these beliefs were statistically significantly higher at Time 2 compared to Time 1 for 
both the myths vs. facts (M = 1.13, SE = .2, p < .001) and visual condition (M = .13, 
SE = .06, p = .043).  
As shown in Figure 5.6A, there was a significant difference between conditions 
in Vaccine Cause Autism Change Score [F(3,116) = 23.263, p < .001]. This effect was 
driven by the myths vs. facts condition, which led to larger changes in scores and 
therefore strongest beliefs in vaccines causing autism compared to the other two 
correction interventions, that is the visual (M = 1, SE = .16, p < .001) and the fear 
condition (M = 1.13, SE = .16, p < .001), and the control condition (M = 1.13, SE = 
.16, p < .001). 
 
Beliefs in vaccines side effects 
Concerning beliefs in vaccines side effects, there was a statistically significant 
interaction between interventions and time [F(3, 116) = 18.914, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.328]. The data in the conditions by time interaction are detailed in Figure 5.5B. Simple 
main effect for condition revealed that there was a statistically significant difference 
in these beliefs between interventions at Time 1 [F(3, 116) = 3.651, p = .015, partial 
η2 = .086]. Beliefs in vaccines side effects were statistically significantly higher in the 
fear correction intervention compared to the myth vs. facts (M = .67, SE = .24, p = 
.035), visual (M = .63, SE = .24, p = .05), and control condition (M = .67, SE = .24, p 
= .035). A statistically significant difference in beliefs concerning vaccines side effects 
between interventions was also detected at Time 2 [F(3, 116) = 32.919, p < .001, partial 
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η2 = .46]. Again, beliefs in vaccines side effects were statistically significantly greater 
in the fear correction intervention compared to the myth vs. facts (M = 1.57, SE = .25, 
p < .001), visual (M = 2.07, SE = .25, p < .001), and control condition (M = 2.17, SE 
= .25, p < .001). Simple main effect for time revealed that there was a statistically 
significant effect of time on beliefs in vaccines side effects for the myths vs. facts [F(1, 
29) = 9.207, p = .005, partial η2 = .241] and fear intervention [F(1, 29) = 96.000, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .768]. Pairwise comparisons indicated that these beliefs were 
statistically significantly higher at Time 2 compared to Time 1 for both the myths vs. 
facts (M = .7, SE = .23, p = .005) and fear condition (M = 1.6, SE = .16, p < .001).  
 There was also a significant difference between conditions in Vaccines Side 
Effects Change Score [F(3,116) = 18.914, p < .001] (Figure 5.6B). This time, this effect 
was driven by the fear condition, which led to larger changes in scores and therefore 
strongest beliefs in vaccines causing side effects than the other two correction 
interventions, that is the myths vs. facts (M = .9, SE = .22, p = .001) and the visual 
condition (M = 1.43, SE = .22, p < .001), and the control condition (M = 1.5, SE = .22, 
p < .001). 
 
Vaccine hesitancy 
Concerning vaccine hesitancy, there was a statistically significant interaction between 
interventions and time [F(3, 116) = 2.828, p = .042, partial η2 = .068]. The data in the 
conditions by time interaction are detailed in Figure 5.5C. Simple main effects for 
condition revealed that there was a statistically significant difference in vaccination 
intentions between interventions at Time 1[F(3, 116) = 3.613, p = .015, partial η2 = 
.085]. Vaccine hesitancy was statistically significantly higher in the myths vs. facts 
condition compared to the fear condition (M = .67, SE = .21, p = .01). A statistically 
significant difference in vaccination hesitancy between interventions was also detected 
at Time 2 [F(3, 116) = 6.413, p < .001, partial η2 = .142]. Vaccine hesitancy was 
statistically significantly higher in the myths vs. facts condition compared to the fear 
(M = .6, SE = .22, p = .04) and control condition (M = .97, SE = .22, p < .001). Simple 
main effects for time showed that there was a statistically significant effect of time on 
vaccination intentions for the fear condition [F(1, 29) = 20.605, p < .001, partial η2 = 
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.415]. Pairwise comparisons indicated that vaccine hesitancy increased over time (M 
= .6, SD = .13, p < .001). 
There was a significant difference between conditions in Vaccine Hesitancy 
Change Score [F(3,116) = 2.828, p = .042], (Figure 5.6C) as the fear correction led to 
larger changes in scores and higher vaccine hesitancy than the control condition (M = 
.6, SE = .23, p = .045). 
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Figure 5.5. Mean scores of the 3 key outcomes evaluated: Vaccines Cause Autism (A), Vaccines Side Effects (B), and Vaccine Hesitancy (C) by condition 
and time (after a week). Outcomes means at Time 1 are represented by blue bars, while outcome means at Time 2 by green bars. Error Bars: 95% CI. 
 









Figure 5.6. Change scores for the 3 key outcomes evaluated: Vaccine Cause Autism Change Score (A), Vaccines Side Effects Change Score (B), and 





The serious psychological and social implications of the persistence of incorrect 
information have been under investigation for decades, although interest has 
intensified in recent years, arguably because of the increasing presence of 
misinformation regarding relevant and sensitive topics, such as health care. The 
present study addressed the pertinent case of misinformation about vaccines. The 
correction of vaccine misinformation has become an urgent priority to assure the 
continued success of immunization programs. In this respect, some authors advocated 
the need to carefully test pro-vaccination messaging before making it public, especially 
given the risk of backfire effects, whereby messages created with a pro-social intent 
can result in the targeted attitude or behaviour at issue actually becoming worse 
(Nyhan & Reifler, 2015; Nyhan et al., 2014). However, there has been little systematic 
comparison of different forms of correction of vaccine misinformation. 
In this study, we provided a direct test of corrections on factual beliefs about 
vaccines, investigating the different impact of three common strategies used to 
promote vaccination. These were the use of the myth vs. fact message frame, the 
presentation of fact/icon boxes, and a format involving fear-inducing material. We 
outlined two core questions to evaluate the continued influence effect of 
misinformation. The first question concerned the extent to which these different 
techniques supported people’s updating process of information, being effective in 
discounting or at least reducing vaccine misperceptions. The second question was 
constrained by the answer to the previous one and reconnected to the issue of memory: 
in other words, to what extent the various effects described in this study faded, were 
amplified, or backfired over time? As our primary concern was in the phenomenon by 
which misinformation in memory can affect later inferences and behaviours, we 
incorporated a delay in our design to evaluate the effectiveness of the aforementioned 
strategic messages over time, with a particular interest in explaining possible backfire 
effects. 
Our study provided further support to the growing literature showing how 
corrective information may have unexpected and even counter-productive results. 
Specifically, we found that the myths vs. facts format, at odds with its aims, induced 
stronger beliefs in the vaccine/autism link and in vaccines side effects over time, 
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lending credit to the literature showing that countering false information in ways that 
repeat it may further contribute to its dissemination (Schwarz et al., 2007). Also the 
exposure to fear appeals through images of sick children led to more increased 
misperceptions about vaccines causing autism. Moreover, this corrective strategy 
induced the strongest beliefs in vaccines side effects, highlighting the negative 
consequences of using loss-framed messages and fear appeals to promote preventive 
health behaviours (Erceg‐Hurn & Steed, 2011; Guillaumier, 2014). Our findings also 
suggest that no corrective strategy was useful in enhancing vaccination intention. 
Compared to the other techniques, the usage of fact/icon boxes resulted in less damage 
but did not bring any effective result. 
Our pattern of results thus confirms that there should be more testing of public 
health campaign messages. This is especially true because corrective strategies may 
appear effective immediately yet backfire even after a short delay, when the message 
they tried to convey gradually fades from memory, allowing common misconceptions 
to be more easily remembered and identified as true (Schwarz et al., 2007). This is the 
case for one of the most frequently used corrective strategy employing the myths 
versus facts format, which often backfires because the simple repetition of the myth, 
though well-intended and necessary in order to contrast it with the available evidence, 
paradoxically amplifies the familiarity of that false claim making it seem even more 
believable and widely-shared (Schwarz et al. 2016). This happens, at least partly, 
because people tend to mistake repetition for truth, a phenomenon known as the 
“illusory truth” effect (Dechêne et al., 2010; Hasher et al., 1977). Familiarity appears 
as a key determinant of this effect; indeed, when something seems familiar is easier to 
process and one is more inclined to believe it (Peter & Koch, 2016), regardless of 
whether the statement is factually true or false (Hasher et al., 1977; Gigerenzer, 2014) 
or was initially rated as credible or questionable (Arkes, Hackett, & Boehm, 1989). 
Multiple explanations have been proposed for the continued influence of 
misinformation. A strong argument is that, once a belief is formed, people generate 
explanations that fit and further reinforce this belief and tend to vigorously reject 
counter-arguments that make them uncomfortable, regardless of their validity (Nyhan 
& Reifler, 2010). People’s worldview, or personal ideology, can indeed override 
unwelcome facts and determine the effectiveness of retractions, which can even 
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backfire when they are attitude-incongruent and strengthen the initial held beliefs (i.e., 
“attitude bolstering”; Prasad et al., 2009). This effect can be better understood within 
a cognitive consistency perspective (Festinger, 1957), according to which rejecting a 
belief would generate numerous inconsistencies that threaten one’s self-concept. To 
reduce the emerging fear they may feel, people (especially those with high personal or 
partisan stakes on the issue in question) can engage in different defensive mechanisms, 
which are likely to appear in combination and may include selective exposure 
(engaging in a biased search process, seeking out information from outlets that 
supports ones’ preconceptions), source derogation (dismissing the validity of the 
source of the unwelcome corrective information), social validation (bringing to mind 
others who held the same view), and even reactance (coming to support one’s original 
opinion even more strongly, which is a classic backfire effect). 
Another explanation for the lingering effect of misinformation assumes that 
people build mental models of unfolding events. If a central piece of the model is 
invalidated, people are left with a gap in their knowledge of the event, whose 
representation simply does not make any sense unless one decides to maintain the false 
and invalidated information. Thus, feeling uncomfortable with gaps in their 
understanding, people prefer a more readily available and complete model, albeit 
inaccurate, over a correct but incomplete one, sticking to the original idea and ignoring 
the retraction (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). 
Presumably, a golden strategy capable of overcoming all the intricacies of 
setting people straight, regardless of their basic beliefs and/or temporal shifts, does not 
exist. Public information campaigns may instead benefit from tailoring different, 
simultaneous, and frequent interventions to increase the likelihood of corrective 
messages’ dissemination and acceptance (Jarrett et al., 2015). Ideally, corrective 
strategies should be directed at the precise factors that may influence vaccination 
decision-making and impede vaccine uptake, which include, over and beyond strong 
attitudes against vaccines, social norms pushing individuals to conform to the 
majority’s behaviour, standards for vaccine uptake in a specific population, and 
structural barriers to vaccination such as potential financial costs of vaccines and their 
ease of access. Successful interventions should therefore be targeted to differently 
“driven” vaccine-hesitant individuals. For instance, when people do not vaccinate 
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because they lack confidence in vaccines, corrective strategies should dispel 
vaccination myths, or when people do not vaccinate because perceived risks outweigh 
benefits, interventions should emphasize the social benefit deriving from vaccination 
and add incentives (Betsch et al., 2015). However, the inter-relationship of multi-level 
factors which contribute to vaccine hesitancy seems somewhat difficult to disentangle 
in order to make such targeted approach successful; indeed, the independent and 
relative impact of each determinant of vaccination choice is complex and context-
specific, varying across time, place, and vaccines (Larson et al., 2014). What is clear, 
though, is the urgent need for appropriately designed, well-executed, and rigorously 
evaluated interventions to address parental vaccine refusal and hesitancy (Sadaf, 
Richards, Glanz, Salmon, & Omer, 2013). 
Some aspects of our experimental procedures may limit the generalization of 
the findings. Firstly, we used a convenience sample with limited variability in age and 
educational level. Future research should rely on more representative and specific 
samples (e.g., parents, health practitioners), as well as investigate possible moderating 
variables (e.g., age, education, socioeconomic status) to account for a broader range of 
individual differences in how people comprehend scientific information. Also, our 
participants were domiciled in Italy or Scotland, which raises the question of possible 
effects of between-country heterogeneity in vaccine attitudes, which might introduce 
uncontrolled variance into our data. To the best of our knowledge, comparative data 
on vaccine attitudes and uptake in the UK and Italy are still lacking. However, some 
studies report a general shift towards a more positive perception of vaccines in both 
countries (Impicciatore, Bosetti, Schiavio, Pandolfini, & Bonati, 2000; Smith, 
Yarwood, & Salisbury, 2007). Because our participants were randomly allocated to 
conditions, there is no reason to expect our results to be systematically biased by 
between-country heterogeneity. Because of the small sample size of our study, we are 
not able to ascertain whether these differences actually exist and are reflected in our 
findings. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the modest sample size (N = 120) in the 
present study may have limited the significance of the statistical comparisons 
conducted because a post-hoc power analysis (G*Power 3; Faul et al., 2007) revealed 
that there was an almost perfect 99% chance of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis 
of no significant effect of the interaction with a total sample size of 120 participants. 
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Secondly, self-reported vaccine uptake should be supplemented with objective data 
from primary records to produce a more reliable measure of uptake. Moreover, as 
beliefs can change and evolve dynamically over time, prospective longitudinal data 
are also needed to assess the robustness of changes in individual beliefs. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, our findings offer a useful example of how 
factual information is misremembered over time. More importantly, our work can help 
public health authorities and practitioners to understand why it is necessary to adopt 
an appropriate strategy to influence people’s beliefs and behaviours toward 
vaccination, which can result in better health outcomes for the individuals themselves 
and for society as a whole.  
Given the relevance of this topic, in the next chapter I try to replicate the 





















Study 4: Parents’ beliefs in misinformation about vaccines are 
strengthened by pro-vaccine campaigns 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Although vaccines are recognized by health authorities and the medical community as 
an important tool for reducing the incidence of life-threatening diseases, their 
acceptance among the general population is quite variable (Barrows, Coddington, 
Richards, & Aaltonen, 2015; Shrivastava, Shrivastava, & Ramasamy, 2016). 
According to recent World Health Organisation (WHO, 2018b) estimates, 1.5 million 
children die every year because of diseases that could have been prevented by 
vaccines. Like other European countries, Italy has recorded a dangerous decrease in 
childhood vaccination coverage rates, resulting in a widespread measles epidemic in 
2017 (Ministry of Health, National Institute of Public Health, 2017; WHO, 2018a). In 
an attempt to prevent other outbreaks of potentially fatal diseases across the country, 
in July 2017 the Italian parliament made vaccinations compulsory for all children up 
to 16 years of age (Mantovani & Santoni, 2018). Whether mandatory vaccination is 
the best way to improve vaccine uptake rates remains debated (Editorial, 2018). 
However, ironically many parents no longer perceive a threat from a number of 
vaccine-preventable diseases, hold misconceptions about the safety of vaccines, and 
often decide against immunization because they are not confident in medical, public 
health, and government advice on vaccines (Myers & Pineda, 2009; Lewandowsky et 
al., 2017; Salmon et al., 2005; Smailbegovic, Laing, & Bedford, 2003).  
 Research on how people respond to corrections of misinformation has painted 
a rather pessimistic picture where the most salient misconceptions appear to be widely 
held, easily spread, and difficult to correct (Cook et al., 2015; Cook & Lewandowsky, 
2011; Myers & Pineda, 2009; Nyhan & Reifler, 2012). This is true also for vaccines 
misinformation. It has been shown in an online study (Nyhan et al., 2014) and in 
Pluviano et al.’s (2017) previous laboratory experiment with university students that 
78 
 
campaigns intended to correct misinformation about vaccines are likely to have little 
or no effect or even backfire by entrenching anti-vaccination beliefs. 
 These difficulties in belief updating account for some of the uncertainty of 
immunization providers about how best to communicate with parents. One of the most 
commonly employed strategies used to debunk myths relies on the use of the “myths 
vs. facts” format, which is based on the idea of reiterating myths and then discrediting 
them with a number of facts (Yeh & Jewell, 2015). To illustrate, the myth is usually 
presented in form of a highlighted statement (e.g., “There is a link between the MMR 
shot and autism”), followed by a longer passage that contrasts it with scientific data 
about the actual situation (e.g., “Scientists have carefully studied the MMR shot. None 
has found a link between autism and the MMR shot”). In many cases, myths and facts 
are identified by clear labels or are directly followed by short claims such as “False!” 
and “True!”, respectively (Peter & Koch, 2016).  
 A key problem with this technique is that repeating myths might contribute to 
increasing their acceptance due to their perceived familiarity. Several studies suggest, 
in fact, that people are more swayed when they hear an opinion more than once, 
confounding its familiarity with its validity (Dechêne et al., 2010; Weaver et al., 2007). 
The familiarity boost associated with this type of correction can be so 
counterproductive that it may cause a “familiarity backfire effect”, such that the 
correction inadvertently increases individuals’ beliefs in the very myth it is aiming to 
debunk (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Swire et al., 2017). 
A number of studies have reported that myths are often misremembered as facts over 
time, corroborating the idea that campaigns using the myths vs. facts format may do 
more harm than good toward positive health behaviour (Nyhan et al., 2014; Pluviano 
et al., 2017; Peter & Koch, 2016; Swire et al., 2017). 
 However, another theoretical framework that focuses on the salience of the 
misinformation during the correction suggests that repeating misinformation in the 
course of a retraction could facilitate memory updating. According to the co-activation 
hypothesis advanced by Kendeou, Walsh, Smith, & O’Brien (2014), refutation texts 
that directly state a belief incorrectly held by the reader and then refute that belief elicit 
the activation of both the erroneous and new information – the necessary first step in 
the knowledge revision process (Kendeou & O’Brien, 2015). Consistent with this 
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view, Pashler et al. (2013) found that reviewing erroneous information actually 
improves storage of new information. Similarly, according to Stadtler, Scharrer, 
Brummernhenrich, & Bromme (2013), as well as Putnam, Wahlheim, & Jacoby 
(2014), the detection of conflicting information, which is arguably more likely to occur 
if the correction explicitly refers to both the invalidated information and the new 
correct information, is beneficial for memory updating. Indeed, a study by Ecker et al. 
(2017) found that an explicit reminder or repetition of misinformation in the course of 
its retraction effectively reduces people’s reliance on misinformation because it makes 
both the falsity of the misinformation and the conflict between the outdated and 
updated event representations salient. Finally, in the specific context of health 
misinformation, a study by Cameron et al. (2013) revealed that people exposed to facts, 
myths, and evidence to counteract those myths may gain more knowledge regarding a 
specific health topic and have a better recall accuracy than those merely presented with 
factual information. 
 Therefore, we face a conundrum: while some accounts indicate that the best 
strategy to counter vaccine misinformation is to emphasize the facts instead of drawing 
further attention to false information to avoid a familiarity backfire effect, other 
accounts suggest that if a myth is not repeated when corrected, the associated lack of 
salience, conflict detection, and myth/correction co-activation may be equally or even 
more detrimental to belief updating than the boost of the myth’s familiarity (Swire et 
al., 2017). 
 Systematic reviews on the strategies for reducing vaccine hesitancy concluded 
that there is no convincing evidence to support one intervention over the other (Dubè 
Gagnon, & MacDonald, 2015; Sadaf et al., 2013). Acknowledging the need to identify 
the best ways to convince hesitant parents in an age of internet-fed misinformation, the 
current study aims to determine whether the myths vs. facts format can be considered 
an effective tool to counter vaccines misinformation. Since parental choice to decline 
childhood vaccinations is widely recognised as an important factor in suboptimal 
uptake (Brown et al., 2010; Tickner, Leman, & Woodcock, 2006) the method 
employed in the current study improves upon that of Pluviano et al. (2017) because 






A total of 60 Italian parents attending pediatricians’ surgeries and nurseries in three 
Italian Regions were recruited for participation in the current study. Participants were 
divided into two groups, and randomly assigned half to the control condition (Control; 
5 males and 25 females, average age M = 38.06, SD = 4.55 years) and half to the 
experimental condition (Myths vs. Facts Correction; 2 males and 28 females; average 
age M = 32.2, SD = 5.52 years). 41 participants had a high school education, while 19 
had an academic degree. Both participants and researchers were blind to condition 
allocation. The study received ethical approval from the University of Edinburgh’s 
ethic panel. Written informed consent was obtained from each participant.  
 
Materials 
 Questionnaires. All participants in the study completed two questionnaires, 
which have been used in previous studies (Nyhan et al., 2014; Pluviano et al., 2017; 
see Appendix C). The first one was a preliminary survey aimed at assessing 
participants’ baseline beliefs and attitudes towards vaccines. It consisted of 8 items 
covering common stances from both the pro- (e.g., “Getting vaccines is a good way to 
protect my future child(ren) from disease”) and the anti-vaccination side (e.g., “Some 
vaccines cause autism in healthy children”). Participants were asked to indicate their 
degree of agreement to each statement on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (= 
strongly disagree) to 5 (= strongly agree). The second questionnaire was a post-
manipulation survey that assessed whether and how participants’ beliefs and attitudes 
toward vaccines changed compared to the baseline measure. It consisted of three items. 
The first item (“Some vaccines cause autism in healthy children”) evaluated general 
misconceptions about vaccines causing autism on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 
1 (= strongly disagree) to 5 (= strongly agree). The second item (“Children vaccinated 
against measles, mumps, and rubella will suffer serious side effects”) investigated 
beliefs about vaccine side effects on a 6-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (= very 
unlikely) to 6 (= very likely). Lastly, the third item asked participants to evaluate how 
likely they would be to give the MMR vaccine to their child on a 6-point Likert scale, 
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ranging from 1 (= very unlikely) to 6 (= very likely). This post-manipulation survey 
was given twice, immediately after the intervention and after a 7-day delay to evaluate 
the longevity and robustness of the observed effects.  
 Conditions. Control condition (Control) participants read some tips to help 
prevent medical errors and get safer healthcare, drawn from the AHRQ’s (Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality) website. Experimental condition (Myths vs. Facts 
Correction) participants received a booklet confronting 10 “myths” with a number of 
“facts”. Each page of the leaflet contrasted a popular erroneous belief about 
vaccination with established evidence intended at decreasing the acceptance of that 
myth. The text for this intervention, which was taken nearly verbatim from the WHO’s 
(World Health Organization) website, was displayed in a columnar format, with the 
“myth” and “fact” headings on each column to avoid any ambiguity. The length of 
each myth and fact was matched to reduce the risk of individuals attending more to 
one text than the other.  
 
6.3 Procedure  
Participants were informed at the outset that the experiment consisted of two parts or 
sessions, both seeking to gather their opinions about vaccines. After providing some 
demographic details (i.e., gender, age, educational level), all participants completed 
the preliminary survey aimed at assessing their baseline beliefs and attitudes towards 
vaccines. Next, they were randomly assigned to the Control condition or the Myths vs. 
Facts Correction condition. All participants then completed the post-manipulation 
survey (Time 1), evaluating their beliefs in the link between vaccines and autism, in 
vaccines side effects, and vaccination intention. After a 7-day delay, all participants 
were re-contacted to participate in the second wave of the study during which the same 
post-manipulation questions were asked (Time 2). At the end of the second session, 
participants were carefully debriefed.  
 Three key outcomes were evaluated: individual beliefs in vaccines causing 
autism (Vaccines Cause Autism) and side effects (Vaccines Side Effects), and intention 
to vaccinate (Vaccines Hesitancy). As these outcomes were collected twice for all the 
participants, our study design consisted of one between-subject variable (Conditions) 
with two levels (Myths vs. Facts Correction and Control), and three within-subject 
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variables (Vaccines Cause Autism, Vaccines Side Effects, and Vaccines Hesitancy), 
each with two levels (Time 1 and Time 2).  
 
6.4 Results 
Data were stored and analysed using SPSS (version 20). For ease of interpretation, the 
item evaluating vaccination intent was reverse-coded so that higher values indicated 
higher vaccine hesitancy. Therefore, all 3 key outcomes were in the same direction as 
higher means indicated stronger vaccine misconceptions. 
 To determine whether correction interventions had a time-varying effect or 
resulted in null effect on vaccination attitudes, different mixed-design ANOVAs were 
performed on the whole sample, with independent measure on conditions (treated as a 
between-subjects variable) and repeated dependent measures on the three 
items/outcomes of the post-manipulation survey, i.e., Vaccines Cause Autism, 
Vaccines Side Effects, and Vaccines Hesitancy (treated as within-subjects variables). 
When significant interactions between conditions and time were found, separate 
estimates of simple main effects were carried out.  
 Finally, to test whether the difference between outcomes measurements at 
Time 1 and Time 2 was statistically significant, we created “change scores” for each 
of the 3 key outcomes (Vaccines Cause Autism, Vaccines Side Effects, and Vaccines 
Hesitancy), which were computed as the difference between mean outcomes scores at 
Time 2 vs Time 1. Significance was accepted at p < .05 for all statistical analyses. 
Table 6.1 indicates means and standard deviations for the outcomes at Time 1 and 
Time 2 in the two subgroups. Following Table 6.1, the three sub-sections address our 











Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) for the outcomes at Time 1 
and Time 2 in the two subgroups. 
 Control  Myths vs. Facts Correction 
 Time 1  Time 2  Time 1  Time 2 
Outcomes M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Vaccines Cause Autism 2.37 .89  2.17 .83  2.27 .74  2.63 .76 
Vaccines Side Effects 2.5 .82  2.13 .73  2.53 .73  3 .87 
Vaccines Hesitancy 2 1.2  2 1.29  1.9 1.02  1.83 .87 
 
Beliefs in vaccines/autism link. Concerning beliefs in the vaccines/autism link, there 
was a statistically significant interaction between correction interventions and time 
[F(1, 58) = 14.133, p < .001, partial η2 = .196]. The data in the conditions by time 
interaction are detailed in Figure 6.1A. Simple main effect for condition revealed that 
there was a statistically significant difference in these beliefs between interventions at 
Time 2 [F(1, 58) = 5.102, p = .028, partial η2 = .081]. Indeed, beliefs in the 
vaccines/autism link were significantly greater in the myths vs. facts condition (M = 
2.63, SD = .76) compared to the control (M = 2.17, SD = .84) condition. Simple main 
effect for time confirmed that there was a statistically significant effect of time on 
beliefs in the vaccines/autism link for both the myths vs. facts [F(1, 29) = 9.021, p = 
.005, partial η2 = .237] and control condition [F(1, 29) = 5.118, p = .031, partial η2 = 
.150]. Pairwise comparisons indicated that these beliefs were statistically significantly 
higher at Time 2 compared to Time 1 for the myths vs. facts condition (M = .367, SE 
= .122, p = .005) and, conversely, lower at Time 2 compared to Time 1 for the control 
condition (M = -.200, SE = .088, p = .031). Furthermore, there was a significant 
difference between the two conditions in Vaccines Cause Autism Change Score [F(1, 
58) = 14.133, p < .001], with the myths vs. facts condition leading to larger changes in 
scores and therefore strongest beliefs in vaccines causing autism (M = .37, SD = .67), 




Beliefs in vaccines side effects. Concerning beliefs in vaccines side effects, there was 
a statistically significant interaction between conditions and time [F(1, 58) = 19.852, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .255]. The data in the conditions by time interaction are detailed 
in Figure 6.1B. Simple main effect for condition revealed that there was a statistically 
significant difference in these beliefs between interventions at Time 2 [F(1, 58) = 
17.441, p < .001, partial η2 = .231]. Indeed, beliefs in vaccines side effects were 
significantly greater in the myths vs. facts condition (M = 3, SD = .87) compared to 
the control condition (M = 2.13, SD = .73). Simple main effect for time revealed that 
there was a statistically significant effect of time on beliefs in the vaccines side effects 
for both the myths vs. facts [F(1, 29) = 9.733, p = .004, partial η2 = .251] and control 
[F(1, 29) = 10.666, p = .003, partial η2 = .269] condition. Pairwise comparisons 
indicated that these beliefs were statistically significantly higher at Time 2 compared 
to Time 1 for the myths vs. facts condition (M = .467, SE = .15, p = .004) and, 
conversely, lower at Time 2 compared to Time 1 for the control condition (M = -.367, 
SE = .112, p = .003). Furthermore, there was a significant difference between the two 
conditions in Vaccines Side Effects Change Score [F(1, 58) = 19.852, p < .001], with 
the myths vs. facts condition leading to larger changes in scores and therefore strongest 
beliefs in vaccines side effects (M = .47, SD = .82), compared to the control condition 
(M = -.37, SD = .61). 
 
Vaccines hesitancy. Concerning vaccine hesitancy, there was no statistically 
significant interaction between interventions and time [F(1, 58) = .326, p = .570, 
partial η2 = .006]. Simple main effects for condition revealed that there was no 
statistically significant difference in vaccination intentions between the two groups 
[F(1, 58) = .226, p = .636, partial η2 = .004]. Also, simple main effects for time showed 
that there was no statistically significant effect of time on vaccination intentions 
regardless of group [F(1, 58) = .326, p = .570, partial η2 = .006]. 
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Numerous strategies have been attempted in an effort to increase vaccination rates 
(Jarrett et al., 2015). However, debate still continues about the best ways to convince 
hesitant parents to vaccinate their children, mainly because extant studies often have a 
limited scope, differ in approach, and contradict one other (Kupferschmidt, 2017). This 
is very much the case for one of the most commonly employed strategies to counter 
vaccine misinformation, which employs the myths vs. facts format. While a number 
of studies warn about correcting misinformation in this way because it is often 
ineffective and even counterproductive (Nyhan et al., 2014; Peter & Koch, 2016; 
Pluviano et al. 2017; Skurnik et al., 2005), other studies revealed a stronger belief 
updating with explicit repetitions of misinformation while correcting (Ecker et al., 
2017; Kendeou et al., 2014; Pashler et al., 2013; Putnam et al., 2014; Stadtler et al., 
2013).  
 The present study aimed to assess the potential effectiveness of the myths vs. 
facts strategy to address vaccine hesitancy, focusing on its impact on belief changes 
and vaccination intention in parents. Results provided support for the existence of 
backfire effects associated with the use of this information strategy, with participants 
in the Myths vs. Facts condition having stronger vaccine misconceptions over time, 
both in terms of beliefs in the vaccines/autism link and in vaccines side effects, 
compared with participants in the Control condition. As for vaccination intention, the 
analyses did not reveal any significant differences between the Myths vs. Facts and 
Control group. However, this is not particularly surprising considering Italy’s recent 
introduction of compulsory vaccination which coincided with the period when we 
were gathering data and which means that Italian parents no longer have a choice over 
whether or not to vaccinate against MMR. 
 The myths vs. facts technique, which is one of the most common strategies 
adopted to counteract vaccine misinformation, was found to be ineffective on its own.  
Clearly, countering vaccines misinformation with education, providing people with 
more or better information, is necessary but not sufficient to address the issue (Kata, 
2012). Vaccination hesitancy is, in fact, intertwined with a range of subtle cognitive 
mechanisms and biases such as motivated reasoning (i.e., clinging to pre-existing 
beliefs despite contrary evidence to avoid cognitive dissonance; Festinger, 1957). 
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 Furthermore, measures countering misinformation should also be informed by 
the larger political, technological, and societal context. For instance, factors likely to 
influence parents’ decision-making may include the salience of social norms, 
vaccination uptake in the population, and the presence of structural barriers in terms 
of access to vaccination and potential financial costs (Betsch et al., 2015). Also, to 
counteract the loss of societal fear, it is critical to communicate the risks associated 
with the diseases in an accessible way (Myers & Pineda, 2009). Ultimately, getting 
immunizations is fundamentally a matter of trust. The parent’s trust in his/her doctor 
and, more generally, in science and institutions also plays a part in shaping individual 
vaccination decisions (Kupferschmidt, 2017). Misinformation research suggests that 
expertise may not be a very relevant factor here; rather, when people encounter a piece 
of information, they ask themselves whether and to what extent it fits in with what 
other people – and particularly trusted others – already believe, which obviously may 
open up to biases if what other people believe is based on misinformation (Festinger, 
1957; Guillory & Geraci, 2013).  
 A post-hoc power analysis (G*Power 3; Faul et al., 2007) revealed there was a 
97% chance of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis of no significant effect of the 
interaction for a total of 60 participants. Moreover, the sample used generalizes well 
to the population of parents who are exposed to information, and misinformation, 
regarding the risks of vaccinating their children. However, as beliefs can change and 
evolve dynamically over time, prospective longitudinal research should be carried out 
to assess the robustness of changes in individual beliefs. 
 Taken together, the evidence from this study concurs well with the literature 
showing how people exposed to corrections based on the myths vs. fact format might 
systematically misremember the truth of misinformation and change their attitudes 
accordingly even after a short delay (Nyhan et al., 2014; Pluviano et al., 2017; Skurnik 
et al., 2005).  
 Worryingly, the take home message from Study 4 and Study 5 is that 
retractions may be ineffective. Even worse, the studies demonstrated that there can be 
situations, such as those involved with decision-making about vaccinations, where 
retractions may be entirely ineffective, as they ironically backfire and increase the very 
misconception they are trying to correct. Therefore, what might be a better way of 
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going about the debunking? Since research on autobiographical memory suggests that 
social input is a key source of information used for evaluating the occurrence of events 
and that false beliefs can increase when a credible source of information suggests that 
a certain event happened (Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001; Scoboria, Jackson, 
Talarico, Hanczakowski, Wysman, & Mazzoni, 2014; Wade & Garry, 2005), 
researchers could investigate whether social variables affect also the degree of 
acceptance or rejection of misinformation. Of particular importance is how people 
respond to the credibility of different sources, that is whether and to what extent they 
are more swayed in changing their mind if the retraction they receive comes from a 
perceived credible source. In the next chapter, I examine this very problem, that is the 
social influence that the credibility of a source may have on the acceptance of 


















Study 5: Correcting vaccines misinformation: The effects of 
source expertise and trustworthiness 
 
7.1 Introduction  
Despite being lauded as one of the greatest public health achievements of the 20th 
century, vaccines are losing public confidence (Larson et al., 2011), to the extent that 
some experts have described the problem as “a crisis of public confidence” (Black & 
Rappuoli, 2010, p. 1) and a “vaccination backlash” (Shetty, 2010, p. 970). The most 
important factor driving this decline in confidence is the wide dissemination of 
misinformation about the safety and efficacy of vaccines (Myers & Pineda, 2009). As 
with several other instances of misinformation, vaccines misinformation is especially 
difficult to remove from memory because, even if individuals are presented with 
blatantly false information, their mind seems biased toward its retention and is highly 
resistant to correction attempts (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Nyhan et al., 2014; 
Pluviano et al., 2017). An adding complexity is that people seem to understand 
information on the basis of the perceived credibility of its source, being unable to 
disregard misinformation if they receive a correction from a source perceived as not 
credible (Guillory & Geraci, 2013). Therefore, designing effective communication 
strategies for correcting vaccines misinformation supposes an understanding of how 
the target group might react to a certain type of source of information (Kumkale, 
Albarracín, & Seignourel, 2010). One critical aspect of this understanding is whether 
and for whom the credibility of the source of information matters, namely how people 
trust different sources involved with their vaccination decisions (Yaqub, Castle-
Clarke, Sevdalis, & Chataway, 2014). Unfortunately, researchers and practitioners are 
finding it difficult to design effective pro-vaccination messages for two reasons. First, 
few principles of message persuasiveness derive from effective attempts to change 
anti-social or unhealthy attitudes and behaviours (Crano & Burgoon, 2002; McNeill, 
90 
 
Gravely, Hitchman, Bauld, Hammond, & Hartmann‐Boyce, 2017), while many refer 
to quite distant contexts such as advertising (e.g., Gotlieb & Sarel, 2013; Nan, 2013). 
Therefore, the pro-vaccination messages are not properly informed by theory and 
previous research. Second, in many cases the messages can backfire and cause an 
increase in the very ill-founded beliefs targeted for change (Pluviano et al., 2017). The 
present study seeks to address the important yet neglected issue of the impact of source 
credibility in tailoring pro-vaccination messages. 
 Most theories in persuasion predict that highly credible sources produce more 
belief and attitude changes than less credible ones (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; 
Pornpitakpan, 2004). However, source credibility is a complex concept. The most 
common notion of credibility encompasses two core dimensions: expertise, namely 
the extent to which the communicator is perceived to be capable of making correct 
assertions, and trustworthiness, that is the willingness of the communicator to provide 
the assertions he or she considers most valid (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). The 
expertise and trustworthiness dimensions may have differential weights in affecting 
belief and attitude change and assessing them in combination may obscure the 
complexity of the source evaluation (Pornpitakpan, 2004). For example, Guillory and 
Geraci (2013) analysed the individual contribution of source trustworthiness and 
expertise in reducing political misinformation, revealing that source expertise was not 
sufficient to reduce erroneous inferences, while the trustworthiness of the source was 
the critical factor that led people to correct their inferences. They suggested that there 
could be situations in which expertise would be more relevant to the decision at hand 
as in medical decision making, encouraging further studies to test this hypothesis.  
 The current study provides the first empirical examination of whether 
erroneous inferences about vaccination could be effectively corrected by a source 
perceived as credible (i.e., expert or trustworthy). In particular, we seek to evaluate the 
relative effects of the source expertise and trustworthiness on people’s ability to 
disregard misinformation and update their knowledge and memories, and subsequent 







Prior to running the actual experiments, a norming study was conducted to identify 
sources of information generally considered to be highly credible and not very credible 
within the health context. A separate group of participants, who did not take part in 
Experiment 5A or Experiment 5B, was used to this aim. This group consisted of 15 
students from the University of Edinburgh (4 males, 11 females, mean age 22.4 years, 
age range 18-33 years), who participated on a voluntary basis and received course 
credit in exchange for their participation. Each participant read a fictitious story (see 
Appendix E) about a child presenting with ADHD (attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder) after receiving the vaccine against “Brainpox”, described as an illness that 
can be transmitted via airborne droplets and may cause symptoms such as fever, chills, 
and runny nose. Rare complications include convulsions, encephalitis, and even death.  
 The story was organized in 14 individual messages typed on separate pages 
and combined into a booklet, with 1 message per page. Participants were instructed to 
read through them, one at a time, at their own pace. Message no. 9 of the story was 
about a rumour of a possible link between the vaccine against Brainpox and ADHD, 
while message no. 13 revealed that this rumour had been shown to be untrue.  
 After reading the story, participants were given a list of sources of information 
that are frequently reported to be trusted by parents for vaccine-safety information (cf. 
Freed, Clark, Butchart, Singer, & Davis, 2011) and asked to judge how expert or 
trustworthy the correction in the story would be coming from each of the provided 
sources on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (= “to little or no extent expert/trustworthy”) 
to 5 (= “to a great extent expert/trustworthy”). They first made expertise judgements 
for each of the sources and then they were given the same list of sources to rate on 
trustworthiness. According to the means of participants’ ratings, sources of health 
information were differed as low-credibility (M < 2), neutral (2 < M < 3), and high-
credibility (3 < M < 4) sources.  
 For Experiment 5A, I selected two sources of health information that differed 
on expertise, that is one source of information that normed high (“Websites from doctor 
groups like the British Association of General Paediatrics”; M = 4.07, SD = .88) and 
one source that normed low (“Celebrities”; M = 1.33, SD = .62) on expertise, but that 
were neutral on trustworthiness (M = 2.73, SD = .7 and M = 2.06, SD = .97, 
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respectively). Conversely, for Experiment 5B, I selected two sources of health 
information that differed on trustworthiness, that is one source of information that 
normed high (“Family and friends”; M = 3.13, SD = 1.06) and one source that normed 
low (“Television programs”; M = 1.47, SD = .64) on trustworthiness, but that were 
neutral on expertise (M = 2.13, SD = .83 and M = 2.13, SD = .62, respectively) (see 
Table 7.1 and Table 7.2). 
 
Table 7.1. Means and standard deviations for credibility ratings of sources of health 
information  
 
Sources of health information 
Expertise Trustworthiness 
M SD M SD 
Parents who vaccinated their children 2.27 (.8) 2.93 (1.22) 
Blogs from groups that support vaccines 2.2 (.56) 2.5 (.83) 
Celebrities 1.33 (.62) 2.06 (.97) 
Your personal doctor 4.07 (.46) 4.4 (.51) 
Newspapers like The Daily Telegraph 2.87 (.99) 2.67 (.9) 
Professors from a medical university 4.47 (.52) 4.2 (.68) 
Websites from Government agencies like the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)  
4.4 (.63) 4.27 (.7) 
Healthcare providers (doctors, nurses) 4.13 (.35) 4.27 (.6) 
Family and friends 2.13 (.83) 3.13 (1.06) 
The World Health Organization (WHO) 4.33 (.72) 4.33 (.62) 
Social media  1.53 (.64) 2.27 (1.33) 
Websites from doctor groups like the British Association 
of General Paediatrics (BAGP) 
4.07 (.88) 2.73 (.7) 
Radio 2.13 (.64) 2.27 (.88) 
Tabloid like The Sun 1.53 (.74) 1.53 (.83) 
Companies that make vaccines (Sanofi, Novartis, Pfizer, 
etc.) 
2.53 (.64) 2.2 (.86) 
Books 2.8 (.77) 2.8 (.77) 
Medical and scientific journals like The New England 
Journal of Medicine  
4.33 (.62) 3.93 (.7) 
Churches or community groups 1.33 (.49) 1.53 (.64) 
Wikipedia 2.13 (1.06) 2.27 (.96) 
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Internet in general 2.2 (.86) 2.13 (.74) 
Websites from universities or medical schools like the 
Mayo Clinic 
3.6 (.83) 3.67 (.62) 
Television programs  2.13 (.62) 1.47 (.64) 
Note: Expertise and trustworthiness of each source of information were rated on a 5-point 
Likert scale from 1 (= “to little or no extent”) to 5 (= “to a great extent”).  
 
Table 7.2. Selected sources for the correction statement 
 Expertise Trustworthiness 
Experiment 5A – on the effect of expertise   
Sources   
Websites from doctor groups like the British 
Association of General Paediatrics (High 
expertise) 
4.07 (.88) 2.73 (7) 
Celebrities (Low expertise) 1.33 (.62) 2.06 (.97) 
   
Experiment 5B – on the effect of 
trustworthiness 
  
Sources   
Family and friends (High trustworthiness) 2.13 (.83) 3.13 (1.06) 
Television programs (Low trustworthiness) 2.13 (.62) 1.47 (.64) 
 
 
7.2 Experiment 5A 
Both experiments reported in this chapter used a standard continued influence 
paradigm (Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988), whereby 
participants are presented with one piece of information at a time about an unfolding 
fictional event. The report typically contains a target piece of mistaken information 
that is later corrected. Participants’ understanding of the event is then assessed with an 
open-ended questionnaire consisting of factual and inference questions. To evaluate 
whether the correction was effective, the number of clear references to the target piece 
of mistaken information in participants’ responses is tallied.  
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 Experiment 5A examined the individual’s ability to disregard vaccine 
misinformation and adjust behaviour accordingly, when the correction is provided by 




A-priori power analysis (G*Power 3; Faul et al., 2007) for a one-way ANOVA with 3 
groups suggested a minimum sample size of 159 participants to detect a medium size 
effect of f = .25, with α = .05 and 1 – β = .80. In line with previous literature (see: 
Guillory & Geraci, 2013), we decided to test a total of N = 90 participants, all 
undergraduate students from the University of Edinburgh (25 males, 65 females, mean 
age 18.91 years, age range 18-35 years), who participated on a voluntary basis and 
received course credit in exchange for their participation. Participants were tested 
individually. A quasi-random method of condition allocation was used whereby 
participants were assigned alternatively to 1 of 3 conditions, namely the High-expertise 
Correction condition, the Low-expertise Correction condition, or the Baseline no-
correction condition (30 per condition). The study received ethical approval from the 
University of Edinburgh’s Ethics Committee. 
 
Study design 
A between-subjects design was used with condition (two correction conditions and a 
baseline no-correction condition) as the independent variable, while the dependent 
variables were (a) the accuracy of recall (free-recall and fact-recall score), and most 
importantly, (b) the extent to which misinformation persists in one’s memory (use of 
the original information to answer inference questions) and (c) the intention to 
vaccinate one’s child (vaccination intent). For multiple comparisons between groups, 
Tukey’s HSD correction method was applied. Significance was set at p < .05 for all 
analyses. Two principal hypotheses were formulated: 
H1: Participants will be less likely to use the original misinformation to answer 
inference questions when receiving a correction from a high-expert source than 
from a low-expert source.  
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H2: Participants who rely more on misinformation will report a lower intention 
to vaccinate their own child. 
Hypothesis 1 derived from the literature on source credibility effects showing that 
highly credible sources have proven to be more persuasive than less credible sources 
(Hovland et al., 1953; Pornpitakpan, 2004). Hypothesis 2 was based upon recent 
studies showing the lingering effect of vaccine misinformation and the ineffectiveness 
of correction interventions in increasing the intent to vaccinate a future child (Nyhan 
& Reifler, 2015; Nyhan et al., 2014; Pluviano et al., 2017). 
 
7.2.2 Procedure 
Participants read a fictitious story about a child developing ADHD after receiving the 
vaccine against “Brainpox” (the full story is presented in Appendix E), described as a 
serious illness. This story contained a critical piece of information – a rumour claiming 
a link between this vaccine and ADHD. In the two correction conditions, the High- 
and Low-expertise Correction conditions, a message specifically asserted that this 
rumour was incorrect. In the baseline no-correction condition, this information was 
not corrected. For both correction conditions, participants received the correction from 
one of the sources of information as identified during the norming study.  
 As explained in the previous section, for Experiment 5A, in the High-expertise 
Correction condition the correction came from “Websites from doctor groups like the 
British Association of General Paediatrics” as a source with a high level of expertise 
(M = 4.07, SD = .88), while in the Low-expertise Correction condition the correction 
came from “Celebrities” as a source with a low level of expertise (M = 1.33, SD = .62). 
The trustworthiness of the high- (M = 2.73, SD = .7) and low-expert (M = 2.06, SD = 
.97) source of information did not differ; t(14) = 1.848, p = .086. 
 After reading the story, all participants were exposed to a rehearsal-preventing 
distractor task lasting 2 minutes, during which they were asked to count backwards by 
3. Then, they were given a free-recall test, in which they were asked to write 
everything they remembered reading in the story as accurately as possible. After, 
participants completed a questionnaire (the questionnaire is presented in Appendix F) 
including specific questions about the story. The first eight questions (fact-recall 
questions) were designed so that participants could answer them by recalling the literal 
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content of the story, while the following eight (inference questions) were designed so 
that participants could answer them by using inferences about the story. Then 
followed, just for the participants in the correction conditions, a retraction-awareness 
question controlling for insufficient encoding, asking what was the message given by 
the source providing the correction. Finally, participants rated how likely they would 
be to give the vaccine against the illness at hand to their own child on a Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (= “very unlikely”) to 6 (= “very likely”).  
 
7.2.3 Results 
Coding procedure. A scorer checked all the participants’ answers to the retraction-
awareness question, including in the following analyses only data for those who 
correctly answered this question in order to ensure that results did not reflect 
differences in participants’ ability to recall the retraction statement. All participants 
recalled the purpose of the message from the source of the correction. Free recall, 
factual questions, and inference questions were scored by different pairs of judges 
blind to condition allocation and acting independently. Inter-rater reliability was high 
(r = .93, .88, .90, respectively).  
 The free recall test was scored using “idea units”. Each idea unit corresponded 
to one of the 14 messages in which the story was organised. An idea unit was recorded 
as being recalled and received a score of 1 if the participant reproduced all or 
substantial part of its content; otherwise it was scored as absent and received a score 
of 0. The highest possible individual score was therefore 14. 
 Factual questions were scored 1 for correct responses and 0 for incorrect 
responses. Responses containing partially correct information were given a score of 
0.5. Since 8 factual recall questions were presented, the maximum possible score was 
8. 
 Inference questions were scored 0 or 1. Using a strict scoring system, any 
mention of the vaccine causing ADHD was considered a reference to the original and 
incorrect information and was scored as 1, while 0 was assigned to all “other” 
responses, including comments about the benefits of vaccines or worries over their 
safety but not the use of the original and incorrect information (the alleged link 
between the vaccine and ADHD). Since 8 inference questions were presented, the 
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maximum score achievable was 8. Means and standard deviations for Experiment 5A 
are presented in Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3. Means and Standard Deviations for the experimental conditions in Experiment 5A  
 High-expertise 
Correction 
(n = 30) 
Low-expertise 
Correction 
(n = 30) 
Baseline No-
correction 
(n = 30) 
Outcome M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Free-recall 
accuracy  
10.33 (1.81) 10.47 (1.48) 10.03 (1.96) 
Factual questions 6.33 (1.13) 6.83 (.9) 6.48 (1.15) 
Inference 
questions 
1.17 (1.7) 1.13 (1.33) 2.17 (1.72) 
Vaccination intent 5.03 (1.16) 5.13 (1.28) 4.57 (1.61) 
Note. Means and standard deviations of free-recall accuracy rates (out of a maximum of 14), 
factual and inference questions’ scores (out of a maximum of 8), and vaccination intent 
(measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 = “very unlikely” to 6 = “very likely”) for the 
High- and Low-expertise Correction conditions and the Baseline No-correction condition. 
 
Accuracy of recall. Results from the free recall test revealed that participants’ overall 
recall performance did not differ across conditions, F(2, 87) = .478, p = .622. Likewise, 
there was no difference in participants’ ability to answer factual questions across 
conditions, F(2, 87) = 1.734, p = .183 (Figure 7.1). 
 
Inferential reasoning. Participants’ responses to inference questions were influenced 
by condition, F(2, 87) = 4.058, p = .021, η² = .085 (Figure 7.1). Multiple comparisons 
using Tukey’s HSD test showed that participants in the Baseline No-correction 
condition were more likely to refer to the original incorrect information to answer 
inference questions in comparison to the High- (M = 1, SE = .41, p = .045) and Low-
expertise Correction (M = 1.03, SE = .41, p = .037) conditions. 
 
Vaccination intent. Even though there was no effect of condition on vaccination 
intentions, F(2, 87) = 1.476, p = .234 (Figure 7.1), there was a significant negative 
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correlation between reference to the original incorrect information across conditions 
and vaccination intention, r = -.561, p < .01, showing that the more participants used 
misinformation to answer inference questions, the less likely they were to state an 
intention to vaccinate their children. 
 




7.3 Experiment 5B 
Experiment 5B examined the individual’s capability to disregard misinformation and 
adjust one’s behaviour accordingly, when the correction is provided by a source of 




90 undergraduates (32 males, 58 females, mean age 19.43 years, age range 17-26 
years) from the University of Edinburgh were recruited for this study in exchange for 
course credit and, as in Experiment 5A, were quasi-randomly assigned to 1 of the 3 
conditions, namely the High-trustworthiness Correction condition, the Low-
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trustworthiness Correction condition, or the Baseline No-correction condition (30 per 
condition). None took part in Experiment 5A. 
 
Study design 
The study design was the same as in Experiment 5A. Two principal hypotheses were 
formulated: 
H1: Participants will be less likely to use the original misinformation to answer 
inference questions when receiving a correction from a high-trustworthiness 
source than from a low-trustworthiness source.  
H2: Participants who rely more on misinformation will report a lower intention 
to vaccinate their own child. 
 
7.3.2 Procedure 
Study materials and procedure mirrored those in Experiment 5A with one exception: 
as detailed in the previous section about the norming study, in the High-
trustworthiness Correction condition the correction came from “Family and friends” 
as a source of information with a high level of trustworthiness (M = 3.13, SD = 1.06), 
while in the Low-trustworthiness Correction condition the correction came from 
“Television programs” as a source with a low level of trustworthiness (M = 1.47, SD 
= .64). Source expertise of the high- (M = 2.13, SD = .83) and low-trustworthy (M = 
2.13, SD = .62) source was held constant across the two correction conditions. 
 
7.3.3 Results 
Coding procedure. The coding procedure was identical to that in Experiment 5A. A 
scorer checked all of the participants’ answers to the retraction-awareness question. 
Once again, all of the participants recalled the content of the correction statement. 
Significance was set at p < .05 for all analyses. Inter-rater reliability for free recall, 
factual questions, and inference questions as assessed by different couples of judges 
blind to condition allocation was found to be high (r = .87, .93, .91, respectively). 





Table 7.4. Means and Standard Deviations for the experimental conditions in Experiment 5B 
 High-trustworthiness 
Correction 
(n = 30) 
Low-trustworthiness 
Correction 
(n = 30) 
Baseline No-
correction 
(n = 30) 
Outcome M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Free-recall 
accuracy  
10.4 (1.87) 9.93 (1.8) 9.47 (1.46) 
Factual 
questions 
6.67 (.94) 6.7 (.83) 6.47 (1.17) 
Inference 
questions 
.5 (1.04) 1.7 (1.18) 1.93 (1.8) 
Vaccination 
intent 
5.4 (.93) 5 (1.36) 5.03 (1.16) 
Note. Means and standard deviations of free recall accuracy rates (out of a maximum of 14), 
factual and inference questions’ scores (out of a maximum of 8), and vaccination intent 
(measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 = “very unlikely” to 6 = “very likely”) for the 
High- and Low-trustworthiness Correction conditions and the Baseline No-correction 
condition.  
 
Accuracy of recall. As in Experiment 5A, results from the free recall test showed that 
the overall recall performance did not differ across conditions, F(2, 87) = 2.216, p = 
.115 (Figure 7.2). Likewise, there was no difference in participants’ ability to recall 
factual questions across conditions, F(2, 87) = .489, p = .615 (Figure 7.2). 
 
Inferential reasoning. Participants’ responses to inference questions were influenced 
by condition, F(2, 87) = 9.319, p < .001, η² = .176 (Figure 7.2). Multiple comparisons 
using Tukey’s HSD test showed that participants in the High-trustworthiness 
Correction condition were less likely to refer to the original incorrect information to 
answer inference questions in comparison to the Low-trustworthiness Correction 
condition (M = -1.2, SE = .36, p = .003) and the Baseline No-correction condition (M 
= -1.43, SE = .3, p < .001). Use of the original information to answer inference 
questions did not differ across the Low-trustworthiness Correction condition and the 




Vaccination intent. Analogous to Experiment 5A, even though there was no effect of 
condition on vaccination intentions, F(2, 87) = 1.088, p = .341 (Figure 7.2), there was 
a significant negative correlation between reference to the original incorrect 
information across conditions and vaccination intention, r = - .358, p < .01, showing 
that the more participants used misinformation to answer inference questions, the less 
likely they were to report that they would vaccinate their children.  
 
Figure 7.2. Mean scores for the key outcomes across conditions 
 
 
7.4 General discussion 
In conclusion, all evidence seems to indicate that debunking misinformation is no easy 
matter (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2011). Building relations based on trust is key to 
ensure high vaccination coverage. In two experiments, we manipulated the credibility 
of the source of a correction to evaluate the differential impact of source expertise 
(Experiment 5A) and trustworthiness (Experiment 5B) on the persistence of vaccine 
misinformation.  
 Results from Experiment 5A suggest that simply providing a correction 
reduced participants’ use of the original information, as participants in both correction 
conditions were less likely to continue using the original incorrect information to 
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answer inference questions compared to participants in the baseline no-correction 
condition. However, our first hypothesis was not confirmed because the overall 
reference to misinformation did not differ across the two correction groups; indeed, 
when the correction in the story came from a more expert (but not more trustworthy) 
source, participants were just as likely to rely on erroneous information when making 
inferences about the story as those who received a correction from a less expert source. 
Supporting the first hypothesis laid out for Experiment 5B, participants were able to 
reduce their use of the original incorrect information when the correction came from a 
highly trustworthy source. This was confirmed by the fact that the use of the original 
information to answer inference questions did not differ across participants exposed to 
a low-trustworthy correction or to no correction at all. Thus, this finding suggests that 
source trustworthiness (and not expertise) is crucial in reducing people’s reliance on 
misinformation.  
 Some studies corroborate that source trustworthiness is more important than 
source expertise in reducing misconceptions; therefore, corrections of misinformation 
should come from a trusted source (Trembath, Paynter, Keen, & Ecker, 2016). In a 
cross-cultural experiment evaluating different combinations of high and low expertise 
and high and low trustworthiness, McGinnies and Ward (1980) found that a 
trustworthy source was more persuasive regardless of whether it was expert or not. A 
recent study by Swire and colleagues (2017) corroborates the view that people use 
sources of information they believe trustworthy, though not necessarily expert, to 
guide their evaluation of what is true or false and do not necessarily insist on veracity 
as a prerequisite for supporting a particular viewpoint.  
 Both experiments reported here supported our prediction that the continued 
influence of misinformation would be negatively associated with vaccination 
intention, so that those who continued to rely on invalidated information were also less 
likely to state an intention to vaccinate their own child. Therefore, somehow the 
corrections we provided, regardless of their degree of credibility, did not positively 
affect the reported intent to vaccinate one’s child. This can be partly explained by the 
role that “belief perseverance” may play during information processing; when 
confronted with new information that contradicts one’s own beliefs, people can 
unexpectedly hold on even more to their initial beliefs (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 
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1980; Kunda, 1990). In fact, one of the most potent backfire effects of corrective 
information strategies occurs with topics that tie in with people’s “worldviews” (Cook 
& Lewandowsky, 2011). Future research should be done to investigate whether 
vaccine misinformation correlates with actual uptake and to what extent deeply-held 
beliefs could be affected by a correction perceived to come from a trustworthy source. 
 Our sample consisted of university students who have not been exposed to real 
decision making about vaccinating their children; this may limit the generalizability of 
our results. Also, overall inference scores were relatively low, showing that even in 
the no-correction condition, participants did not much rely on misinformation in 
answering inference questions. Likewise, the overall vaccination intentions were quite 
high, suggesting that our sample was biased towards those with more positive views 
of vaccines. In conclusion, the present study adds to the growing literature 
demonstrating the powerful, lingering effect of misinformation in memory, showing 
how effective correction can be extremely difficult. In the specific case of health 
information, our research showed that corrections are effective as long as they come 
from a perceived trustworthy source. This finding is noteworthy to better comprehend 
the loss of public confidence in science and experts.   
 The contributions reported thus far in Part Two of this Thesis have exemplified 
the problems associated with encountering misinformation, highlighting how people 
seem to rely on the content of what they read or hear without careful consideration of 
whether it is relevant and valid, and behave according to patently incorrect 
information. Studies 4, 5, and 6 have demonstrated in fact that people remain confident 
in misinformation even in the face of sophisticated correction attempts, and even if the 
correction comes from an expert source. Why this is so? People, of course, may hold 
different degrees of background knowledge and a number of different beliefs about the 
topic at hand. In the next chapter we consider how pre-existing beliefs may dictate the 
degree by which people rely on misinformation, questioning whether memory 









Study 6: Forming and updating beliefs and future intentions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In the so-called “post-truth” era, it is critically important to differentiate real from 
unreal, to correctly assess what is true and what is false (Lewandowsky, Ecker, & 
Cook, 2017). Yet, our ability to form and update beliefs about the world goes awry 
(Pennycook, Cannon, & Rand, 2018). Current public discourse – on topics ranging 
from politics to vaccines, from genetically modified food to human-caused climate 
change – suggests that on many occasions we may go with our gut rather than rely on 
established facts based on scientific evidence, with alarming consequences not just for 
the individual but for the society as a whole (Kahneman, 2011; Schwarz & Newman, 
2017). Worse, as extensively discussed in Studies 3, 4 and 5, people may irrationally 
cling to false information even in the face of new, updated and correct information, a 
phenomenon known as continued influence effect (Seifert, 2002).  
There is a long tradition of work in cognitive science explaining the difficulties 
in memory and belief updating in terms of Festinger’s pioneering theory of cognitive 
dissonance (1957), whereby people are biased reasoners who selectively attend to, 
process and recall information. As mentioned in the Introduction to Part Two of this 
Thesis, there is a strong tendency to automatically favor information that supports our 
prior expectations, known as confirmation bias (Klayman, 1995; Nickerson, 1998). 
When we consider issues that we feel strongly about, confirmation bias may turn into 
motivated reasoning, whereby people tend to reject the veracity of information that 
conflicts with their priors (Cooper, 2007; Kunda, 1990). Under certain circumstances, 
individuals may, in fact, display a tendency to cling more strongly to their initial beliefs 
even after receiving new information that contradicts or disconfirms these beliefs, a 
tendency known as belief perseverance (Lewandowsky et al., 2012, Nyhan & Reifler, 
2010). Conversely, those with relatively little background knowledge and/or no deeply 
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held beliefs about the topic at hand may update their mental representations more 
easily when persuaded to do so.  
To test whether this is true in the case of vaccines misinformation, here I 
confronted misconceptions about the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine 
and the Zika virus, which have captivated global attention and are surrounded by 
misinformation, rumors, and even conspiracy theories (Avery, 2017; Poland & Spier, 
2010). Though both equally real and worrying, these two cases may differ in terms of 
their rootedness in people’s mind, as the MMR controversy has a long tradition of 
deceptions and ill-founded beliefs, of which the most enduring avers that the MMR 
vaccine is linked to autism, whereas the Zika virus crisis represents a novel emergency 
about which knowledge and ill-founded beliefs may be limited in comparison (PAHO, 
2016; Poland & Jacobson, 2011; Weldon et al., 2018). From a practical standpoint, 
confronting these two cases of vaccine misinformation could be of particular relevance 
for health communicators to prevent the spill-over effect from misbeliefs about one 
vaccine on intention to use another. In fact, in the absence of deeply ingrained beliefs 
about Zika virus, individuals may base their intentions to vaccinate against it on beliefs 
about other vaccines, such as the misbelief that MMR causes autism (Ophir & 
Jamieson, 2018). 
In the following section, I explain how the MMR vaccine and the Zika virus 
represent two peculiar cases of broken trust. Then, two experiments are presented, 
which examined misconceptions about the MMR vaccine and Zika virus as motivated 
by a poor risk understanding (Experiment 6A) or the exposure to conspiracy theories 
(Experiment 6B). A general discussion concludes this chapter. 
 
8.1.1 Misinformation about MMR vaccine and Zika virus: Two cases of broken 
trust  
A key issue in vaccine acceptance is public mistrust in science and experts. Many 
events have the potential to erode public trust in vaccines and in the authorities 
delivering them (WHO, 2017). Sometimes, it is a new critical study that spreads 
misinformation about a vaccine. An example is the now discredited study suggesting 
a causal link between the MMR vaccine and autism, which originated the current 
MMR vaccine scare and reduced vaccine uptake in several countries (Offit & Coffin, 
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2013). Even though researchers rejected the hypothesis that the MMR vaccine could 
trigger autism, “with the explosion of ‘contrary’ expertise online…many parents see 
even the most respected vaccine experts’ perspective on the issue as just one more 
opinion’’ (Gross, 2009, p. 6; Kaufman, 2007).  
Another departure point for the possible emergence of health misinformation 
are scientific uncertainties about a novel or re-emerging infectious disease (TELL ME, 
2015), as in the case of Zika virus. Zika is spread mostly by the bite of an infected 
Aedes species mosquito, which is found throughout the tropics. Common Zika 
symptoms include mild fever, rash, headache, joint pain, conjunctivitis, and muscle 
pain. However, the major concern is the impact that Zika can have during pregnancy, 
as a pregnant woman can pass the virus to her fetus causing serious birth defects. To 
date, no vaccine or treatment is available and the most effective public health measures 
include controlling the mosquito population and preventing people from direct 
exposure to mosquitoes (Chang, Ortiz, Ansari, & Gershwin, 2016). Since its outbreak, 
Zika has been surrounded by uncertainty. Unfortunately, missing information about 
the disease easily evolved into misinformation, especially on the internet 
(Venkatraman, Mukhija, Kumar, & Nagpal, 2016). 
The MMR and Zika controversies demonstrate how encouraging trust in 
vaccines can be difficult. As explained below, the harmful effects of vaccine 
misinformation are particularly pronounced when a personal risk is involved (e.g., 
“vaccines cause adverse events”) or the misinformation is packaged as a conspiracy 
theory (e.g., “vaccines are part of a conspiracy to make money for pharmaceutical 
companies”) (Lewandowsky et al., 2017; Myers & Pineda, 2009).  
 
8.2 Experiment 6A 
Risk perceptions are generally defined as people’s subjective judgements about the 
likelihood of negative occurrences (e.g., diseases, death) and are portrayed as having 
two dimensions: the cognitive dimension, which relates to how much people know and 
understand about risks, and the emotional dimension, pertaining to how people feel 
about them (Paek & Howe, 2017).  
 Several theoretical models have been developed to explain how people 
perceive and process information about risks, as well as how they act on its basis (De 
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Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Reyna & Rivers, 2008; Roeser, 
Hillerbrand, Sandin, & Peterson, 2012). A central tenet of the rational choice model of 
decision-making is that people evaluate the possibility of outcomes after they calculate 
potential costs and benefits (Simon, 1955, 1956). However, mainly experts tend to 
engage in such analytic and effortful behavior, relying on scientific information and 
objective assessment. And, under certain circumstances, even experts fail to 
comprehend real risks (Gigerenzer, 2014). By contrast, laypeople have been found to 
evaluate risks mostly according to their subjective experiences or emotions and relying 
on all sorts of bias and heuristics (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Loewenstein, 
Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Weinstein, 1980). 
 Targeting risk perceptions is key in health communication as much empirical 
evidence demonstrates that risk perceptions are important precursors of future actions; 
thus, interventions that change risk perceptions subsequently change health behaviors 
(for a meta-analysis on how risk appraisals may change people’s intentions and 
behavior, see: Sheeran, Harris, & Epton, 2014). Therefore, Experiment 6A examined 
misconceptions about the MMR vaccine and Zika virus as motivated by a poor risk 
understanding, inducing people to underestimate the risks that diseases may pose and 
to give disproportionate weight to unproven vaccine adverse events.  
In particular, we made a series of predictions. First, as misinformation has 
proved to negatively impact on beliefs and attitudes toward vaccination (Nyhan & 
Reifler, 2015; Nyhan et al., 2014; Pluviano et al., 2017), we anticipated that: 
Hypothesis 1: Misconceptions about the MMR vaccine and Zika virus would 
be higher when misinformation was presented than when no misinformation 
was presented.  
Then, we supposed that the cases of the MMR vaccine and Zika virus might differ in 
terms of the cognitive processing underlying people’s beliefs, in that convictions in 
unproven vaccine-autism theories, because of their rootedness in people’s minds, 
might be more resistant to correction attempts than false beliefs about Zika virus, a 
relatively novel disease with limited availability of scientific evidence from which to 
draw conclusions. Therefore, we expected that participants would be relatively 
familiar with the MMR vaccine misconceptions, whereas the Zika virus 
misconceptions would be relatively unfamiliar. Accordingly, we proposed that: 
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Hypothesis 2: Misconceptions would be higher in the case of the MMR vaccine 
than in the case of Zika virus. 
Moreover, as previous research has shown that misinformation may negatively impact 
on parents’ stated intention to vaccinate their children (Nyhan & Reifler, 2015; Nyhan 
et al., 2014; Pluviano et al., 2017), we also proposed that:   
Hypothesis 3: Misconceptions about the MMR vaccine and Zika virus would 
be negatively associated with the stated intention to vaccinate, so that 
participants who had more misconceptions would report a lower intention to 
vaccinate their child. 
Finally, as lack of confidence may influence the effectiveness of the messages deemed 
at correcting misconceptions (Hovland et al., 1953; Pluviano et al., under review), we 
also proposed that: 
Hypothesis 4: Credibility evaluations of public health experts would be 
negatively associated with misconceptions and vaccines hesitancy, so that 
participants who put less trust in the source providing the correction would 




A-priori power analysis (G*Power 3; Faul et al., 2007) for a one-way ANOVA with 2 
groups suggested a minimum sample size of 128 participants to detect a medium size 
effect of f = .25, with α = .05 and 1 – β = .80. We decided to test 130 students from the 
University of Florence, half randomly assigned to the Baseline no-misinformation 
condition (20 males and 45 females, average age M = 24.81, SD = 2.95) and half to 
the Misinformation condition (32 males and 33 females, average age M = 25.15, SD = 
3.1). They all participated on a voluntary basis and were tested in groups. To protect 
the independence and privacy of their responses, participants were requested not to 
talk to each other while reading the stories and filling out the questionnaires and a 
proper seating distance was maintained between them. Participants were unaware of 
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the other experimental condition and also researchers were blind to assignment. Data 
collection was conducted from December 2017 to March 2018. 
 
8.2.2 Procedure 
All participants were presented with two fictitious stories (full stories are presented in 
Appendix G). The first story was about a baby developing autism after receiving the 
MMR vaccine. The second story was about a baby developing epilepsy after receiving 
a fictitious vaccine against Zika virus. In the Misinformation condition, both stories 
contained a critical piece of information, which was later retracted by public health 
experts. In the first story about the MMR vaccine, there was a rumor about the alleged 
link between the MMR vaccine and autism, while in the second story about Zika virus 
there was a rumor about the alleged link between Zika virus and epilepsy. In the 
Baseline no-misinformation condition, there was no reference to these rumors or to 
their correction. After reading the stories, all participants were asked to complete a 
short distraction task to prevent rehearsal of the stories. Then, they were given a free 
recall test, in which they were asked to write everything they remembered reading in 
the stories as accurately as possible. After the free-recall test, participants completed a 
questionnaire (see Appendix I) assessing misconceptions about the MMR vaccine and 
Zika virus, the intention to vaccinate one’s child, negative attitudes towards 
vaccination, and the perceived credibility of the correction received from public health 
experts (this latter just in the Misinformation condition). In particular, in the 
questionnaire, after providing some demographic details (sex, age, education level), 
participants were asked whether they had any children and had ever delayed or refused 
a recommended vaccine for their child(ren). Then, various scales followed: 
Misconceptions about the risks associated with the MMR and Zika virus vaccine. 
Misconceptions about the MMR vaccine were evaluated by two questions used in 
previous studies (Freed et al., 2010; Nyhan et al., 2014; Pluviano et al., 2017). First, 
participants were asked to indicate whether they agree or disagree that “MMR vaccine 
causes autism in healthy children” on a 5-point scale from “strongly disagree” (1) to 
“strongly agree” (5). Then, they were asked to indicate the perceived likelihood that 
“children will suffer serious side effects from MMR vaccine” on a 6-point scale from 
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“very unlikely” (1) to “very likely” (6). These two items were averaged, with a higher 
score indicating greater misconceptions about MMR vaccine. 
Misconceptions about Zika virus were also evaluated by two questions. First, 
participants were asked to indicate whether they agree or disagree that “Zika virus 
vaccine causes epilepsy in healthy children” on a 5-point scale from “strongly 
disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). Then, they were asked to indicate the perceived 
likelihood that “children will suffer serious side effects from Zika virus vaccine” on a 
6-point scale from “very unlikely” (1) to “very likely” (6). These two items were 
combined into a single index, with a higher score indicating greater misconceptions 
about the fictitious Zika virus vaccine. 
 
Vaccines hesitancy. Vaccination intent was evaluated by asking participants how 
likely they would be to give the MMR vaccine to their child(ren) on a 6-point scale 
from “very likely” (1) to “very unlikely” (6), a question which has been used in 
previous studies (Freed et al., 2010; Nyhan et al., 2014; Pluviano et al., 2017).  
Then, participants were asked to evaluate how likely they would be to give a 
possible vaccine against Zika virus to their child(ren) on the same 6-point scale from 
“very likely” (1) to “very unlikely” (6). 
Negative attitudes towards vaccination. Attitudes towards vaccination were evaluated 
by 8 questions, which have been used in previous studies (Freed et al., 2010; Nyhan et 
al., 2014; Pluviano et al., 2017). These questions covered common attitudes from both 
the pro- (e.g., “Getting vaccines is a good way to protect my future child(ren) from 
disease”) and the anti-vaccination side (e.g., “Some vaccines cause autism in healthy 
children”). Participants were asked to indicate their degree of agreement with each 
statement on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly 
agree” (5). After reverse coding, average scores were computed, so that higher means 
indicated more negative attitudes towards vaccination. 
 
Credibility evaluations of public health experts. Participants in the Misinformation 
condition were also asked to evaluate the credibility of the correction received from 
public health experts. Two out of the three subdimensions composing Ohanian’s 
(1990) scale were used, namely the expertise and trustworthiness subscales. We chose 
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these two subscales because extant literature indicates that the notion of credibility 
encompasses two core dimensions: expertise, namely the extent to which the 
communicator is perceived to be capable of making correct assertions, and 
trustworthiness, that is the willingness of the communicator to provide the assertions 
he or she considers most valid (Hovland et al., 1953). Both Ohanian’s (1990) subscales 
constituted of five pairs of oppositional adjectives (antonyms) rated on a 7-point scale 
like a semantic differential. The descriptive pairs for measuring expertise included: an 
expert – not an expert, inexperienced – experienced, unknowledgeable – 
knowledgeable, qualified – unqualified, and unskilled – skilled. The descriptive pairs 
that measure trustworthiness were: dependable – undependable, dishonest – honest, 
unreliable – reliable, insincere – sincere, and trustworthy – untrustworthy. After 
reverse coding, average scores were computed for both subscales, with scores ranging 
from 1 to 7, so that higher means indicated a higher credibility rating. 
 
8.2.3 Results 
Descriptive statistics for Experiment 6A are reported in Table 8.1. 
 






Outcomes M  SD Range  M  SD Range  
Free-recall accuracy  22.03  2.07 19-26  21.1  2.07 18-26  
Misconceptions about the risks 
associated with the MMR 
vaccine 
1.57  .21 1-2  3.21  .52 2-4.5  
Misconceptions about the risks 
associated with the Zika virus 
vaccine 
2.18  .57 1-3.5  3.11  .64 2-4.5  
MMR Hesitancy 1.43  .5 1-2  2.4  .55 2-4  
Zika Hesitancy 2.21  .62 1-5  3.58  1.06 2-5  
Negative attitudes towards 
vaccination 





Perceived expertise of public 
health experts 
- - -  3.94  .29 3.2-4.6  
Perceived trustworthiness of 
public health experts 
- - -  3.38  .25 2.8-4  
 
The free-recall test was scored using “idea units” (see Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988). 
Each idea unit corresponded to one of the 14 messages in which each story was 
organised. An idea unit was recorded as being recalled and received a score of 1 if the 
participant reproduced all or substantial part of its content; otherwise it was scored as 
absent and received a score of 0. Since all participants read two stories, the highest 
possible individual score on the free-recall test was 28. Results revealed that 
participants’ overall recall performance did not differ across conditions, F(1, 129) = 
.352, p = .554.  
 A series of ANOVAs was performed to test our hypotheses. Figure 8.1 displays 
the results relevant to Hypotheses 1 and 2. First, we tested Hypothesis 1, which posited 
that misconceptions about the MMR vaccine and Zika virus would be higher in the 
Misinformation than in the Baseline-no misinformation condition. As expected, 
significant differences in misconceptions about the MMR vaccine [F(1, 129) = 
551.967, p < .001, η² = .812] and Zika virus [F(1, 129) = 76.404, p < .001, η² =.374] 
were found, with participants in the Misinformation condition having higher 
misconceptions (M = 3.21, SD = .52 for the MMR vaccine; M = 3.11, SD = .64 for 
Zika virus) than those in the Baseline-no misinformation condition (M = 1.57, SD = 
.21 for the MMR vaccine; M = 2.18, SD = .57 for Zika virus). 
 Next, we tested Hypothesis 2, which predicted that misconceptions would be 
higher in the case of the MMR vaccine than in the case of Zika virus. The analyses did 
not support Hypothesis 2. In fact, a within-subjects ANOVA conducted to determine 
whether there was a statistically significant difference between MMR and Zika 
misconceptions was significant [F(1, 129) = 11.895, p = .001, η² = .084], with 
participants having lower misconceptions when questioned about their beliefs about 
the MMR vaccine (M = 2.4, SD = .92) as opposed to their beliefs about Zika virus (M 
= 2.65, SD = .76).  
 Then, we tested Hypothesis 3, which posited that vaccines hesitancy would be 
higher in the Misinformation than in the Baseline-no misinformation condition. 
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Significant differences in MMR [F(1, 129) = 109.964, p < .001, η² = .462] and Zika 
[F(1, 129) = 80.595, p < .001, η² = .386] vaccine hesitancy were found,  with 
participants in the Misinformation condition being more hesitant towards the MMR 
vaccine and a possible shot against Zika virus (M = 2.4, SD = .55 for the MMR 
vaccine; M = 3.58, SD = 1.05 for Zika virus) than participants in the Baseline-no 
misinformation condition (M = 1.43, SD = .5 for the MMR vaccine; M = 2.21, SD = 
.62 for Zika virus). The results also indicated that there was a significant difference in 
negative attitudes towards vaccination [F(1, 129) = 118.123, p < .001, η² = .48], with 
participants in the Misinformation condition having more negative attitudes (M = 3.21, 
SD = .23) than those in the Baseline-no misinformation condition (M = 2.82, SD = 
.18). As further confirmation of the expected misinformation effect, MMR 
misconceptions positively correlated with MMR hesitancy (r = .665, p < .01) and 
negative attitudes towards vaccination (r = .65, p < .01); similarly, Zika 
misconceptions positively correlated with Zika hesitancy (r = .197, p < .05) and 
negative attitudes towards vaccination (r = .356, p < .01), so that participants having 
higher misconceptions about the MMR vaccine and Zika virus reported a lower 
intention to vaccinate their child and more negative attitudes towards vaccination in 
general. 
Finally, we tested Hypothesis 4, which predicted that credibility evaluations of 
public health experts would be negatively associated with misconceptions and 
vaccines hesitancy. The analyses partially supported Hypothesis 4. The perceived 
expertise of the source providing the correction negatively correlated with MMR 
vaccine hesitancy (r = -.289, p < .05), so that the more the perceived expertise of the 
source, the higher the vaccination intent. Instead, the perceived trustworthiness of the 
source providing the correction negatively correlated with Zika misconceptions (r = -
.354, p < .01), so that the more the perceived trustworthiness of the source, the less 







Figure 8.1. MMR and Zika misconceptions, along with MMR and Zika hesitancy, across 




8.3 Experiment 6B 
Besides biased risk appraisal, a key psychological factor that may motivate people to 
reject scientific consensus around vaccination is represented by conspiratorial 
thinking, namely the tendency to explain events as the secret acts of powerful, 
malevolent forces (Grimes, 2016; Hornsey, Harris, & Fielding, 2018). An emerging 
literature pointed out indeed that parents who believe in anti-vaccine conspiracy 
theories are less likely to vaccinate their child (Jolley & Douglas, 2014; Lewandowsky, 
Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013). Understanding conspiracy theories therefore becomes 
crucial for health communicators. For this reason, Experiment 6B examined the 
persistence of misconceptions about the MMR vaccine and Zika virus as motivated by 
the exposure to conspiracy theories. This experiment employed most of the hypotheses 
(Hypotheses 1, 3 and 4) tested in Experiment 6A. However, this time we could not 
rule out the possibility that misconceptions about the MMR vaccine and Zika virus as 
motivated by conspiracy theories were equivalent, because the idea that vaccines are 
part of a medical/pharmaceutical/governmental conspiracy may be widespread both in 
the case of “already known” vaccines as the MMR vaccine and in the case of “new” 
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vaccines as a possible vaccine against Zika virus. Therefore, we posed a further 
research question: 





Similarly to Experiment 6A, we tested 130 students from the University of Florence, 
half randomly assigned to the Baseline no-misinformation condition (27 males and 38 
females, average age M = 23.06, SD = 2.77) and half to the Misinformation condition 
(21 males and 44 females, average age M = 24.6, SD = 3.15). None of the participants 
in this experiment had taken part in Experiment 6A. Data collection was conducted 
from December 2017 to March 2018. 
 
8.3.2 Procedure 
All participants were presented with two fictitious stories (full stories are presented in 
Appendix G). The first story was about a baby developing measles because he was not 
immunized with the MMR vaccine. The second story was about a baby been diagnosed 
with Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) after a mosquito bite. In the Misinformation 
condition, both stories contained a critical piece of information, which was later 
retracted by public health experts. In particular, in both stories there were rumors 
claiming the MMR and Zika virus vaccines were just part of a conspiracy to make 
money for pharmaceutical companies. In the Baseline no-misinformation condition, 
there was no reference to these rumors or to their correction. As in Experiment 1, after 
reading the stories, all participants were asked to complete a short distraction task to 
prevent rehearsal of the stories. Then, they were given a free-recall test, in which they 
were asked to write everything they remembered reading in the stories as accurately 
as possible. After the free-recall test, participants completed a questionnaire (the 
questionnaire is presented in Appendix H) as in Experiment 6A. Scales assessing the 
intention to vaccinate one’s child, negative attitudes towards vaccination, and the 
perceived credibility of the correction received from public health experts (this latter 
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just in the Misinformation condition) were the same as those administered in 
Experiment 6A. However, misconceptions about the MMR vaccine and Zika virus 
were assessed by means of different questions. In particular, conspiracy 
misconceptions about the MMR vaccine and Zika virus were evaluated by means of 
two questions. Participants were asked to indicate whether they agree or disagree that 
“viral experts are in the pocket of pharmaceutical companies” and “vaccines are 
nothing more than a pharmaceutical company conspiracy to make money” on a 5-point 
scale from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). These two items were 
averaged, with a higher score indicating greater conspiracy misconceptions about the 
MMR vaccine and Zika virus, respectively. 
 
8.3.3 Results 
Descriptive statistics for Experiment 6B are reported in Table 8.2.  
 
Table 8.2. Descriptive statistics for the outcomes in Experiment 6B 




Outcomes  M  SD Range  M  SD Range 
Free-recall accuracy   22.91  1.88 19-26  22.98  1.96 19-26 
Conspiracy misconceptions 
about the MMR vaccine 
 1.61  .43 1-3  2.98  .91 1.5-5 
Conspiracy misconceptions 
about the Zika virus vaccine 
 2.02 .5 1-3  3.14 .87 2-5 
MMR Hesitancy  2.51  .64 2-4  4.72  .89 2-6 
Zika Hesitancy  2.94  .58 2-4  4.26  1.21 2-6 
Negative attitudes towards 
vaccination 
 2.17  .2 1.63-
2.75 
 2.51  .28 2-3.38 
Perceived expertise of public 
health experts 
 - - -  2.84  .39 2.2-
3.8 
Perceived trustworthiness of 
public health experts 




Similarly to Experiment 6A, the free-recall test was scored using “idea units”. Results 
revealed that participants’ overall recall performance did not differ across conditions, 
F(1, 129) = .052, p = .82.  
 A series of ANOVAs was performed to test our hypotheses. Figure 8.2 displays 
results relevant to Hypothesis 1 and to the novel Research question. First, we tested 
Hypothesis 1, which posited that misconceptions about the MMR vaccine and Zika 
virus would be higher in the Misinformation than in the Baseline-no misinformation 
condition. As expected, significant differences in misconceptions about the MMR 
vaccine [F(1, 129) = 121.843, p < .001, η² = .488] and Zika virus [F(1, 129) = 79.659, 
p < .001, η² = .384] were found, with participants in the Misinformation condition 
having higher misconceptions (M = 2.98, SD = .91 for the MMR vaccine; M = 3.14, 
SD = .87 for Zika virus) that those in the Baseline-no misinformation condition (M = 
1.61, SD = .43 for the MMR vaccine; M = 2.02, SD = .5 for Zika virus). 
 Next, to answer the new Research question, which asked whether conspiracy 
misconceptions about the MMR vaccine and Zika virus would differ, a within-subjects 
ANOVA was conducted. The results were significant [F(129) = 10.102, p = .002, η² = 
.073], with participants having lower misconceptions when questioned about their 
beliefs about the MMR vaccine (M = 2.29, SD = .99) as opposed to their beliefs about 
Zika virus (M = 2.58, SD = .9).  
 Then, we tested Hypothesis 3, which posited that vaccines hesitancy would be 
higher in the Misinformation than in the Baseline-no misinformation condition. 
Significant differences in the MMR [F(1, 129) = 264.258, p < .001, η² = .674] and Zika 
[F(1, 129) = 62.612, p < .001, η² = .328] vaccine hesitancy were found,  with 
participants in the Misinformation condition being more hesitant towards the MMR 
vaccine and a possible shot against Zika virus (M = 4.72, SD = .89 for the MMR 
vaccine; M = 4.23, SD = 1.21 for Zika virus) than participants in the Baseline-no 
misinformation condition (M = 2.51, SD = .64 for the MMR vaccine; M = 2.94, SD = 
.58 for Zika virus). The results also indicated that there was a significant difference in 
negative attitudes towards vaccination [F(1, 129) = 63.802, p < .001, η² = .333], with 
participants in the Misinformation condition having more negative attitudes (M = 2.17, 
SD = .2) than those in the Baseline-no misinformation condition (M = 2.82, SD = .18). 
As further confirmation of the expected misinformation effect, MMR misconceptions 
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positively correlated with MMR hesitancy (r = .67, p < .01) and negative attitudes 
towards vaccination (r = .355, p < .01); similarly, Zika misconceptions positively 
correlated with Zika hesitancy (r = .335, p < .01) and negative attitudes towards 
vaccination (r = .355, p < .01), so that participants having higher misconceptions about 
the MMR vaccine and Zika virus reported a lower intention to vaccinate their child 
and more negative attitudes towards vaccination in general. 
 Finally, we tested Hypothesis 4, which predicted that credibility evaluations of 
public health experts would be negatively associated with misconceptions and 
vaccines hesitancy. The analyses partially supported Hypothesis 4. The perceived 
expertise of the source providing the correction negatively correlated with negative 
attitudes towards vaccination (r = -.246, p < .05), so that the greater the perceived 
expertise of the source, the more vaccination complacency. Instead, the perceived 
trustworthiness of the source providing the correction negatively correlated with Zika 
vaccine hesitancy (r = -.36, p < .01), so that the more the perceived trustworthiness of 
the source, the less Zika vaccine hesitancy. 
  
Figure 8.2. MMR and Zika misconceptions, along with MMR and Zika hesitancy, across 






8.4 General discussion 
The present study contributes to the literature on how to effectively counteract 
vaccines misinformation and promote evidence-based decision-making by presenting 
new findings concerning how people may be differently affected by misinformation 
according to their prior knowledge and deeply held beliefs about a specific content. In 
two experiments, we confronted the persistence of misconceptions about the MMR 
vaccine and Zika virus as motivated by a poor risk understanding (Experiment 6A) 
and exposure to conspiracy theories (Experiment 6B). 
 First, the findings confirmed Hypothesis 1 about the continued influence effect 
of misinformation. Both in Experiment 6A and 6B, MMR and Zika misconceptions 
were higher in the Misinformation condition as compared to the Baseline-no 
misinformation condition. Moreover, corroborating Hypothesis 3, both in Experiment 
6A and 6B vaccines hesitancy was higher in the Misinformation than in the Baseline-
no misinformation condition, corroborating the large amount of evidence about the 
limited effect of debunking efforts (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky et 
al., 2012). More importantly, in contrast with Hypothesis 2 in Experiment 6A 
assuming that Zika virus misconceptions are not deeply ingrained, misconceptions 
were lower in the case of the MMR vaccine than in the case of Zika virus. The same 
happened in Experiment 6B. One plausible explanation is that Zika virus represents a 
peculiar case showing how missing information can easily evolve into misinformation. 
As anticipated in the Introduction, Zika is a relatively novel disease that may have 
received less coverage in traditional media outlets than the MMR vaccine, except for 
the abounding misinformation in the Internet. While the evidence about the safety of 
the MMR vaccine is solid (DeStefano & Thompson, 2004), scientists are still learning 
about Zika, with the public and the media struggling to keep up (Bode & Grava, 2015, 
2017). This unstable situation may have intensified the negative impact of 
misinformation about Zika compared to other diseases. Some evidence seems to 
corroborate this reasoning. For example, a meta-analysis of the efficacy of messages 
countering misinformation pointed out that, when trying to set the record straight, 
simply labelling the misinformation as wrong is less effective that debunking it with 
new details (Chan, Jones, Hall Jamieson, & Albarracín, 2017). In fact, a key element 
for an effective rebuttal is replacing misinformation with an alternative causal account 
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covering the “gap” created in people’s understanding or mental models of the events. 
In Experiment 6A, although the correction we provided did not feature a detailed 
explanation of the reasons why the link between MMR and autism was false, at least 
participants were informed that “signs of autism typically appear around the same time 
that children are recommended to receive the MMR vaccine”. Instead, no explanation 
of the alleged link between the hypothetical Zika vaccine and epilepsy was provided; 
participants were just advised that there was no connection between the two. 
Therefore, in Experiment 6A people might have been more resistant to the 
misinformation related to the MMR vaccine because they might have been already 
exposed (both inside and outside the laboratory) to corrections detailing why the link 
between the MMR vaccine and autism was false. Conversely, in the case of Zika, they 
could have continued to rely on misinformation in order to account for otherwise 
unexplained events (if Zika does not explain epilepsy, what does?).  
 Similarly, reference (or absence of reference) to causal accounts could explain 
the results of Experiment 6B, showing that conspiracy theory endorsement was higher 
for Zika than MMR. Indeed, conspiracy theories flourish when there is missing 
information as in the case of Zika, because people tend to think there is always a 
“cover-up”, something that the government wants to hide (Nyhan et al., 2016). Missing 
information might also more easily turn into misinformation and conspiracy ideation 
because of the feeling of lack of control (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Indeed, 
conspiracy beliefs may be described as giving “causes and motives to events that are 
more rationally seen as accidents…[in order to] bring the disturbing vagaries of reality 
under…control” (Pipes, 1997, p. 181). 
 Some limitations of the present study are important to mention. One concerns 
the use of similar questions for different texts, which might have resulted in some kind 
of context effect, with prior questions having the potential to affect participants’ 
responses to later questions in the questionnaires administered. Moreover, as 
correlational designs do not allow conclusions about cause and effect, firmer 
conclusions about the causality of the relationships that we observed between 
perceived source credibility and vaccines misconceptions and hesitancy need further 
experimental work.  
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Returning to our main findings, partially confirming Hypothesis 4, the results 
provided in these experiments illustrate the importance of a trusted source 
communicating the scientific consensus about vaccines; at least in the case of Zika 
virus, a trusted source may indeed diminish vaccines misconceptions (Experiment 6A) 
and increase the stated intention to vaccinate one’s child (Experiment 6B). In fact, to 
enhance the effectiveness of science communication, experts recommend to use 
“simple clear messages, repeated often, by a variety of trusted sources” (Cook, van der 
Linden, Maibach, & Lewandowsky, 2018, p. 14). It is also important to mention that 
the perceived trustworthiness of public health experts was very low among 
respondents in this study. This could be partially explained by the crisis of public 
confidence in vaccines, which is leading to long-term decline in vaccines uptake and 

















Understanding human agency requires first and foremost understanding intentions 
because of their intrinsic relation to the actions and activities that we perform in our 
everyday lives (Brandimonte et al., 1996). The present Thesis addressed delayed 
intentions, namely those intentions whose fulfilment is, by definition, postponed at 
some designated moment in the near or distant future. In particular, the focus was on 
the complex nature of prospective memory and on the difficulties associated with the 
retrieval and realization of these delayed intentions. The general aim of this Thesis was 
in fact to investigate some key causes leading to forgetting and misremembering one’s 
intended actions. Two main factors affecting the fulfilment of a delayed intention were 
investigated, namely stress and misinformation.  
Drawing on an open debate about prospective memory decline under stress 
conditions, Part One of this Thesis suggests that stress may have a remarkable, 
disruptive effect on prospective memory functioning. In fact, Study 1 and Study 2 
highlighted that both daily and work stress may increase the likelihood of prospective 
memory errors in a strict sense – namely forgetting to carry out intended actions at the 
appointed time and place. Specifically, Study 1 revealed that high-stressed individuals 
reported a substantial higher frequency of both general cognitive failures and 
prospective memory errors in everyday life, compared to low-stressed individuals. In 
the proposed model, besides stress, potential drivers of prospective memory failures 
appear to be age, mental health (e.g., negative symptoms such as anxiety and 
depression) and reliance memory strategies (e.g., using other people as memory aids). 
These latter could also buffer the negative effect of stress on prospective memory 
errors, so that leaning on reliance memory strategies might help in reducing 
prospective memory errors. Study 2 corroborated the adverse effect of stress on 
prospective memory functioning, showing how work stress and burnout in the 
healthcare context may contribute to forgetting clinical tasks, which may result in 
potential adverse events jeopardizing patient safety. 
In Part Two of this Thesis I argued that a great deal about prospective memory 
errors may be learned from the studies on the continued influence effect of 
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misinformation. False information, in fact, may distort one’s future intentions and 
plans, to the extent that even if a person understands and remembers a subsequent 
retraction, his/her future intentions, even inadvertently, may not change accordingly. 
The misinformation effect is rather ubiquitous and robust, as it occurs nearly all the 
time and for all events for which misinformation is provided. The findings reported in 
Study 3 to Study 6 proved that misinformation is particularly lingering in the case of 
vaccines misconceptions. As showed in Study 3, common strategies employed for 
correcting misinformation about the dangers of vaccination may have the opposite 
effect and reinforce ill-founded beliefs, such as that vaccines cause autism. Study 4 
corroborated that a popular technique based on countering false information in ways 
that repeat it actually amplifies false information, making it familiar and therefore 
more acceptable. Altogether, the findings presented in these two studies offer a useful 
example of how factual information is misremembered over time. In fact, even after a 
short delay, facts tend to fade from the memory, leaving behind popular 
misconceptions. Study 5 and Study 6 provided further insight into the reasons why 
people continue to rely on misinformation even if they remember and understand a 
subsequent retraction. In particular, the findings reported in Study 5 suggest that source 
trustworthiness is crucial in reducing people’s reliance on misinformation, while Study 
6 indicates that missing information can easily evolve into misinformation. 
The overall theme of the studies presented in this Thesis supports the idea that 
“human memory is not a recording device, but rather a process of (re)construction that 
is vulnerable to both internal and external influences” (Van Damme & Smets, 2014, p. 
310). Therefore, forgetting and/or misremembering one’s intended actions are the 
inevitable result of the limitations of human information processing. The question then 
becomes: what can be done to counteract our own fallible humanity?  
As shown in Study 1, if the problem derives from forgetting delayed intentions 
because of daily stress, compensatory memory strategies based on relying on other 
people to remember things proved to buffer the disruptive effect of stress on 
prospective memory errors. Also external memory aids (e.g., shopping lists, calendars, 
notes and anything which disturbs the regular stream of events) could be of great value 
in enhancing prospective remembering in healthy people, especially when there is a 
lengthy time interval between encoding of the prospective memory task and carrying 
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out the task or in situations where internal aids (e.g., mentally rehearsing the list of 
items one intends to buy) cannot be trusted (Brandimonte, 2006; Mizuno, 2001). The 
same is true in complex working contexts, such as in aviation, where the use of external 
aids signalling when to act have proven to reduce prospective memory errors (Loft, 
Smith, & Bhaskara, 2011; Loft, Smith, & Remington, 2013), and in healthcare, where 
such failures could be reduced implementing checklists or distributing the prospective 
memory task in the sense that multiple agents (other doctors, nurses, equipment, IT) 
remind the person of the intended task (Grundgeiger et al., 2014). 
As discussed in Part Two of this Thesis, the situation becomes much more 
nuanced when trying to repair the damage caused by misinformation on our memory 
(Mazzoni & Scoboria, 2007). Under such circumstances, there is no such thing as a 
memory aid or an explicit reminder signalling that facts are not always properly 
checked before information is disseminated that is capable of eliminating altogether 
the continued influence of misinformation (Ecker et al., 2010). Indeed, misinformation 
research shows that no corrective technique can reduce ill-founded beliefs to a base 
level, as if the misinformation was never previously mentioned (Swire & Ecker, 2018). 
For instance, in the Introduction to Part Two of this Thesis I mentioned that past 
research has shown that one of the most effective techniques for enhancing prospective 
memory is based on the notion of “implementation intentions”; generally, encouraging 
people to make a plan to accomplish a desired outcome may enhance the rate of goal 
attainment (Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 1998, 2007). In the context of 
vaccination, prompting individuals to write down the date and time when they planned 
to get their flu shot proved to increase vaccination rates (Milkman et al., 2011). 
However, understanding why parents do or do not accept vaccinations is complex. 
Creating cues and plans to reduce forgetfulness and procrastination may serve as a 
means to increase vaccination rates among those with favourable attitudes toward 
vaccination but may not be enough when parents are misinformed about vaccines.  
Another point has to do with the strong innate mechanisms inducing people to 
preserve misinformation, even in the face of unequivocal evidence to the contrary. As 
anticipated in the Introduction to Part Two of this Thesis, as well as suggested by the 
pattern of results from Studies 3 to 6, people who have acquired false beliefs may 
stubbornly persist in holding them so as to avoid “cognitive dissonance”, i.e. that 
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unpleasant state of having inconsistent thought, beliefs, or attitudes regarding 
behavioural decisions and attitude change (for reviews on motivated cognition, see 
Cooper, 2007; Kunda, 1990; for a review from a misinformation perspective, see 
Ecker, Swire, and Lewandowsky, 2014). A cornerstone of Festinger’s dissonance 
theory (1957) is that people refrain from cognitive dissonance and actively seek out 
ways to relieve this discordance, engaging in particular avoidance techniques. A 
peculiar case of motivated cognition may arise when we are confronted with new 
information that contradicts an already held belief. Under certain circumstances, we 
may tend not to rationally compare the two opposing theses in front of us and resolve 
the inner conflict using available evidence. Rather, we may respond in the same way 
we react to a physical threat by instinctively fighting against the information that 
threatens our beliefs (Salingaros, 2014). In particular, strong believers may reject 
incongruent beliefs in order to maintain and preserve a pervasive worldview, whose 
dismissal would be too threatening for their identity or sense of self. This strategy may 
therefore be regarded as a kind of protective mechanism and add to the wide array of 
methods to reduce cognitive dissonance described by Festinger (1957).  
The use of motivated reasoning to avoid cognitive dissonance induced by new, 
opposing information has been widely documented in the political realm; in particular, 
it has been demonstrated that people on the conservative side of politics tend to 
assimilate only those facts that confirm what they already believe (e.g., Nyhan & 
Reifler, 2010; Prasad et al., 2009). As regards vaccination decision-making, Nyhan et 
al. (2014) clearly showed that, when confronted with evidence against their strong 
belief that vaccine cause autism, “respondents brought to mind other concerns about 
vaccines to defend their anti-vaccination attitudes” (p. e840). Likewise, Voinson, 
Billiard and Alvergne (2015) reported that the overlapping notion of confirmation bias, 
i.e. the propensity to seek out information that confirms one’s pre-existing belief 
(Klayman, 1995; Nickerson, 1998), can explain variation into vaccination coverage. 
Many others pointed out that vaccine hesitancy is a problem of biased reasoning 
(Brewer et al., 2017; Goldenberg, 2016), with vaccine refusers ignoring the rational 
findings of science and engaging in all types of tactics and tropes to favour their 
strongly held beliefs about vaccines (Kata, 2012). The cognitive phenomenon by 
which we may look for what confirms our beliefs and do not scrutinize contrary ideas 
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is only one among several, however, as other heuristics have been documented in 
previous research on vaccine acceptance. For instance, recent research demonstrated 
that anti-vaccination attitudes may be favoured by a feeling of “overconfidence”, as 
people who know the least about the causes of autism and the possible side effects of 
vaccines are the most likely to think they know more or better than medical and 
scientific experts – a typical Dunning-Kruger effect (Motta, Callaghan, & Sylvester, 
2018). Other studies reported a link between vaccine hesitancy and “omission bias”, 
i.e., the tendency to prefer a potentially harmful inaction (an act of omission) over a 
potentially less harmful act (an act of commission), or “ambiguity aversion”, i.e., the 
tendency to prefer a known risk (for instance, the risks related to getting Zika virus 
after a mosquito bite) to unknown risks (the more ambiguous risks from a new vaccine 
against Zika virus) (Dubov & Phung, 2015; Voinson et al., 2015). Together, studies 
like these show that people are biased reasoners. The implication is that researchers 
should remain cognizant of how internal processes may affect behavioural measures 
and be aware that even the most sophisticated and well-designed messages may not 
convince people because of the intricate ways in which their mind works (Strickland, 
Taber, & Lodge, 2011). 
However, there are some recommendations that can serve as guidelines for 
mass communication as how best to counteract the fallouts from misinformation in the 
public sphere. As discussed earlier, misinformation is particularly difficult to correct 
if it comes from a trusted source (as revealed in Study 5) and is plausible, easy-to-
understand, familiar (as suggested by the familiarity backfire effect in Study 3 and 
Study 4), or it concerns “uncertain” arguments about which it is easier for 
misinformers to cast doubt (as shown in Study 6). Therefore, communicators, as well 
as health professionals in the case of vaccines misinformation, should first endeavour 
to build trusting relationships. In particular, when a source bases its claims on 
evidence, adequately references the evidence, and presents data in an easily accessible 
way to minimize misinterpretations – and does this consistently – its perceived 
credibility increases and thus the corrections coming from this source tend to have a 
greater efficacy (Swire & Ecker, 2018). Then, when trying to set the record straight, 
communicators should focus on the facts, which should be communicated in a way 
that makes them easy to understand, as well as avoid unnecessary repetitions of 
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misinformation that lead people to more easily remember the very false claims (Nyhan 
& Reifler, 2012; Trembath et al., 2016). Another practical recommendation for 
reducing the prevalence of misinformation, particularly among people who held strong 
prior beliefs about the issue at hand and tend to select like-minded sources and reject 
unwelcome corrections, could be to encourage the public to employ scientific 
skepticism, “approaching claims with an open mind, and a willingness to accept only 
those claims that have survived scrutiny in rigorous scientific tests” (Schmaltz & 
Lilienfeld, 2014, p. 1). Consistent with Sagan’s (1995) argument that critical thinking 
facilitates “baloney detection” and protects against the aggressive self-righteousness 
of one’s mind, people engaging in true skepticism tend indeed to differentiate more 
accurately between truth and falsehood (Lewandowsky et al., 2016; Lewandowsky, 
Stritzke, Oberauer, & Morales, 2005, 2009). Finally, given the difficulties of 
improving human cognition, communicators should ensure the dissemination of high 













APPENDIX A. Items and instructions for the scales 
used in Study 1 
 
 
Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-10; Cohen & Williamson, 1988)  
The questions in this scale ask you about your feelings and thoughts during the last month. 
In each case, you will be asked to indicate how often you felt or thought a certain way. For 




 = Never           = Almost never         = Sometimes       
 = Fairly often             = Very often 
 
1. In the last month, how often have you been upset because 
of something that happened unexpectedly? 
                
2. In the last month, how often have you felt that you were 
unable to control the important things in your life? 
                
3. In the last month, how often have you felt nervous and 
“stressed”? 
                
4. In the last month, how often have you felt confident about 
your ability to handle your personal problems? 
                
5. In the last month, how often have you felt that things were 
going in your way? 
                
6. In the last month, how often have you found that you 
could not cope with all the things that you had to do? 
                
7. In the last month how often have you been able to control 
irritations in your life? 
                
8. In the last month, how often have you felt that you were 
on top of things? 
                
9. In the last month, how often have you been angered 
because of things that happened that were outside of your 
control? 
                
10. In the last month, how often have you felt difficulties 
were piling up so high to the point that you could not 
overcome them? a 
                









Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982; Di Fabio et al., 2004) 
The following questions are about minor mistakes which everyone makes from time to time, 
but some of which happen more often than others. We want to know how often these things 
have happened to you in the last six months. For each question choose from the following 
alternatives: 
    
 
 
 = Never            = Very rarely           = Occasionally       
  = Quite often        = Very often 
 
1. Do you read something and find you haven’t been 
thinking about it and must read it again? 
                
2. Do you find you forget why you went from one part of the 
house to the other? 
                
3. Do you fail to notice signposts on the road?                 
4. Do you find you confuse right and left when giving 
directions? 
                
5. Do you bump into people?                    
6. Do you find you forget whether you’ve turned off a light 
or a fire or locked the door? 
                
7. Do you fail to listen to people’s names when you are 
meeting them? 
                
8. Do you say something and realize afterwards that it might 
be taken as insulting? 
                
9. Do you fail to hear people speaking to you when you are 
doing something else? 
                
10. Do you lose your temper and regret it?                 
11. Do you leave important letters unanswered for days?                 
12. Do you find you forget which way to turn on a road you 
know well but rarely use? 
                
13. Do you fail to see what you want in a supermarket 
(although it’s there)? 
                
14. Do you find yourself suddenly wondering whether you’ve 
used a word correctly? 
                
15. Do you have trouble making up your mind?                 
16. Do you find you forget appointments?                 
17. Do you forget where you put something like a newspaper 
or a book? 
                
18. Do you find you accidentally throw away the thing you 
want and keep what you meant to throw away - as in the 
example of throwing away the matchbox and putting the 
used match in your pocket? 
                
19. Do you daydream when you ought to be listening to 
something? 
                
20. Do you find you forget people’s names?                 
130 
 
21. Do you start doing one thing at home and get distracted 
into doing something else (unintentionally)? 
                
22. Do you find you can’t quite remember something 
although it’s ‘on the tip of your tongue’? 
                
23. Do you find you forget what you came to the shops to 
buy? 
                
24. Do you drop things?                 
25. Do you find you can’t think of anything to say?                 
 
Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ; Smith et al., 2000) 
As before, the following questions are about minor mistakes which everyone makes from 
time to time. We want to know how often these things have happened to you. For each 
question choose from the following alternatives: 
 
 = Never             = Rarely            = Sometimes        
  = Quite often           = Very often 
 
1. Do you decide to do something in a few minutes’ time 
and then forget to do it? 
              
2. Do you fail to recognise a place you have visited before?              
3. Do you fail to do something you were supposed to do a 
few minutes later even though it’s there in front of you, 
like take a pill or turn off the kettle? 
             
4. Do you forget something that you were told few minutes 
before? 
             
5. Do you forget appointments if you are not prompted by 
someone else or by a reminder such as a calendar or 
diary?  
             
6. Do you fail to recognise a character in a radio or 
television show from scene to scene? 
             
7. Do you forget to buy something you planned to buy, like 
a birthday card, even when you see the shop? 
             
8. Do you fail to recall things that have happened to you in 
the last few days? 
             
9. Do you repeat the same story to the same person on 
different occasions? 
             
10. Do you intended to take something with you, before 
leaving a room or going out, but minutes later leave it 
behind, even though it’s there in front of you? 
             
11. Do you mislay something that you have just put down, lie 
a magazine or glasses? 
             
12. Do you fail to mention or give something to a visitor that 
you were asked to pass on? 
             
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13. Do you look at something without realising you have seen 
it moments before? 
             
14. If you tried to contact a friend or relative who was out, 
would you forget to try again later? 
             
15.  Do you forget what you watched on television the 
previous day? 
             
16. Do you forget to tell someone something you had meant 
to mention a few minutes ago? 
             
Note: Items 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 14, and 16 compose the ProM subscale, while items 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 
and 15 constitute the RetM subscale. 
 
Memory Compensation Questionnaire (MCQ; Dixon & Bäckman, 1993; de Frias & 
Dixon, 2005) 
The following questions are about common behaviours that one may have. For each question 
choose from the following alternatives: 
 
 = Never            = Very rarely           = Occasionally       
  = Quite often        = Always 
 
1. Do you use shopping lists when you go shopping?                 
2. When you want to remember an important appointment 
do you ask somebody else (for example, spouse or friend) 
to remind you? 
                
3. When you are reading a book, do you use a bookmark to 
indicate the point where you stopped reading last time? a 
                
4. When an interesting TV program is going to be on in the 
next few days do you ask somebody else to help you 
remember (for example, spouse or friend)?  
                
5. When you want to remember an event such as a birthday, 
do you ask somebody else (for example, spouse or friend) 
to help you remember? 
                
6. Do you post notes on a board or other prominent place to 
help you remember things for the future (for example, 
meetings or dates)?  
                
7. When you want to remember the name of a particular 
person, do you ask somebody else (for example, spouse 
or friend) to help you remember? 
                
8. Do you sometimes ask someone (for example, spouse or 
friend) to help you remember when you are going to start 
a trip? 
                
9. Do you put things (for example, glasses or keys) in 
particular places to remember where they are for future 
purposes? 
                
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10. Do you put things in obvious places (for example, 
briefcase in front of the door) in order to remember them 
when you’re going out? 
                
11. When you want to remember something from a TV 
program do you use “memory tricks” like grouping or 
repeating to yourself? 
                
12. Do you take your time to go through and reconstruct an 
event you want to remember? 
                
13. Do you write down appointments (for example, with the 
hairdresser or the dentist) in a notebook or calendar? 
                
14. Before an important day do you think about or plan the 
things you have to do? 
                
15. Do you note birthdays in a notebook or calendar in order 
to remember them? 
                
16. Do you repeat telephone numbers to yourself in order to 
remember them well? 
                
17. Do you write down telephone numbers in a calendar or 
notebook in order to remember them? 
                
18. When you want to remember the name of a person do you 
try to associate the name with the person’s face? 
                
19. When you want to remember something that happened in 
a particular day do you review and reconstruct the events 
of that day in order to help you remember? 
                
20. Do you use letters as cues (in other words, go through the 
alphabet) when you want to remember the name of a 
person, a city, or something else? 
                
21. When you want to remember something do you try to 
relate it to something else you know well in order to 
remember it better? 
                
22. Do you use mental images or pictures to remember some 
types of information? 
                
23. Do you repeat important appointments to yourself in 
order to remember them as well as possible? 
                
Note: Items 1, 3, 6, 9, 10, 13, 15, and 17 compose the External subscale, items 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, 
20, 21, 22, and 23 constitute the Internal subscale, while items 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 are included in the Reliance 
subscale; a Item modified for the purpose of the objective test of PM employed in this study. 
 
Ego-Resiliency Scale (ER89; Block & Kramen, 1996; Caprara et al., 2003) 
Please indicate the extent to which the following statements are true for you, using the 
following response scale: 
 
 = Never           = Very rarely            = Rarely 
 = Quite often     = Often       = Very often       = Always 
 
1. I am generous with my friends.                       
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2. I quickly get over and recover from being 
startled. 
                      
3. I enjoy dealing with new and unusual situations.                       
4. I usually succeed in making a favorable 
impression on people. 
                      
5. I enjoy trying new foods I have never tasted 
before. 
                      
6. I am regarded as a very energetic person.                       
7. I like to take different paths to familiar places.                       
8. I am more curious than most people.                       
9. Most of the people I meet are likeable.                       
10. I usually think carefully about something before 
acting. 
                      
11. Seeing things from a different point of view can 
help us understand why people act the way they 
do. a  
                      
12. I like to do new and different things.                       
13. My daily life is full of things that keep me 
interested. 
                      
14. I would be willing to describe myself as a pretty 
"strong" personality. 
                      
15. I get over my anger at someone reasonably 
quickly. 
                      
Note: a Item added to the original scale for the purpose of the objective test of PM employed in this 
study but not included in the statistical analyses. 
 
General Health Questionnaire (GH12; Goldberg & Williams, 1988) 
Please answer the following questions about your health from your POINT of view. For 
each question choose from the following alternatives: 
 
 = Not at all           = No more than usual 
 = Rather more than usual        = More than usual 
 
1. In the last two weeks, how often have you lost sleep over worry?                 
2. In the last two weeks, how often have you felt constantly under 
strain? 
            
3. In the last two weeks, how often have you felt you couldn’t 
overcome difficulties? 
               
4. In the last two weeks, how often have you felt unhappy and 
depressed? 
                
5. In the last two weeks, how often have you lost confidence in 
yourself? 
            
6. In the last two weeks, how often have you thought of yourself as 
worthless? 
               
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Now, please answer these questions choosing from the following alternatives: 
 
 = Much more than usual           = Same as usual 
 = Less than usual        = Much less than usual 
7. In the last two weeks, how often have you felt able to concentrate?                
8. In the last two weeks, how often have you felt you were playing a 
useful part? 
                
9. In the last two weeks, how often have you felt capable of making 
decisions? 
            
10. In the last two weeks, how often have you felt able to enjoy day-
to-day activities? 
                
11. In the last two weeks, how often have you felt able to face 
problems? 
            
















APPENDIX B. Items and instructions for the scales 
used in Study 2 
 
 
Need for Recovery Scale (Van Veldhoven & Meijman, 1994) 
 
Please indicate the extent to which the following statements are true for you, using the 




 = Never       = Sometimes          = Often          = Always  
 
1. I find it difficult to relax at the end of a working day.              
2. By the end of the working day, I feel really worn out.              
3. Because of my job, at the end of the working day I feel really 
exhausted. 
             
4. After the evening meal, I generally feel fit.              
5. In general, I only start to feel relaxed at the end of the second 
non-working day. 
             
6. I find it difficult to concentrate in my free time after work.              
7. I cannot really show much interest in other people when I have 
just come home myself. 
             
8. Generally, I need more than an hour before I feel completely 
recuperated after work. 
             
9. When I get home from work, I have a series of reoccurring 
thoughts about what I could do better at work .a 
             
10. When I get home from work, I need to be left in peace for a 
while. 
             
11. After a day’s work, I often feel so tired that I cannot get 
involved in other activities. 
             
12. During the last part of the working day, a feeling of tiredness 
prevents me from doing my work as well as I normally would. 
             
Note: a Item added to the original scale for the purpose of the objective test of PM employed in this study 
but not included in the following analyses. 
 
Oldenburg Burnout Inventory (OLBI; Demerouti et. al, 2001) 
Below you can find a series of statements which you may agree or not agree with. Please 
indicate the extent to which the following statements are true for you, using the following 
response scale: 
 
 = Strongly agree       = Agree  
 = Disagree        = Strongly disagree 
 
1. I always find new and interesting aspects in my work.              
2. There are days when I feel tired before I arrive at work.              
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3. It happens more and more often that I talk about my work in a 
negative way. 
             
4. After work, I tend to need more time than in the past in order to 
relax and feel better. 
             
5. I can tolerate the pressure of my work very well.              
6. Lately, I tend to think less at work and do my job almost 
mechanically. 
             
7. I find my work to be a positive challenge.              
8. During my work, I often feel emotionally drained.              
9. Over time, one can become disconnected from this type of 
work. 
             
10. After working, I have enough energy for my leisure activities.              
11. Sometimes I feel sickened by my work tasks.              
12. After my work, I usually feel worn out and weary.              
13. This is the only type of work that I can imagine myself doing.              
14. Usually, I can manage the amount of my work well.              
15. I feel more and more engaged in my work.              
16. When I work, I usually feel energized.              
Note: Exhaustion items are 2(R), 4(R), 5, 8(R), 10, 12(R), 14, 16, while disengagement items are 1, 
3(R), 6(R), 7, 9(R), 11(R), 13, 15. (R) indicates items to be reversed so that higher scores indicate more 
burnout. 
 
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982; Di Fabio et al., 
2004) 
The following questions are about minor mistakes which everyone makes from time to time, 
but some of which happen more often than others. We want to know how often these things 
have happened to you in the last six months. For each question choose from the following 
alternatives: 
    
 
 
 = Never      = Very rarely       = Occasionally       
  = Quite often        = Very often 
 
1. Do you read something and find you haven’t been thinking 
about it and must read it again? 
                
2. Do you find you forget why you went from one part of the 
house to the other? 
                
3. Do you fail to notice signposts on the road?                 
4. Do you find you confuse right and left when giving 
directions? 
                
5. Do you bump into people?                    
6. Do you find you forget whether you’ve turned off a light or 
a fire or locked the door? 
                
7. Do you fail to listen to people’s names when you are 
meeting them? 
                
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8. Do you say something and realize afterwards that it might 
be taken as insulting? 
                
9. Do you fail to hear people speaking to you when you are 
doing something else? 
                
10. Do you lose your temper and regret it?                 
11. Do you leave important letters unanswered for days?                 
12. Do you find you forget which way to turn on a road you 
know well but rarely use? 
                
13. Do you fail to see what you want in a supermarket (although 
it’s there)? 
                
14. Do you find yourself suddenly wondering whether you’ve 
used a word correctly? 
                
15. Do you have trouble making up your mind?                 
16. Do you find you forget appointments?                 
17. Do you forget where you put something like a newspaper 
or a book? 
                
18. Do you find you accidentally throw away the thing you 
want and keep what you meant to throw away - as in the 
example of throwing away the matchbox and putting the 
used match in your pocket? 
                
19. Do you daydream when you ought to be listening to 
something? 
                
20. Your favourite TV series will be broadcast tomorrow night. 
Do you ever ask someone else (such as your spouse or a 
friend) to remind you? a 
                
21. Do you find you forget people’s names?                 
22. Do you start doing one thing at home and get distracted into 
doing something else (unintentionally)? 
                
23. Do you find you can’t quite remember something although 
it’s ‘on the tip of your tongue’? 
                
24. Do you find you forget what you came to the shops to buy?                 
25. Do you drop things?                 
26. Do you find you can’t think of anything to say?                 
Note: a Item added to the original scale for the purpose of the objective test of PM employed in this 
study but not included in the statistical analyses. 
 
Prospective Memory subscale from the Prospective and Retrospective Memory 
Questionnaire (PRMQ ProM; Smith et al., 2000) 
 
The following questions are about minor mistakes which everyone makes from time to time. 
We want to know how often these things have happened to you. For each question choose 
from the following alternatives: 
 
 = Never         = Rarely         = Sometimes        




1. Do you decide to do something in a few minutes’ time and 
then forget to do it? 
              
2. Do you fail to do something you were supposed to do a 
few minutes later even though it’s there in front of you, 
like take a pill or turn off the kettle? 
             
3. Do you forget appointments if you are not prompted by 
someone else or by a reminder such as a calendar or 
diary?  
             
4. Do you forget to buy something you planned to buy, like 
a birthday card, even when you see the shop? 
             
5. Do you intended to take something with you, before 
leaving a room or going out, but minutes later leave it 
behind, even though it’s there in front of you? 
             
6. Do you fail to mention or give something to a visitor that 
you were asked to pass on? 
             
7. If you tried to contact a friend or relative who was out, 
would you forget to try again later? 
             
8. Do you forget to tell someone something you had meant 
to mention a few minutes ago? 
             
 
 
Item investigating the importance attributed to PM for daily practice 
 
Please answer the following question at the best of your knowledge, using the following 
response scale: 
 
 = Not important at all           = Of little importance 
 = Of average importance 
 = Very important            = Absolutely essential 
 
Prospective memory refers to situations in which an 
individual intends to perform an action at a later time. In 
your opinion, how much is important prospective memory 
for patient safety? 
             
 
 
Self-developed scale modelled after Dismukes & Nowinski’s (2007) taxonomy of PM 
tasks in the aviation setting 
 
The following items are about situations which you may experience at work from time to 
time. We want to know how often these situations have happened to you in the last month. 
For each question choose from the following alternatives: 
 
 = Never       = Rarely       = Sometimes 




1. You postponed some work task that is not habitually 
performed to resume it at later time. However, you cannot 
remember whether you eventually performed this task.  
             
2. While performing some work task, you were abruptly 
interrupted by other patients, co-workers, or events on the 
unit and you cannot remember whether you resumed the 
interrupted task at a later time. 
             
3. You made some error while performing a habitual work 
task, namely a task including steps that are normally 
performed in the same sequence. 
             
4. While performing some work task, circumstances 
required you to modify a well-established procedure but 
you unintentionally reverted to the normal procedure. 
             
5. You made some error while performing several work tasks 
concurrently. 
             
6. A SERIES of changes is occurring in your work.              
Note: a Item added to the original scale for the purpose of the objective test of PM employed in this study 
but not included in the statistical analyses. 
 
Gladstone Questionnaire (Gladstone, 1995) 
The following items are about situations that may cause of medication errors. We want to 
know how often these situations usually happen. For each item, please place an “X” over the 
response that best corresponds to your opinion, using the following response scale: 
 
 
 = Never         = Rarely         = Sometimes         
 = Quite often         = Very often 
 
1. Medication errors occur when the physician’s writing on 
the doctor’s order form is difficult to read or illegible. 
             
2. Medication errors occur when nurses are distracted by 
other patients, co-workers, or events on the unit. 
             
3. Medication errors occur when nurses are tired and 
exhausted. 
             
4. Medication errors occur when there is confusion between 
two drugs with similar names. 
             
5. Medication errors occur when the nurse miscalculates the 
dose. 
             
6. Medication errors occur when the physician prescribes the 
wrong dose. 
             
7. Medication errors occur when the nurse fails to check the 
patient’s name-band with the Medication Administration 
Record (MAR). 
             
8. Medication errors occur when the nurse sets up or adjusts 
an infusion device incorrectly. 
             
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9. Medication errors occur when the medication 
label/packaging are of poor quality or are damaged. 
             
10. Medication errors occur when nurses are confused by 
different types and functions of infusions devices. 
             
The following items describe some events that you may encounter at work. For each item, 
please indicate whether the described event represents a medication error and whether it 
should be reported to the physician, ticking “yes” or “no”. 
 
1) A patient misses his midday dose of oral ampicillin because he was in x-ray for 3 hours. 
 a. Is this a medication error?                               YES          NO 
 b. Would you report it to the physician?             YES           NO 
2) Four patients on a busy surgical unit receive their 6 PM dose of IV antibiotics 4 hours 
late. 
a. Is this a medication error?                                YES          NO 
b. Would you report it to the physician?              YES           NO 
3) A patient receiving TPN feeding via an infusion pump is given 200 ml/hr instead of the 
correct rate of 125 ml/hr for the first 3 hours of the 24-h infusion. The pump was reset to 
the correct rate after the change of shift at 7 A when the oncoming nurse realized the pump 
was set at the incorrect rate. 
a. Is this a medication error?                                YES          NO 
b. Would you report it to the physician?              YES           NO 
4) A patient admitted with status asthmaticus on 08/13 at 2 AM is prescribed albuterol 
(ventolin) nebulizers every 4 h. The nurse omits the 6 AM dose on 08/13 as the patient is 
asleep. 
 a. Is this a medication error?                               YES           NO 
b. Would you report it to the physician?              YES           NO 
5) A physician orders oxycodone hydrochloride and acetaminophen (Percocet) 1-2 tabs for 
post-operation pain every 4 h. At 4 pm the patient complains of pain, requests 1 pill and is 
medicated. At 6.30 pm the patient requests a second pain pill. The nurse administers the 
pill. 
a. Is this a medication error?                                 YES           NO 
b. Would you report it to the physician?               YES           NO 
 
Finally, please indicate answer the following questions, ticking “yes” or “no”. 
 
I am usually sure what constitutes a medication error. YES        NO 
I am usually sure when a medication error should be reported using 
an incident report. 
YES        NO 
Some medication errors are not reported because nurses are afraid 
of the reaction they will receive from the nurse manager or co-
workers. 
YES        NO 
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Have you ever failed to report a medication error because you did 
not think the error was serious enough to warrant reporting? 
YES        NO 
Have you ever failed to report a medication error because you were 
afraid that you might be subject to disciplinary action or even lose 
your job? 

























APPENDIX C. Preliminary and post-manipulation 









First, please put your sex, age, and educational level on the top of this page. Then, please read 
the following statements and check the box (one for each row) which best indicates your idea 
and/or behaviour.  












Getting vaccines is a good way to 













Generally I would do what my 
doctor recommends about vaccines 












New vaccines are recommended 
only if they are as safe as older 
vaccines. 










My future child(ren) will not need 













Parents should have the right to 
refuse vaccines that are required for 













So many children are vaccinated 
















from these illnesses even if I will not 
vaccinate them. 
 
I am concerned about serious 












Some vaccines cause autism in 
healthy children. 






Now, please answer the following questions. For each item, check the box which best indicates 
your idea and/or behaviour.  
 
 
















Some vaccines cause 






































Just based on 
what you know, 
how likely is it 
that children who 
get the measles, 
mumps, and 
rubella vaccine – 















as the MMR 
vaccine – will 
suffer serious side 
effects? 
How likely is that 





vaccine, which is 














Finally, please indicate your email address and a password that we will use to match your 
answers in the first and second session of the study. Be sure to remember it for the second time 

















APPENDIX D. Interventions used in Study 3 
 
 
Myths vs. Facts Correction
 
In this experiment you will read a series of statements that contrast myths and facts 
about vaccines. You can go through them at your own pace. 
 
1  MYTH 
It is well-known that better hygiene, 
sanitation, and nutrition are actually 
responsible for decreased infections, 
not vaccines. Therefore, vaccines are 
not necessary. 
   
 
  FACT 
Many infections can spread regardless 
of improved sanitation. If people are 
not vaccinated, diseases that have 
become uncommon, such as polio, will 
quickly reappear.
 
2   MYTH         FACT 
Vaccines are risky. They have several 
damaging and long-term side-effects 
that are as yet unknown. Vaccination 
can even be fatal. 
Vaccines are very safe. You are far 
more likely to be seriously injured by a 
vaccine-preventable disease than by a 
vaccine. 
 
3  MYTH         FACT 
The combined vaccine against 
diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis 
(whooping cough) and the vaccine 
against poliomyelitis cause sudden 
infant death syndrome (SIDS). 
  
There is no link between giving these 
vaccines and sudden infant death. It is 
only coincidental that these vaccines 





4  MYTH         FACT 
Many diseases that can be preventable 
by vaccines, such as meningitis, are 
almost eradicated in my country. 
Therefore, there is no reason to be 
vaccinated, especially for uncommon 
diseases. 
In a highly inter-connected world, the 
infectious agents that cause diseases, 
even if uncommon, continue to 
circulate, can easily cross geographical 
borders, and infect anyone who is not 
protected.
 
5  MYTH         FACT 
Vaccine-preventable childhood 
illnesses are not so serious. They are 
just an unfortunate fact of life that 
everyone has to face. 
  
Illnesses such as measles, mumps and 
rubella are serious and can lead to 
severe complications, such as 
encephalitis. 
 
6  MYTH         FACT 
Immunisation schedules are extremely 
daunting. Giving a child more than one 
vaccine at a time can overwhelm his or 
her immune system and increase the 
risk of harmful side-effects. 
  
Giving several vaccines at the same 
time has no adverse effect. Rather, it 
implies fewer injections. Also, children 
are more likely to complete the 
recommended vaccinations on 
schedule. 
  
7  MYTH         FACT 
Influenza, like several other common 
diseases, is not a big deal for most 
people. It is just a nuisance and the 
vaccine isn’t very effective. 
  
Influenza is a serious disease that can 
even be fatal. Pregnant women, 
children, elderly are at higher risk of 




8  MYTH         FACT 
Natural immunity is better than 
vaccine-acquired immunity. Indeed, 
catching a disease and then getting sick 
results in a stronger immunity to the 
disease than a vaccination. 
  
Vaccines interact with the immune 
system to produce a response similar to 
that produced by the natural infection, 
but they protect against its potential 
severe complications. 
  
9  MYTH         FACT 
Aside from antigens and antibiotic, we 
do not know what goes into a vaccine. 
They can contain dangerous toxic 
chemicals, such as thiomersal. 
  
Vaccines are safe. For example, there is 
no evidence to suggest that the amount 
of thiomersal contained in vaccines 
poses a health risk. 
  
10  MYTH         FACT 
A 1998 study showed that the MMR 
vaccine causes autism, because some 
signs of autism appear around the same 
age that children receive the MMR 
vaccine against measles, mumps, and 
rubella. 
There is no evidence of a link between 
the MMR vaccine and autism. The 
1998 study which first suggested this 
link was later found to be seriously 
















In this experiment you will examine a series of tables which compare the negative 
consequences of some diseases such as measles, mumps and rubella with the potential 
problems caused by the MMR vaccine, injected to prevent these diseases. You can go 
through them at your own pace. 
 
 
What are measles, mumps and rubella? 
Measles, mumps and rubella are infectious diseases that are caused by three different 
viruses. They are spread when the viruses are passed from an infectious person to 
someone who is not immune to them. Rubella is also known as “German measles”. 
 
What is the MMR vaccine? 
MMR is the combined vaccine against measles, mumps and rubella. It contains live, 
weakened measles, mumps and rubella viruses. Over 90 countries around the world 
use MMR vaccine. Two doses of the vaccine are usually recommended to be given 


















Common symptoms of measles 
These are usually mild symptoms and include fever, loss of appetite, rash, diarrhoea, 
runny nose, cough and red painful eyes. Children who get measles usually have to 
spend about 5 days in bed and have to take 10 to 14 days off from school, if there is 
no serious complication. 
 
Complications of measles 
These are usually serious conditions and include ear infections, pneumonia, fits or 
convulsions, croup, inflammation of the brain (encephalitis), which could result in 
hospitalisation. A late complication of measles is the so-called subacute sclerosing 
panencephalitis (SSPE), which causes progressive brain damage and nearly always 
results in death. 
 
Now look at the following table that compares the potential problems caused by 
measles with the potential problems caused by the MMR vaccine. 
 
Green - Common, usually mild symptoms that can be treated at home.  
Yellow - Moderate complications that need medical attention but may not include 
hospitalisation. 










Common symptoms of mumps 
These are usually mild symptoms and include fever, mild headaches, abdominal pain, 
loss of appetite, painful and swollen glands in the cheeks, neck or under the jaw in 7 
out of 10 people. These symptoms usually go away within 10 days or so, if there is no 
serious complication. 
 
Complications of mumps 
These are usually serious conditions and include inflammation of the pancreas 
(pancreatitis), partial or complete deafness and inflammation of the brain 
(encephalitis), which could result in hospitalisation. Complications are more serious 
after puberty. Boys (after puberty) and men may experience painful, swollen testicles, 
which very rarely causes infertility. Mumps may cause spontaneous miscarriage 
during the 1st three months of pregnancy. Mumps is the commonest cause of 
meningitis in the UK. 
 
Now look at the following table that compares the potential problems caused by 
measles with the potential problems caused by the MMR vaccine. 
 
Green - Common, usually mild symptoms that can be treated at home.  
Yellow - Moderate complications that need medical attention but may not include 
hospitalisation. 











Common symptoms of rubella 
These are usually mild symptoms and include fever, swollen glands, joint pain and a 
red rash around the ears and neck. 
 
Complications of rubella 
These are usually serious conditions and include a tendency to bleed or bruise 
(thrombocytopenia), deafness and inflammation of the brain (encephalitis), which 
could result in hospitalisation. Congenital rubella (which means rubella infection of an 
unborn child) is a very serious condition. If a woman catches rubella during the first 3 
months of her pregnancy, the virus almost always causes serious birth defects 
(congenital abnormalities) in her unborn child. This can include deafness, blindness, 
heart defects or damage to the brain. 
 
Now look at the following table that compares the potential problems caused by 
measles with the potential problems caused by the MMR vaccine. 
 
Green - Common, usually mild symptoms that can be treated at home.  
Yellow - Moderate complications that need medical attention but may not include 
hospitalisation. 









In this experiment you will see some of the consequences you may face by choosing 
to not vaccinate your child.  
Measles, mumps, and rubella are serious diseases. a combined shot — called mmr 




The measles virus can be spread very easily. Even being in the same room with a 
person with measles is enough to catch the disease. Symptoms include a rash, fever, 
cough and watery eyes. Measles also can cause pneumonia, brain damage, seizures or 
death. 
 
Image available at: http://www.idph.state.il.us/about/imm unepics/measles.htm 
 
MUMPS 
The mumps virus causes fever, headaches and swollen salivary glands under the jaw. 
Children who get mumps may develop meningitis (inflammation of the covering of 
the brain and spinal cord) and encephalitis (inflammation of the brain). Mumps can 
also result in permanent hearing loss. 
 




The rubella virus usually causes mild sickness with fever, swollen glands and a rash 
that last about three days. But, if a pregnant woman gets rubella, she can lose her baby, 
or the baby can be born blind, deaf, mentally retarded, with heart defects or other 
serious problems. 
 





In this experiment you will read some fact sheets containing tips to help prevent 
medical errors and get safer healthcare. You can go through them at your own pace. 
 
 
Materials for this intervention were drawn from: 
 
https://www.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/patients-consumers/care-
























APPENDIX E. Stories used in study 5  
 
The story of Sylvia and her child 
 
Message 1. It is a sunny morning in the spring of 2015. Sylvia, a young mother of a three-
year-old boy, sits in a paediatrician’s office with her wriggling son on her lap. She looks visibly 
worried. 
Message 2. Her son has just received the vaccine against Brainpox, an illness that can be 
transmitted via airborne droplets and may cause symptoms such as fever, chills, and runny 
nose. Rare complications include convulsions, encephalitis (brain swelling), and even death. 
Message 3. Two months before, Sylvia’s family doctor had recommended this vaccine. 
But Sylvia thought her baby boy’s immune system was not ready. 
Message 4. “What if something goes wrong?”, she brooded for hours. “It’s just too many 
vaccines, too soon. And there’s got to be a reason if there are so many cases of vaccine 
injuries”. 
Message 5. However, she had heard time and time again about stories where families chose 
not to vaccine their children and then suffered unimaginable consequences. Eventually, she 
decided to vaccinate her son. 
Message 6. When they came back home from the doctor, her baby did not stop crying. The 
day after he had a fever. Sylvia was very worried but the doctor said that it was what normally 
happens when the body mounts its immune response to the vaccine. 
Message 7. In the following months, Sylvia started noticing her son became more and 
more hyperactive. “He was always in constant motion, had trouble playing quietly, and did 
not listen to anything I said”, she remembers. 
Message 8. When her son was five, Sylvia took him to get tested. He was diagnosed with 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). 
Message 9. In the same period, a rumour about a link between the vaccine against 
Brainpox and ADHD spread rapidly. 
Message 10. For some time, Sylvia was upset about her son’s condition because she 
thought she somehow caused it. 
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Message 11. Today she admits her son was ‘different’ before he got the shot and, later, 
nothing has changed. 
Message 12. “I had known for years that something was wrong. My son just didn't seem 
like other children. I couldn’t take my eye off him for one minute and I needed to check on 
him constantly”, she says. 
Message 13. That rumour of a link between the vaccine against Brainpox and ADHD was 
eventually discredited. 
Message 14. Today, Sylvia is in a support group to learn more about ADHD and how to 
parent a child who has ADHD. “Talking to someone who can offer guidance and support made 
a massive difference to both my child and me as parent”, she says. 
 
Baseline no-correction condition  
Message 13. “However, I am truly blessed to have my son. Although his behaviour is 
challenging, he has enriched my life”, she says. 
 
Correction conditions  
Message 13. (source of the correction goes here) reported that the rumour of a link 












APPENDIX F. Questionnaire items used in Study 5 
 
Factual questions 
1. When (season and year) did the mother take her child to vaccinate? 
2. What was the baby’s reaction after receiving the shot? 
3. What did the doctor say? 
4. What did Sylvia notice in the following months? 
5. How old was the baby when he received the diagnosis? 
6. What was his diagnosis? 
7. How did the baby appear to his mother since he was very little? 
8. How did the mother react to her child’s diagnosis? 
 
Inference questions 
9. How do you think the baby’s body responded to the vaccine? 
10. Do you think the mother’s decision to vaccinate her child was wise? 
11. Is there any reason to believe that the vaccine was linked to the baby’s condition? 
12. What is a possible reason for why parents would not vaccinate their children? 
13. Is there any reason to believe that the baby would not have an attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder? If so, what? 
14. Did the mother play any role in her child’s disease? If so, what? 
15. How do you think the mother felt about her child’s disease? 
16. Do you think if the mother could go back she would choose not to vaccinate her son? If 
so, why? 
 
Retraction awareness question (only for Correction conditions) 
What was the message given by (source of the correction goes here)? 
 
17. How likely is it that you would give the vaccine against Brainpox to your child? Use the 
following response scale. Please place an “X” over the appropriate response. 
 □ 
1 = Very 
Unlikely 
□  
2 = Somewhat 
Unlikely 
□ 















APPENDIX G. Stories used in Study 6 
 
Experiment 6A – Baseline Condition 
 
MMR vaccine: A mother’s story 
Jodie is a young mother living in London.  
She followed the regular vaccination schedule for her son; so, when he was 15 months old, he 
took the MMR shot. 
The MMR vaccine protects against measles, mumps, and rubella.  
Serious complications of these diseases may include brain damage and even death. 
Jodie remembers that her son was a healthy boy before receiving the MMR vaccine.  
«He was a regular baby; he always smiled at me, used to say “mum” and played with his toys», 
Jodie says.  
 «After the MMR shot, he was a completely different boy», she admits, «he displayed 
behaviors I had never noticed before».  
«He barely noticed if somebody was around him, didn’t say “mum” anymore, and did not 
know how to play with a basic toy», she says. 
Today Jodie’s son has turned five and has been diagnosed with autism.  
Autism is a complex neurodevelopmental disorder that is characterized by impaired social 
interaction and restricted and repetitive behavior. 
«I love my son no matter how different he his», Jodie says.  
Today, Jodie runs a charity and encourages parents of autistic children to share their stories.   
 «At the beginning, it was tough», Jodie recalls, «I had to adjust».  
«Today, our family life is as rich and meaningful as any other», she says. 
 
Zika virus: A mother’s story 
Claire is a young mother living in London.  
She planned a family vacation to Mexico with her 2-year-old son.  
Mexico is an area with risk of Zika virus.  
Zika primarily spreads through a bite of an infected mosquito, which is found throughout the 
tropics. Common symptoms among Zika infected patients include mild fever, rash, headache, 
joint pain, conjunctivitis, and muscle pain.  
Viral experts have recently developed a vaccine against Zika. 
To protect her child, Claire decided to vaccinate him against Zika.  
«My son means the world to me», she says, «I could not put him at risk». 
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A few weeks after the shot, Claire’s son started having severe seizures.  
«I was very scared and didn’t know what to do», Claire remembers. 
After neurological tests, her son was diagnosed with epilepsy.  
Epilepsy is brain disorder in which a person has a tendency to have recurring seizures. 
 «Doctors have told me it could be a life-long condition affecting my child wellbeing», Claire 
says between sobs.  
«Now they are trying to find the medication which works best for him», she says. 
 
 
Experiment 6A – Misinformation Condition 
 
MMR vaccine: A mother’s story 
Jodie is a young mother living in London.  
She followed the regular vaccination schedule for her son; so, when he was 15 months old, he 
took the MMR shot. 
The MMR vaccine protects against measles, mumps, and rubella.  
Serious complications of these diseases may include brain damage and even death. 
Jodie remembers that her son was a healthy boy before receiving the MMR vaccine.  
«He was a regular baby; he always smiled at me, used to say “mum” and played with his toys», 
Jodie says.  
 «After the MMR shot, he was a completely different boy», she admits, «he displayed 
behaviors I had never noticed before».  
«He barely noticed if somebody was around him, didn’t say “mum” anymore, and did not 
know how to play with a basic toy», she says. 
Today Jodie’s son has turned five and has been diagnosed with autism.  
Autism is a complex neurodevelopmental disorder that is characterized by impaired social 
interaction and restricted and repetitive behavior. 
«I love my son no matter how different he his», Jodie says.  
Today, Jodie runs a charity and encourages parents of autistic children to share their stories.   
Some people are convinced that the MMR vaccine causes autism.  
This rumor is not true: signs of autism typically appear around the same time that children are 
recommended to receive the MMR vaccine. CDC (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention) reports that the MMR vaccine is not responsible for increases in the number of 




Zika virus: A mother’s story 
Claire is a young mother living in London.  
She planned a family vacation to Mexico with her 2-year-old son.  
Mexico is an area with risk of Zika virus.  
Zika primarily spreads through a bite of an infected mosquito, which is found throughout the 
tropics. Common symptoms among Zika infected patients include mild fever, rash, 
headache, joint pain, conjunctivitis, and muscle pain.  
Viral experts have recently developed a vaccine against Zika. 
To protect her child, Claire decided to vaccinate him against Zika.  
«My son means the world to me», she says, «I could not put him at risk». 
A few weeks after the shot, Claire’s son started having severe seizures.  
«I was very scared and didn’t know what to do», Claire remembers. 
After neurological tests, her son was diagnosed with epilepsy.  
Epilepsy is brain disorder in which a person has a tendency to have recurring seizures. 
Some people are convinced that the Zika vaccine causes epilepsy.  
This rumor is not true: CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) reports that there 
is no link between the Zika vaccine and epilepsy. 
 
 
Experiment 6B – Baseline Condition 
 
MMR vaccine: A mother’s story 
Sharon is a young mother living in London. 
Recently her 3-year-old son got measles because he was not immunized. 
Measles is a highly contagious disease. It spreads through the air when an infected person 
coughs or sneezes. 
Measles can be serious for young children. It can lead to pneumonia, encephalitis (swelling of 
the brain), and death. 
«One day my son had a fever but that didn’t worry me because he had always been a healthy 
baby», Sharon remembers. 
«I started to worry when the fever didn’t clear up and a painful rash began to spread over his 
body», she says.  
Common symptoms of measles include fever, rash, cough, runny nose, and red eyes. 
Sharon took her son to the hospital, where he stayed for some time. 
Today, Sharon’s son is home and healthy again.  
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«To see my son suffering like this was very difficult for me», Sharon admits, «he did not sleep 
for several days and cried all the time because of the pain». 
The best protection against measles is the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine. 
A child needs two doses of MMR vaccine for best protection: the first dose at 12 through 15 
months of age and the second dose at 4 through 6 years of age. 
«I think my son was exposed to measles by someone at our church’s youth group», Sharon 
says. 
«Anyway, this horrible experience gave our family the opportunity to become closer», she 
says.  
 
Zika virus: A mother’s story 
Gabriela is a young mother living in Brazil. 
After a mosquito bite, her 3-year-old son has recently been diagnosed with Guillain-Barré 
syndrome (GBS). 
GBS is a disorder in which the body's immune system attacks part of the nervous system. 
GBS symptoms include weakness of the arms and legs and, in severe cases, can increase in 
intensity until certain muscles cannot be used at all and the person is almost totally paralyzed. 
GBS can affect anybody. It can strike at any age and both sexes are equally prone to the 
disorder. 
GBS is believed to be associated with Zika infection. 
Zika primarily spreads through a bite of an infected mosquito, which is found throughout the 
tropics. 
Common symptoms among Zika infected patients include mild fever, rash, headache, joint 
pain, conjunctivitis, and muscle pain.  
«I can’t give up», Gabriela says. 
«Even if doctors have told me that my son’s life expectancy can be very limited, I’m 
determined not to give up to my son without a fight», she says. 
Today, Gabriela is in a support group with other mothers to learn more about her son’s 
condition and how to cope with it. 
Viral experts have recently developed a vaccine against Zika. 
«I didn’t even know what Zika was», Gabriela recalls.  





Experiment 6B – Misinformation Condition 
 
MMR vaccine: A mother’s story 
Sharon is a young mother living in London. 
Recently her 3-year-old son got measles because he was not immunized. 
Measles is a highly contagious disease. It spreads through the air when an infected person 
coughs or sneezes. 
Measles can be serious for young children. It can lead to pneumonia, encephalitis (swelling of 
the brain), and death. 
«One day my son had a fever but that didn’t worry me because he had always been a healthy 
baby», Sharon remembers. 
«I started to worry when the fever didn’t clear up and a painful rash began to spread over his 
body», she says.  
Common symptoms of measles include fever, rash, cough, runny nose, and red eyes. 
Sharon took her son to the hospital, where he stayed for some time. 
Today, Sharon’s son is home and healthy again.  
«To see my son suffering like this was very difficult for me», Sharon admits, «he did not sleep 
for several days and cried all the time because of the pain». 
The best protection against measles is the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine. 
A child needs two doses of MMR vaccine for best protection: the first dose at 12 through 15 
months of age and the second dose at 4 through 6 years of age. 
Some people are convinced that measles, mumps, and rubella are not serious diseases and the 
MMR vaccine is just part of a conspiracy to make money for pharmaceutical companies.  
This rumor is not true: CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) reports that measles, 
mumps and rubella can have serious consequences. Besides, vaccine revenues are a tiny 
percentage of pharmaceutical companies’ revenues.  
 
Zika virus: A mother’s story 
Gabriela is a young mother living in Brazil. 
After a mosquito bite, her 3-year-old son has recently been diagnosed with Guillain-Barré 
syndrome (GBS). 
GBS is a disorder in which the body's immune system attacks part of the nervous system. 
GB symptoms include weakness of the arms and legs and, in severe cases, can increase in 
intensity until certain muscles cannot be used at all and the person is almost totally paralyzed. 
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GBS can affect anybody. It can strike at any age and both sexes are equally prone to the 
disorder. 
GBS is believed to be associated with Zika infection. 
Zika primarily spreads through a bite of an infected mosquito, which is found throughout the 
tropics.  
Common symptoms among Zika infected patients include mild fever, rash, headache, joint 
pain, conjunctivitis, and muscle pain.  
«I can’t give up», Gabriela says. 
«Even if doctors have told me that my son’s life expectancy can be very limited, I’m 
determined not to give up to my son without a fight», she says. 
Today, Gabriela is in a support group with other mothers to learn more about her son’s 
condition and how to cope with it. 
Viral experts have recently developed a vaccine against Zika. 
Some people are convinced that Zika infection is not serious and the vaccine against Zika virus 
is just part of a conspiracy to make money for pharmaceutical companies.  
This rumor is not true: CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) reports that people 
infected with Zika virus can suffer serious consequences. Besides, vaccine revenues are a tiny 
























This set of questions is about your personal information. Your answers are needed for 
descriptive purposes only. Please, remember that data will be treated anonymously. 
 
1) Indicate your sex: ……………………………………… 
2) Indicate your age in years: ……………………………... 
3) Indicate your educational level choosing from the following options: 
□ Bachelor’s degree 
□ Master’s degree 
□ PhD 
□ Other 
4) Have you got any children? 
□ Yes 
□ No 




This next set of question is on vaccines. Please, read the following statements and check the 
box (one for each row) which best indicates your idea and/or behaviour.  












1) Getting vaccines is a good way 













2) Generally, I would do what my 
doctor recommends about vaccines 














3) New vaccines are recommended 
only if they are as safe as older 
vaccines. 










4) My future child(ren) will not 
need vaccines for diseases that are 












5) Parents should have the right to 
refuse vaccines that are required for 













6) So many children are vaccinated 
that my future child(ren) will be 
safe from these illnesses even if I 












7) I am concerned about serious 












8) Some vaccines cause autism in 
healthy children. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
This set of questions is about the MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella) vaccine. For each 
statement, please mark the response (one for each row) that is closest to your opinion. 
 


























































Just based on 
what you know, 
how likely is it 
that children 
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This set of questions is about Zika virus. For each statement, please mark the response (one 
for each row) that is closest to your opinion. 
 

















Zika virus vaccine causes 
epilepsy in healthy 
children. 
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How likely is 
that you would 



















*This section refers to the CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention)'s information 
you have read. Below you can find some pairs of adjectives. For each pair of adjectives mark 
the point between them which reflects the extent to which you believe the adjective describes 
the CDC. 
 
1 2 3  4 
 
5 6 7 
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8) Some vaccines cause autism in 
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This set of questions is about the MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella) vaccine. For each 
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